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THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
1950-1966

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THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
1950-1966


OTR-11

by

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Approved by:


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Director of Training
Directorate for
Management and Services
June 1973

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Foreword

In preparing the material for the writing of this report on the Junior Officer Training Program, the historian was confronted with an embarrassment of riches. The records of the origin of the program and its later development have been kept with meticulous care and nice discrimination; all of the basic documents were preserved, key papers related to change and expansion were kept in logical order, and notes on significant details were retained to lend color and life to the chronology. The historian's tasks here were basically those of selection, interpretation, evaluation, and -- finally, of course -- the compression of a host of documentary information into a coherent and readable story. Whatever success he may have achieved should be credited to those unheralded people who, over the years, have kept the records of the Junior Officer Training Program with what must have been a feeling of personal involvement.

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THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM

1950 - 1966

I. Origin and Early Development

A. Background

The origin and early development of the Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP) can best be described against the background out of which the program arose. In a real sense, the program was a product of the pressures of the time. The following paragraphs identify those pressures and describe the responses to them.

1. The Agency Climate, October 1950. On 7 October 1950, when General Walter B. Smith became the Director of Central Intelligence, 1/* CIA was little more than three years old and was still in a stage of organizational infancy. Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, whom Smith succeeded, had been DCI both before and after the activation of CIA in September 1947 -- before, of course, as the director of the Central Intelligence Group -- and had nurtured the new Agency through the early formative years. Smith faced the problem of bringing the Agency to maturity and building an organization that would have

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix D.

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the full capability of meeting the responsibilities outlined in the National Security Act of 1947 and satisfying the many and varied requirements implicit in those responsibilities -- requirements that appeared to multiply geometrically with the advent of the Korean War.

In October 1950 most of the intelligence officers in the Agency were men who had served in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, had stayed with the Strategic Services Unit after OSS was abolished, and had come to CIA through the short-lived CIG organization. They were competent, experienced intelligence officers, but they constituted only a cadre; the cadre was quite capable of providing the leadership needed at the time, but there was no reservoir of experienced manpower from which future leaders could be drawn. Neither was there, of course, any facility -- either academic or government -- capable of developing a reservoir of trained intelligence officers.

At the time, the Agency did have an excellent training component, the OSO/OPC Training Division (TRD), but the work of the TRD was oriented toward specialized training in the specific skills necessary to the conduct of clandestine activities. There was no systematic program directed toward the recruiting and training of

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people for the intelligence profession. Smith was faced, then, with the problem of building for the future without a reliable source of building materials. The establishment of the JOT program was a concrete manifestation of his determination to solve the problem.

2. The Appointment of Colonel Baird.* An interesting example of the development of organizational mythology is the generally accepted belief in the Agency, particularly in OTR, that late in 1950 Smith arranged with the US Air Force to have Colonel Matthew Baird recalled to active duty and assigned to the Agency to organize and develop a program designed to train people for the intelligence profession. Baird himself had no part in the generation of this myth; indeed, he did everything that he could to dispel the illusion. It persisted, however, and actually it did no real harm; but the historical record need not be garnished with myth.

Baird was on active duty with the US Army throughout World War II, primarily as a troop commander in the Pacific Theater of Operations. After the war, he was detached to inactive-duty status, and when the US Air Force was established in 1947 he became a

* The factual information in this section is based on Matthew Baird's recollections of the period. 2/

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member of the Air Force Reserve. After the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, Baird was recalled to active duty, and in November he reported to the Pentagon without any knowledge of what his assignment would be.

At the same time that Smith was appointed DCI in October 1950, William H. Jackson, a prominent New York attorney who had served the government in an important civilian role during World War II, was appointed Deputy to Smith.* Jackson and Baird had been roommates at Princeton University during their undergraduate years and had continued a close friendship thereafter. Jackson knew, of course, that Baird had been recalled to active duty and had not been assigned; he also knew that Baird had had experience in the administration of educational programs and had, in his military role as troop commander, demonstrated a high capability in the direction and management of people.

* Jackson resigned from staff status in the Agency on 23 August 1951 but continued to serve as Special Assistant and Senior Consultant to the DCI. He was followed in the DDCI position by Allen W. Dulles.

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The juxtaposition of the two events -- Baird's recall to active duty and Smith's urgent need for a man to develop and manage a career development program -- was a fortuitous one, and Jackson took the logical step. He recommended that Smith take the action necessary to have Baird assigned to the Agency under the established Air Force allotment of officers to CIA. During November 1950 Jackson arranged to have Baird meet Smith -- without informing Baird of the real reason for the meeting. There followed two or three other meetings, ostensibly social ones, during which Smith and Baird discussed -- within a more-or-less abstract military context -- the problems of officer development and career management.

During this period Baird was waiting for the Pentagon's decision on his assignment; according to his recollection of the situation, he was completely surprised when Smith told him what that assignment would be. Apparently neither Baird nor the Agency waited for the official papers on the assignment. There is in official files a document -- cited in the following section of this history -- obviously prepared by Baird and dated 30 November 1950; and CIA General Order 38, "Designation of CIA Officials," dated 1 December 1950,

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lists Baird as Director of Training. Baird recalls that the Air Force orders assigning him to the Agency carried an effective date of 2 January 1951. Whatever the cause of the discrepancy -- faulty recollection or bureaucratic expediency -- it has no bearing on the origin of the JOT program or on the emergence of the career service concept of which the program was a part.

There was, however, another factor in the appointment of Baird that did have a bearing. That was Smith's decision to bring into the Agency from the outside a man to develop the career service. There was in the Agency at the time a Personnel Office with a competent senior officer in charge, and career development was a standard function of the personnel component of an organization -- including military organizations. The probable explanation of Smith's deviation from standard practice is that the senior personnel officer was not a military man, and Smith felt that only a military officer could do the kind of job he wanted done. The consequences of Smith's action were serious and lasting. Most of the senior officers of the Agency at the time were members of the OSS alumni club; Baird was an intruder -- without any intelligence experience whatever -- brought in to do a job that could have been done by a member of the club; he was looked upon

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as Smith's "boy," and the club members resented him. This resentment was open and obvious during the early years of Baird's service with the Agency, and vestiges of it were apparent in the years that followed. Undoubtedly it was a major factor in the rough treatment that most of the senior officers gave to Baird's formal proposal for the establishment of a career service in the Agency -- a situation that is described in some detail in an earlier history.*

3. Emergence of the Career Service Concept.** Unfortunately, but understandably, no records were kept of the informal discussions, both before and after Baird's appointment, in which Smith described for Baird his concept of what an Agency career service should be. Such records might have explained the motivations behind some of Baird's subsequent actions -- and, of course, might have identified the origin of the troublesome "elite corps" label, which is reviewed below. In any event, there were a number of such discussions; and before Baird took any action at all, he was thoroughly familiar with Smith's ideas and desires.

* OTR-5, pp. 26-33.

** The undocumented information in this section is based on Baird's recollections. See footnote, p. 3, above.

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These ideas and desires first appeared in document form in a 30 November 1950 paper prepared by Baird and submitted to the "Executive" (a title which was changed in December 1950 to Deputy Director for Administration -- DDA), under whom Baird's program was initially placed.* This paper was a "Proposal" of the function of the Director of Training (DTR). 3/ It reflected Smith's conviction that the DTR should be "responsible for developing and directing all Agency training programs," and it listed two specific functions. The first of these was the DTR's responsibility to "design, establish and direct a program for the pre-employment selection, guidance and development of individuals for careers" in the Agency. The second was the responsibility to "design, direct the establishment of, and supervise an orientation and in-service training program for all staff employees."

The first of these two proposed specific functions contains all but one of the basic elements of what later became the JOT Program: pre-employment selection, guidance, and development; the one element that is not included is post-training job placement. The paper's brief description of this first specific function contains some elements that

* In 1952 the Office of Training was removed from the DDA area, and the DTR reported directly to the Office of the DCI.

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were not subsequently adopted as parts of the JOT program: the tailoring of an individual "development" program for each of the trainees, and the selection of trainees "no later than college graduation (or its vocational equivalent) but in most cases not later than the sophomore year." Between 30 November 1950 and 3 July 1951, when a more detailed proposal was submitted, both of these elements were dropped.* The 30 November 1950 proposal was marked "O.K." and initialed by the DDA, Murray McConnel; and Baird began immediately to put the first function into action. By mid-July 1951, a group of professional trainees had been recruited, screened, selected, and entered on duty in a training status.**

Having initiated action on that part of Smith's career service concept that could be started without getting enmeshed in the Agency's complex coordination machinery, Baird went to work on a detailed proposal for the creation of a career service development program. By the end of June 1951, the work had been completed, and on 3 July the DTR submitted to the DCI "A Proposal to Establish and Implement

* See below, p. 43.

** See below, p. 13.

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a Career Corps Program in CIA." 4/ This was a 72-page staff study of which the first 18 pages were devoted to discussion; 18 appendixes followed. In essence, the study proposed two programs which, together, would constitute the Career Corps Program: a program to "select, recruit, and train young men and women of great promise, and to place them in the Agency where they will be of the greatest use" and a program to "devise a method of identifying those employees of the Agency who have the highest potential for further development; to train and rotate them within and outside the Agency in such a way that they will develop the greatest usefulness to the Agency; and to place them in the most important positions." 5/

The first of these two programs, of course, was already in motion at the time the staff study was submitted. The second ran into rough going at the outset and -- except for a short-lived adaptation of it under the direction of the Office of Personnel* -- never did develop as Baird had proposed. As noted above,** the problems of the second program, identified as the "Career Corps Candidate" program in the

* See below, p. 74.

** See footnote, p. 7, above.

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staff study -- are discussed in an earlier historical paper and will be discussed here only to the extent that the program affected or was affected by the JOT program, which is identified in the staff study as the "Professional Trainee" program. It would be of interest, however, to mention at this point that the problems of the "Career Corps Candidate" program were foreshadowed very early in the game. After Smith received Baird's 3 July staff study, he sent it to the Assistant Director for Personnel for comment; implementation of both phases of the overall career corps program would require the closest coordination of the training office and the personnel office. On 24 July the Assistant Director for Personnel, Brigadier General F. Trubee Davison, USA, responded to the DCI. 6/ In the fourth paragraph of his memorandum, he said that he was "in hearty accord with the proposal, subject to the above minor qualifications. . . ." The minor qualifications included one that said,

Because the Agency is generally understaffed now and in order to gain the essential cooperations of the Assistant Directors, I suggest that rotation of the present Agency employees selected for the Career Corps be delayed until operating offices are nearer to their table of organization goals.

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Davison's memorandum was returned to him with a "1st Indorsement": "I do so approve. W.B.S." The delay, then, was recommended and approved; and thereby hangs the unhappy tale of the gradual demise of a part of the career corps concept. The other part of it, however, was very much alive.

B. The First Professional Trainees

Following the DDA's approval of Baird's 30 November 1950 proposal of the functions of the DTR, a personnel allotment of 100 "professional trainee" positions to be filled from "academic sources" had been granted to OTR. 7/ The Agency's field recruiters had been informed of the new program, and Baird and his chief assistant at the time, [REDACTED] had established informal contacts within the faculties of several universities. By March 1951 recruiting was in progress; by April a general program for training the recruits had been designed; and the first training was scheduled to begin on 9 July. 8/ The following paragraphs will describe the general background and qualifications of the group that entered this first program, the content of the training given them, and the management of the program.

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1. Background and Qualifications. The first group of professional trainees began the training program on 9 July 1951, as scheduled. There were 17 people in the group, 16 men and one woman. The youngest student was 21; the oldest was 28; the average age was 24. All of them had Bachelor degrees, three had M.A.'s, and three had LL.B.'s. The colleges and universities they had attended were Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Williams, Syracuse, Wesleyan, George Washington, Smith, Oxford, Wisconsin, and Denver. Seven of the students had majored in Political Science and five in Economics; the other major fields of study were English, Law, History, Psychology, Philosophy, French Literature, and Public Administration. Within the group there was some degree of fluency in Latin, Greek, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and Norwegian. Nine of them had completed military service, and eight had had foreign residence or travel.

In a general sense, this first group established the pattern of backgrounds and qualifications that was to characterize the JOT program thereafter. In later years there was, of course, a great increase in the number and geographical spread of colleges and universities represented, and there was an increase in both the average

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age level and the relative number of graduate degrees. It is altogether remarkable, however, that only seven months after the junior professional trainee concept had been approved, standards and procedures had been established and a group of prototype trainees had been recruited and processed and entered into a training program.

2. The Training Program. The original program designed for the JOT's* called for 14 weeks of formal training and two or three months of on-the-job training. The 14-week segment of the program consisted of mornings devoted to the study of the nature and function of intelligence and afternoons spent in study of the Russian language. The students were enrolled in the Basic Intelligence Course then being given by the Training (Overt) component of OTR. The Russian language study was done [REDACTED] with which OTR had 25X1A established an external training contract; at that time, the Agency had no internal capability for foreign language training.

* This term was not applied to the junior professional trainees in 1951; it is used here in the interests of convenience and clarity. The first term used for the group was "Career Corps Candidates" (p. 11, above). The JOT designation was first used in September 1952 (p. 92, below). In April 1965 the designation was changed to CT -- Career Trainees (pp. 51 and 138, below). The term used for the program was changed in the same sequence -- from Career Corps Candidate Program to Junior Officer Training Program to Career Training Program.

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The on-the-job segment of the training program began after the completion of the 14 weeks of formal training. The students retained their OTR personnel slots and were assigned to the Agency's substantive divisions for periods of time usually determined by the divisions. At the completion of the period of on-the-job training, the students were assigned to the divisions in which they had been working, if the assignment was mutually agreeable, or were given a different on-the-job training assignment if such a course seemed warranted. The post-training duty assignments of the first group of trainees were all to non-clandestine components of the Agency. At that time, there were still formidable barriers between the Agency's overt and clandestine elements; not until early 1953 did the Clandestine Services begin to accept JOT's.

3. Program Management. The management of the first group of JOT's was initially handled by Baird and his chief assistant, [REDACTED] -- both of whom, of course, had other jobs to do. It was apparent from the outset that the management of the program would be a full-time job, and Baird persuaded [REDACTED] to come into the Agency for a one-year period to manage the JOT program. [REDACTED] entered on duty on

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30 September 1951 and took over the program. 9/ His staff consisted of one clerk-stenographer at the time; in February 1952 an additional clerical person was assigned to the staff.

By the time that [REDACTED] took over the job, the trainee group on board had increased; and by the end of 1951, there were 37 students in the program. 10/ [REDACTED] actually stayed with the Agency only until 13 April 1952. Because his service was clearly understood to be temporary, Baird had sought for a permanent chief of the program; and on 20 February 1952, [REDACTED] reported for duty. [REDACTED] took over the position of chief when [REDACTED] left. By April 1952, the "military agreements" phase of the JOT program had been established, and [REDACTED] was temporarily assigned to the staff to handle it. Thus when [REDACTED] became Chief, JOTP, his staff consisted of two clerical aides and one temporary training officer. Perhaps it should be noted at this point that -- as will become apparent later in this history -- the growth and outstanding success of the JOT program were largely the result of [REDACTED] dedication to the program, his tireless efforts to keep the quality high, and his wisdom and forbearance in facing the many problems that had to be solved during his eleven years as chief.

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C. The Military Service Agreements*

1. Background. One of the major problems that faced the designers of the professional trainee program at the outset was the immediate draft eligibility of most young men at the completion of their academic studies. The colleges and universities of the country were to be the major sources of recruits for the program, and obviously these sources would not be very productive unless some method was found whereby the Agency could recruit draft-eligible young men. This problem must have been discussed at some length during those early unrecorded conversations between Smith and Baird, and a plan must have been made. In March 1951 Smith initiated the action to implement the plan.** Baird's 3 July staff study does not include the plan, but it does indicate clearly that one had been developed. The study includes a flow-chart showing how the professional trainee program would work, from the selection of the trainee to his post-training placement. 11/ In the recruitment and processing segment of that

* The subject of the Agency's relationships with the military services and with the Selective Service is covered in greater detail in Support Services Historical paper OP-5, Mobilization and Military Personnel Division, 1946-70, by [REDACTED] September 1971, S.

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** See footnote, p. 19, below.

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chart, there is a dotted-line box -- all of the other boxes on the chart are solid-line boxes -- in which appears the legend: "Men who have not satisfied their military obligation go into one of the services at our discretion." Also in the study there is an appendix titled "Arrangements with Armed Forces for Training of Professional Trainees," and beneath the title appears this notation: "This appendix will be written when negotiations with the Department of Defense are successfully completed." 12/

By 3 July 1951, then, a plan had been developed, and the implementation of it was in progress. Actually, there was already at that time a near prototype for such a plan. As of 1 June 1951 there was an allowance of 401 active-duty commissioned military personnel assigned to the Agency, and 385 were on board. 13/ Baird mentions this fact in his 3 July staff study -- not as a prototype for the military agreements related to professional trainees but as a segment of the on-duty Agency personnel that should be included in the Career Corps program.

Needless to say, the implementation of the military service agreements and the subsequent coordination of them involved massive paper work, and it would be unprofitable here to give a step-by-step

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chronology of the action.* The following paragraphs, then, limit discussion to a summary treatment of the agreements themselves, the procedures followed to put them into action, the major problems that developed, and an evaluation of the military service phase of the overall JOT program. Details of situations and developments are included only when those details serve to clarify by illustration and exemplification.

2. The Basic Agreements. The basic agreements between the Agency and the four military services -- Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps -- were negotiated and established between March and September 1951.** The original proposals submitted to the Department of Defense and the four component services were signed by Smith, and there was no delay in the affirmative responses to them. Essentially the four agreements were the same: the military service would accept for officer candidate training a quota-determined number of young men nominated by the Agency, would provide the training necessary to qualify them for commissions, and would then return

* Copies of all of the basic documents involved are available in the files of the OTR Career Training Staff.

** The initial proposal was made in a 5 March 1951 letter from Smith to the Secretary of Defense. 14/

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them to the Agency to serve in an active-duty status until the time when their military obligation had been completed and they could be converted to civilian status. These agreements were not restricted to young men recruited for the Agency's professional trainee program; on-duty employees of the Agency were also covered. 15/

There were, of course, certain restrictions common to all four agreements and some differences among the agreements. The common restrictions were those prohibiting the Agency from recruiting people already on active duty with one of the military services, graduates of the service academies, and people who had completed an ROTC program in a college or university.* The differences among the four agreements were those related to the quotas of Agency-sponsored OCS trainees and the duration of military training before the return of the trainees to the Agency. These differences are specified below.

* In 1954 the ROTC restriction was removed from the Army agreement and in 1956 from the Air Force agreement, and the Agency was permitted to recruit college graduates with reserve commissions.

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3. Procedures. The military agreements, necessarily, were predicated on the assumption that the Agency would make the necessary preliminary arrangements with the Selective Service Commission. In September 1951, such arrangements were made by Smith with the Director of Selective Service. Basically, the agreement provided that Selective Service would approve official Agency requests for the draft deferment of specified individuals with the provision that the individuals would be entered into a military Officer Candidate School within six months after the granting of the deferment. There was also a provision whereby the Agency could request a "stay of induction" for an individual after his local draft board had notified him of his induction date; the stay of induction could be requested for 60, 90, or 120 days, and only one stay-of-induction request for any one individual would be honored.

Although the arrangement with the Selective Service authorities was generally workable, it was not flexible enough to accommodate the Agency's security clearance procedures -- particularly when the stay-of-induction device was used. A candidate could not be assured of admission to the Agency's program until he had been fully cleared, and all too often there was a breath-held finish in the race to

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complete the security check before the expiration of the stay of induction. In May 1953 the DTR partially solved this problem by arranging for the provisional clearance of candidates for the JOT Officer Candidate School program. 16/

The procedures for the selection of JOT-OCS candidates for acceptance in the Agency program were the same as those applied to other JOTP candidates; they will be described in some detail later in this history. After selection and clearance, the JOT-OCS trainee entered on duty with the Agency and, along with the non-OCS JOT's, completed the first segment of the training program -- the Basic Intelligence Course or its later equivalent. Thereafter he went through the military enlistment procedures and was assigned to one of the four military services -- usually the one of his choice -- for officer candidate training.

The procedures in the OCS training varied with the individual services. The Army trainees were first processed for basic training -- early in the program at Fort Meade, Maryland, and after 1953 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. At the completion of basic training, the trainees -- without attending "Leadership School" -- were sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, for Officer Candidate School. Before August 1953

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there were two possible types of assignment for the trainee after completing OCS: if the Agency planned to assign the trainee only to headquarters duty after completion of his OCS training, he would be assigned directly to CIA on active-duty status; if the Agency planned to use the man in an overseas assignment, he would be assigned to a one-year tour of duty with a military component overseas. This option feature was a part of the original basic agreement with the Army -- as it was with the other three services -- and the determination of the option was to be made by the Agency. In August 1953, on the recommendation of [REDACTED] Chief of the JOTP, the option feature was eliminated from all four of the military agreements, and all JOT-OCS trainees were assigned to troop or ship duty before returning to the Agency.

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In either event -- whether the trainee returned to the Agency at the completion of OCS or at the completion of a tour of duty abroad -- he was re-entered into the JOT program for whatever formal and on-the-job training was required at the time of his return. He then remained on active-duty status, assigned to the Agency, until the expiration of his required period of military service, and then converted to civilian status as a staff employee of the Agency.

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The OCS training procedures in the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps followed the same general pattern as those of the Army. The Navy OCS trainees reported directly to the OCS at Newport, Rhode Island. After they finished the course, the Agency had the same general assignment option described above; the Navy's requirement for preparation for Agency service overseas was one year of sea duty. Air Force trainees reported to Lackland Air Force Base at San Antonio, Texas, for both basic training and OCS. The overseas preparation requirement was also one year of service abroad, but the Air Force offered additional options; Agency-sponsored OCS graduates could be sent to the Army Language School at Monterey, California, or to one or another of the Air Force special schools, including the Strategic Intelligence School. Marine Corps OCS trainees were sent to Quantico, Virginia, for ten weeks of basic training after which they were commissioned and given a 22-week Basic Officers' Course. Although the Agency's agreement with the Marine Corps included the option clause, the Corps strongly recommended that all Agency-sponsored Marine officers serve a year of active duty with the Corps; otherwise, they could not properly represent themselves as Marine Corps Officers.

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In addition to the clause in the basic Army Agreement permitting optional assignment after OCS, there was a clause permitting the Agency to request a waiver for any JOT-OCS trainee who, during the basic training period, developed a physical condition that would disqualify him for OCS but was not serious enough to disqualify him for enlisted service. The waiver would permit the man to enter OCS and return to the Agency for the completion of his military service. 17/

4. Problems

a. The Quotas. The original agreements with the military services established a quota of 180 positions that could be used by the Agency for the JOT-OCS program -- 50 Army, 65 Air Force, 55 Navy, and 10 Marine Corps. For some unexplained reason, perhaps clerical error, the Chief of the Military Personnel Division of the Personnel Office informed the DTR in a 21 August 1951 memorandum that the total quota was 150 positions -- 57 Army, 50 Air Force, 36 Navy, and 7 Marine Corps -- and assigned individual quotas based on those figures to the operating offices throughout the Agency. 18/ Baird recognized the error but accepted the figures because correction of it would mean a revision of the quotas already assigned to the various Agency

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offices and also because at the time it was obvious that the actual intake of JOT-OCS trainees would fall far below the total 150 figure.

19/ His second reason foreshadowed the course of future events.

More than a year later, in October 1952, only 18 of the 57 Army, 14 of the 50 Air Force, 15 of the 36 Navy, and 3 of the 7 Marine Corps positions had been filled, a total of 50 of the 150 available slots. 20/ Actually, these figures did not indicate a recruiting shortfall. The OCS programs and the subsequent time on active duty covered a period of about three years; if recruiting had continued at the rate indicated by the October 1952 figures and there had been no trainee attrition, the quotas would have been filled by the end of 1954. Recruiting did not continue at the same rate, however, and there was some attrition. In February 1953 there were 12 JOT-OCS trainees who had returned to the Agency after the military phase of their training and 43 who were at some point within the military phases -- a total of 55 in the overall program. 21/ In April 1954, more than a year later, the total was still the same, 22/ and it remained at that approximate level thereafter.

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The failure of the JOT-OCS program to achieve and maintain a full-quota level is explained by two conditions. First, the program was initiated soon after the Korean War began; and in the hot-war climate at the time, it appeared that it would be both in great demand by draft-eligible young men and of great benefit to the Agency. The demand never actually developed. Second, the rate of attrition in the JOT-OCS program was greater than had been anticipated. Some students dropped out during the OCS phase, some elected to remain in the military services and not return to the Agency, and some resigned from the Agency at the completion of the required service period. From the beginning of the program in 1951 to the end of 1959, for example, 152 young men -- about 30 percent of all of the males recruited for the JOT program -- had been entered into the JOT-OCS agreements. Of these 152 JOT-OCS trainees, 69 had either dropped out, stayed in the military service, or resigned from the Agency. 23/ The rate of attrition was very high, and the input to the program was not keeping pace. In calendar year 1958, for example, only 14 trainees entered the program and in 1959 only nine. 24/

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b. The 1956 IG Report. The high rate of attrition in the JOT-OCS program had become a matter of concern to the Agency as early as 1955. During the latter part of that year, the CIA Inspector General conducted a survey of the JOT program; and in his report, released in February 1956, he recommended that the OCS phase of the program be terminated -- giving the attrition rate as his major reason for the recommendation. 25/ In March 1956 the DDS proposed to the DCI that action on the IG's recommendation be deferred for one year, and the DCI approved. 26/

In December 1956 the DDS asked Baird* for his comments on the IG's proposal. In April 1957 Baird replied. 28/ He admitted that the attrition rate had been high -- of the total of 70 JOT-OCS trainees up to that date, only 36 were still with the Agency, an attrition rate of 48.6 percent -- but insisted that the program had advantages that more than offset the one disadvantage; and he described those advantages in detail. He recommended continuation of the

* Baird retained his military rank until 22 June 1953, when he reverted to civilian status. 27/

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JOT-OCS program. On 5 April the DDS approved the DTR's recommendation; on 10 April General Charles P. Cabell, then Acting DCI, approved it; and thereafter the program continued. 29/

c. Changes in Agreements. Through the 1951-66 period alterations were proposed, and many made, in the OCS agreements with the military services. Most of these had little direct bearing on the management and conduct of the JOT-OCS program, but all of them posed problems. Some of the minor changes have been noted above -- the termination of the "option" clause in the agreements and the lifting of the ROTC restriction, for example. There were, however, a few changes that were of some importance and warrant mention here.

In 1955 the Navy informed the Agency that the salaries and other costs of maintaining the JOT-OCS trainees during the required year of sea duty would have to be paid by the Agency. Dulles, then the DCI, objected strongly to this, and there was no compromise; the Navy agreement was terminated. 30/ Before the end of 1959, the Army OCS agreement was abandoned because virtually none of the JOT-OCS trainees could be persuaded to elect the Army OCS program.* 31/

* In September 1966, a new agreement with the Army was negotiated, and the Army OCS program was resumed.

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The Army agreement on ROTC, negotiated in 1957, continued in force, however. Early in 1962 the Air Force decided to send the Agency trainees to their Officer Training School (OTS) instead of their OCS.

32/ The change did not affect the procedures involved in the program, but it created a paper-work problem.

5. Conclusions. The military services agreements and the programs that were developed to implement them never did, perhaps, come up to what was expected of them. The paper work, the coordination, and the actual management of the programs created a major and continuing demand for the expenditure of personnel time and effort; and, quantitatively, the end product was slight in terms of the intake of permanent career intelligence officers for the Agency. Perhaps the best justification for the JOT-OCS program -- a justification that was as valid at the end of 1965 as it was in 1957 -- is that presented by Baird in his 1 April 1957 memorandum recommending that the program not be terminated 33/:

Through this program the Agency is able to recruit many able employees who otherwise would not be attracted to CIA.

Those who remain with us after completing active duty are of very high quality and represent a substantial gain to the Agency.

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All do valuable work while with the Agency, and those who remain are well prepared, through training and work experience, to carry on in responsible assignments.

Experience in the Program will motivate some who leave either to continue their education or to try other work, to return later to CIA.

All participants develop a good cover status which can be extremely useful in subsequent activities.

Those who leave us constitute an informed "Alumni Association" which may be of very considerable potential value to the Agency.

D. The Elite Corps Concept

Any historical account of the origin and development of the JOT program would be remiss if it failed to describe, in at least some measure, the unhappy emergence of the "elite corps" concept -- if concept it was -- and the oftentimes troublesome consequence of that emergence. Other Agency historians have discussed it, some in a veritable orgy of scholarly footnoting 34/ and in an earlier historical paper the present writer dismissed it with a curt footnote: "The origin of the term 'elite corps', as applied to the OTR Junior Officer Training Program, has been a subject for extensive and interesting, but unproductive, controversy." 35/ Neither the writers of the scholarly dissection nor the writer of the curt dismissal, however, had access

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to all the sources at the time of writing -- or, rather, to the one most illuminating source, the recollections of Baird. Subsequently, Baird's recall of the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the elite corps concept became available; the following account is a collation of Baird's written recollections and the evidence furnished by the relevant documents.

The first documentary mention of the elite corps -- the one that started all the trouble -- appeared in Appendix I (eye) of Baird's 3 July 1951 staff study proposing the establishment of a career corps in the Agency. 36/ The title of Appendix I is Identification of Career Corps: Career Management Program. The first sentence under the title is "In this study of career or career management development there is carried forward the conception of a limited and elite group implied in General Smith's letter to the Honorable John McCloy, 17 March 1951." In the Introduction section of the staff study, that part of Smith's letter containing the "implication" is quoted:

I am trying to build up a corps of well qualified men here who are interested in making a career with the Central Intelligence Agency. To effect this, I recently established a training section which functions -- as much as I dislike the term -- as a sort of career management office.

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Obviously, the quotation is given to establish the fact that a career corps program was Smith's idea and desire. Equally obviously, it is difficult to find in Smith's words any implication of an elite corps concept.

This, at least, was the conclusion reached by the chiefs of all the CIA Offices and Area Divisions after the staff study was sent to them on 7 August 1951 with a request for their written comments. 37/ On 13 September the DTR sent to the DCI a summary of the written comments submitted by the Office and Area Division chiefs; there was disagreement "in some quarters," support for basic principles in others, and "general approval" of OTR's recruitment and training plans and career management proposals; there was, however, "unanimous disapproval" of the "elite corps" concept. 38/ On 17 September, the career corps proposal was discussed at the DCI's staff conference, and the DCI concluded the discussion by vetoing the elite corps aspect of the plan. 39/

Thus the elite corps concept died in conference. Its ghost, however, continued to inhabit the halls of the Agency and haunt the Office of Training. Any criticism, no matter how inconsequential, of the JOT program or of anyone connected with it was sure to include

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reference to the elite corps concept, and gradually the phrase "elite corps" acquired the connotations of snobbism and preferential treatment.*

So much for what the documentary evidence -- or part of it -- reveals about the emergence and official demise of the elite corps concept. As usual, however, the documentary evidence does not tell the whole story -- and, of course, there were bits and pieces of documentary evidence that were ignored when Baird was branded with the stigma of having originated the elite corps concept and, by implication, attributing its origin to Smith. With the aid of Baird's recollections, the introduction of additional documentary evidence, and some judicious speculation,** perhaps the whole story can be told.

Baird recalls that during those early, unrecorded conversations with Smith about developing a corps of professional intelligence officers, Smith frequently used the "elite corps" term and even used the German

* As late as March 1971, the ghost was summoned to bolster an official request that the CT (formerly JOT) program be "re-examined." The document says that "the danger of elitism, always present in the CT program, has been considerably heightened. . . . Many CT's expect quick advancement and good assignments simply because 'they are superior.'" 40/

** The speculation is that of the writer of this history -- not Baird's.

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General Staff concept as an analogy. Against this background there was, indeed, in the General's letter to Mr. McCloy an elite corps implication. The Office and Area Division chiefs did not, of course, have this background; and when they unanimously objected to the elite corps idea -- attributing it to Baird, at that time an inexperienced upstart in the intelligence business -- Smith apparently found it politic to agree with them without revealing his own part in the origin of the idea. In all justice to Smith, it should be remembered that he was relatively new on the job, most of his Office and Area Division chiefs were old hands well established in the organization, and he had to depend upon their support. Permitting Baird to carry the elite corps onus on his back was, perhaps, a justifiable compromise with his conscience.

One factor that was, oddly, ignored in assigning the elite corps stigma to the JOT program was Baird's documentary exclusion of the JOT phase of the career corps program from elite corps status. His basic proposal was that there would be two separate phases in the overall program: the Professional Trainee (JOT) phase in which promising young people would be selected and trained for employment in the Agency, and the Career Corps phase in which Agency employees

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who had been on duty for at least two years would be selected and identified as career corps members. The proposal made it quite clear that the JOT's would not be eligible for career corps status until after they had completed the training program and had been on duty for at least two years. Thus, if the career corps was to be the elite corps the JOT's could not possibly be among the initial elite. In fact Baird made this quite clear in his 3 July 1951 proposal. In his discussion of the basic training of professional trainees he stated that "before trainees enter on duty, they will have been clearly informed that they are not an elite corps, and that their future in the Agency depends on their performance." 41/ Earlier in the staff study, in his proposal of the use of University Contacts in the recruitment of the professional trainees, Baird states that "at no time will the contact give the applicant the impression that he is being selected as a member of an elite corps, but rather that he will be given an opportunity to prove by his own performance that he is entitled to training and opportunity for advancement."* 42/ The JOT program, then, acquired the elite corps stigma

* The underlining appears in the text of the staff study.

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in spite of the fact that the program was specifically and firmly excluded from elite corps status. It is not difficult to assume that it was a case of guilt by association.

It is difficult, however, to understand the immediate and unanimous rejection of the elite corps phrase by the Office and Area Division chiefs. After all, the difference between "elite corps" and "career corps" is only one of semantics. Perhaps the explanation -- and the historical value of what may seem to be a somewhat lengthy digression -- lies in the fact that in July 1951 there was already a thriving elite corps in the Agency, and most of the Office and Area Division chiefs were either members of it or aspired to become at least associate members of it. Baird's -- or Smith's -- proposal of an elite corps not only threatened the organizational integrity of the existing elite corps but also -- and, perhaps, worse -- displayed a lack of understanding that an elite corps existed.

The elite-corps-in-being had no name, of course, no tangible charter, and no visible badge of membership; but it did exist, its members were known to each other, and it had a well developed mutual protective system. It was referred to by non-members -- often with ill disguised envy -- as the "OSS Alumni Association," the "DDP Club,"

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or the "Alpha Chapter of Omega Sigma Sigma." Again, lest injustice be done by implication, it should be remembered that this group really was "elite" in many respects, and there was good reason for its existence. The members were professional intelligence officers who had survived, sometimes literally, trial by fire; and they were engaged in an esoteric business the success of which, they were convinced, depended upon tight compartmentation. Certainly it was not their pride, their privacy, or their privileges that they wanted to protect but the standards of their profession. They may have felt that a second, but officially recognized, elite corps in the Agency would threaten those standards.

One might infer from this discussion so far that the elite corps label served as a whip or a goad that could be handily used against the JOT program and that Baird and the JOT staff were entirely innocent of any inclination toward the creation of an elite group. The actual JOT program procedures, however, suggested that the JOT's were, in fact, considered a bit above the level of common men. For example, after 1953 when the JOT's began to EOD in groups rather than singly, the first group exercise was an assembly at which the students were addressed not only by the DTR and the chief of the JOT program but

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also by the DCI or the DDCI and often the Inspector General. Other young professionals entering on duty with the Agency might meet briefly with the chief of the Office, Staff, or Area Division in which they would work, but they seldom met or saw any official at a higher level. Throughout the JOT program, particularly at the end of the individual training courses, very senior Agency officials would address the groups or mingle with the members during a social hour. Non-JOT professionals in training courses didn't get this treatment until they reached the mid-career or senior level of training. JOT program critics who wanted to use the elite corps label as a whip or a goad, then, had no difficulty in making it relevant to the program. The VIP treatment of the JOT's at the EOD stage was discontinued in the mid-60's, but end-of-course "graduation addresses" by senior Agency officials continued.

In conclusion perhaps it should be suggested that the JOT's may have been, in fact, members of an elite corps. They were selected on the basis of the highest standards; their training was rigorous and demanded a high level of performance; and their performance after

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training, the true test of quality, was almost uniformly outstanding. These are things that are discussed later in this history. Perhaps judgment of the validity of the "elite corps concept" should be deferred.

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II. Recruiting and Selection

Although the recruiting of candidates for the JOT program was, by regulation, a joint responsibility of the Office of Personnel (O/Pers) and the Office of Training and the actual selection of the JOT's was solely the responsibility of OTR, the two processes cannot logically be treated as separate activities. Recruiting was done with definite selection standards as guides; and applying these standards, the recruiters actually participated in the early stages of the selection process. The two activities, therefore, are discussed together here. The discussion covers first the basic patterns of recruitment and selection criteria established in the DTR's 3 July 1951 staff study; then the operational recruiting procedures and the application of the selection criteria are described; recruiting problems are identified; the emergence of the JOT "internals" program is discussed; and finally the post-recruiting selection and processing phases up to the point of entering on duty are described.

A. The Original Patterns

1. The Selection Criteria. In the opening sentence of the "Discussion" section of his 1951 staff study, the DTR said, "Our problem is to select able and versatile young people who will fit into several

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offices of the Agency, and to construct a program of training and rotation that will develop their capabilities to the utmost." The specific accomplishments and characteristics of an "able and versatile" young person are then identified:

A bachelor's degree from a good institution, with very high standing (from upper 1/4 to 1/10 of class depending on institution and other factors -- a mediocre undergraduate record will be disregarded only if the student has subsequently shown brilliance in graduate school, in the services, or in other fields); skill in a language of immediate utility, or proven language learning facility, demonstrated by successful study of two languages, or study of one beyond the elementary level; evidence of leadership and breadth shown by participation in non-academic pursuits; good personality, especially tact; sound health and morals; previous military service, or willingness to enter service at our direction; soundly motivated desire to make a career of CIA; willingness to accept anonymity. In the case of an unusually well-qualified person, exception may be made to these requirements.

The DTR also specified a few "negative criteria": people with poor academic records, people with excellent academic records but nothing else, people with physical defects serious enough to disqualify them for "overt" work, people with more than minor emotional troubles, people with a record of failure in language study, people unwilling to serve overseas, and people with "unsound motivation." The DTR pointed out that the Agency would probably continue to hire people with these negative qualities, and -- although they would be

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excluded from the Professional Trainee program -- they might eventually prove their worth and be selected for the "career corps" program.

These, then, were the criteria originally established for the Professional Trainee program. As noted earlier in this paper, the criteria established in the 3 July 1951 staff study differ in some ways from those outlined by the DTR in his 30 November 1950 memorandum containing a proposal of the functions of the DTR. 43/ In referring to the selection of candidates for the program, that proposal recommended that candidates should be selected "in most cases not later than the sophomore year." That concept of mid-college selection was submitted to the Agency's General Counsel in February 1951 for exploration. 44/ The General Counsel explored and discovered that Public Law 110 contained restrictions on the expenditure of government funds for external training of the kind called for by the proposal. The 3 July study, consequently, set the earliest time of selection as the acquisition of the bachelor's degree.

In addition to the general criteria to be applied to individual recruits, the staff study provided criteria for the composition of the trainee group. The DTR stated that in any group of 100 trainees there

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should be 38 "college graduates" -- presumably people with bachelor's degrees but with no work experience; five engineers with some experience in production; seven LL. B. 's, preferably with undergraduate majors in social sciences, area studies, or international relations; and 50 Ph. D. 's or graduate students who have not completed the Ph. D. but have had training and experience in research. The DTR made it clear that his figures were intended only as a guide to recruitment, that a well-qualified person should not be excluded because a specific category was filled, and that a second-rater should not be recruited just to fill a slot.

2. Recruiting Sources and Methods. The original concept of the recruiting phase of the professional trainee program was based on the "University Contacts" plan. Briefly, this was a plan to establish in 50 universities and colleges throughout the country a CIA "contact," a senior member of the faculty or administration who would act as a "spotter" for the Agency and would identify young men and women who had the qualifications for the program. In the universities there were to be two of these contacts, one at the college level and one at the

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graduate-school level. The DTR proposed that each contact be paid \$25 a day for ten days each year "so that he will give more than casual attention to the problem." 45/

An attachment to the staff study listed the 50 colleges and universities that the DTR identified as the most promising sources. The list was divided into four categories: Universities, Technical Schools, Liberal Arts Colleges, and Women's Colleges. Of the total 50 institutions, 29 were on the Eastern seaboard, six were in the west-coast area, and 15 were in the mid-west. This apparent imbalance in the geographic location of sources later became grounds for accusations that the JOT program was overloaded with "ivy leaguers," a subject that will be covered later in this history.

The general recruiting procedures outlined in the staff study began with the University Contact who -- after being selected, cleared, and brought to Washington to be briefed on the program -- would identify potential candidates during their junior year, would guide them into senior-year studies that would enhance their value to the Agency, and at the end of their senior year would turn them over to the Agency's Personnel Recruitment Officer. The Agency recruiter would then take

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Both of these questionable areas were clarified later, of course, but at this point it is of interest to suggest the reasons for the ambiguities. In July 1951 it was the DTR's understanding that OTR would run the professional trainee program -- as directed by Smith -- and that O/Pers would assist and cooperate. It was logical, then, for the DTR to assume that OTR would establish and manage the contacts system, and he felt that there was no need to specify that in his proposal. As far as the role of the professional recruiters of O/Pers was concerned, there were only seven of them in the field at the time, and obviously there were too few to take any major part in such a broadly based recruiting and selection activity. The DTR's assumptions were not without foundation, as was later demonstrated by the development of problems in the function of both the contacts system and the professional recruiters' activities.

Although the University Contacts system was the basic element in the original plan for recruiting professional trainees, the DTR defined two additional sources of candidates. One of these was the separation centers of the Armed Forces. Contacts would be established in these centers, and the personnel files of about-to-be-separated military personnel who met the Agency's criteria for the program would be

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submitted to the Agency for screening. The second additional source was identified as "young men and women turned up by the normal activities of Personnel Procurement." This referred, of course, to candidates that the professional recruiters might recruit without the aid of the University Contact. The first of these two additional sources later proved to be generally unproductive; after the end of the Korean War, the separation centers had little to offer in the way of qualified candidates. The second of the two, however, turned out to be the one major source of candidates.

Despite the fact that some of the DTR's original concepts of selection criteria and recruiting sources and methods did not develop according to plan, they did establish basic patterns that stood the test of time. The following sections of this paper trace the development of these patterns and the adaptations of them that created a viable system for the recruiting, selection, training, and placement of outstanding young men and women through the JOT program.

B. Recruiting Procedures

1. The Selection Criteria Applied. With the launching of the professional trainee program in July 1951, a formal summary statement of the selection criteria was established, and thereafter there

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was little variation. In 1956, for example, the Agency Inspector General wrote, "The JOT Program is designed to locate and acquire young men and women of exceptional talents who have the potential for a successful career in the intelligence field" 46/ -- not much different from the DTR's July 1951 statement: "to select, recruit, and train young men and women of great promise. . ." In an article published in an OTR Bulletin early in 1967 the statement appeared as "a primary means of selecting and developing well-qualified [sic] young men and women interested in making careers in intelligence." 47/

Such general statements, of course, did not provide the sole guidance in the application of criteria in the recruiting process. The real guidance came through constant informal coordination among the professional recruiters, the University Consultants -- as the "contacts" came to be called -- and the members of the JOT Program staff; and the most effective guidance came from experience in recruiting for the program. An example of the informal guidance that came from the JOT staff is provided by an excerpt from a letter that [REDACTED] Chief of the JOTP, wrote to a professional recruiter in 1953 specifying the kind of candidate that should be chosen 48/:

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A guy with brains which he has done a good job of cultivating; a loyal American who believes that being an American is worth doing something about and worth fighting for; to whom earning a big supply of the almighty dollar is not the main objective of his life; who can take it and if necessary hand it out (not so much physically as mentally and by example); who is stable, manly, hard working, and realistic, all to a reasonable degree.

The experiential factor in the application of the selection criteria is exemplified by an excerpt from a February 1961 memorandum written by the Chief of the Personnel Operations Division of O/Pers to the Director of Personnel in response to a request for a summary of the problems of recruiting for the JOT program 49/:

In selecting candidates to be recommended for JOTP, we have recruited the types of people which eight years' experience has shown are acceptable to the C/JOTP and his staff. Emphasis has been on the graduate student with what C/JOTP calls "built-in competence," especially language and area knowledge. We have looked for an excellent academic record, an interest in foreign affairs, a strong personality, and some aptitude for DD/P. We have expected him to be reasonably polished in manners, speech, and attitudes without requiring a rigid conformity to pattern.

The reference to built-in competence, especially in language and area knowledge, reflects an increased emphasis on language competence initiated by the chief of the JOT program in 1958. 50/ This emphasis was sustained and increased thereafter, and by the end of 1965 the pattern of language competence among JOT's had changed

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somewhat. In December 1965 the DTR reported to the DDS that the CT* staff had made a study of foreign language proficiency of JOT/CT's enrolled during the period from January 1960 through October 1965 and found that the number of students with no foreign language capability had decreased from 23 percent of each group entered on duty to 13 percent; and in the four groups entered on duty from 1 January 1965 through October, the highest number of language non-competents was 5 percent and the lowest 3 percent. 51/ At this time there was, understandably, special emphasis on competence in the Chinese languages, and the CT staff's study showed that of all of the JOT/CT's who had entered the program since 1960, 41 had had Chinese language competence, and 35 of them were still on duty with the Agency at the end of 1965. 52/

2. Development of Sources. The list of 50 colleges and universities identified by the DTR in his 1951 staff study did not have a limiting effect on the recruiting activity. Many of the institutions on the list were not exploited, either because no "contact" was established

* The official name of the JOT program was changed to the Career Training Program in April of 1965. The reasons for the change are given later in this history.

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in them or because there weren't enough professional recruiters in the field to exploit them. As the recruiting developed, colleges and universities not on the original list became sources of candidates. At the end of 1959, the JOT staff made a statistical study of recruitment from 1951 through 1959; the study shows that the 579 JOT's who had been recruited during the period had come from 163 different colleges and universities, four of them in foreign countries. 53/

A separate study, made at about the same time by the OTR Plans and Policy Staff, shows that the major geographical sources of JOT's recruited throughout the 1951-60 period were Massachusetts with 62 JOT's, Connecticut with 40, New Jersey with 27, Pennsylvania with 26, New York with 25, Wisconsin with 25, and California with 24. 54/ This study also points out that of all of the JOT's recruited in 1959, 25 percent came from "ivy-league" institutions, 10 percent from "quasi-ivy-league" institutions (Amherst, Williams, Radcliffe, and Smith), 41 percent from other private institutions, and 24 percent from state colleges and universities. Undoubtedly this breakdown by ivy-league and non-ivy-league schools reflects the then-continuing controversy over ivy league domination in the JOT program.

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The existence of this controversy was first noted officially in an IG survey of the program made in 1956. 55/ The report of the survey says that "there has been a tendency to place more emphasis on recruiting in Eastern universities than those in other parts of the country. This may be attributed in part to the convenience of these universities in a relatively small area, and a higher ratio of success in recruitment." The report then went on to recommend that greater effort should be made to recruit in the far-west and mid-west areas. The statistics cited above indicate that a greater effort was made between 1956 and 1960, but apparently the effort was not great enough to satisfy the IG. In a 1960 report the IG again mentioned the ivy-league dominance and again recommended that it be corrected. 56/

██████████ C/JOTP, felt that the 1960 criticism was not justified. He pointed out that in the then-current class the "ivy-leaguers" amounted to only 20 percent and that the IG "neglects to state that of 576 JOT's recruited since the beginning of the program 165 different institutions are represented." He also stated that if the number of ivy leaguers was, proportionately, a bit high there were reasons: there

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were more recruiters in the ivy-league area and "there is greater interest in international affairs on the Eastern seaboard than in other regions."* 57/

In addition to the major source of JOT candidates, the colleges and universities of the country, there were minor sources -- "walk-ins," "references," and (after October of 1956) "internals." The third category, internals, is discussed in some detail later in this history. The walk-ins were people who had become aware of the JOT program by word-of-mouth or through the overt publicity on the program.** They went to the personnel procurement office of the Agency in the Washington area, were interviewed by personnel officers, and -- if the interviewers felt that they were qualified -- applied for admission to the program. There appears to be no record of how many such applicants actually entered the JOT program, but certainly a few of them did, and many who were not accepted for the program were placed in other positions in the Agency.

* The writer of this history, who taught at the college and university level in the mid-west for more than 20 years, feels impelled to point out that this second "reason" was a parochial assumption unsupported by the facts.

** See below, p. 71.

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The so-called "references" were young men and women who were recommended by Agency employees or by non-Agency government officials who were aware of the program. The O/Pers recruiting component encouraged this reference activity and found it useful in developing leads to well qualified candidates. This source, however, was not without its perils. There were occasions when the JOT staff found that a young person recommended by a very senior Agency official did not meet the qualifications; in such cases, the staff always rejected the candidate and risked the displeasure of his sponsor. There were also occasions when the sponsor was a non-Agency government official whose displeasure might damage the Agency itself. For example, in early 1965, [REDACTED] 25X1A was recommended by [REDACTED] 25X1A was invited to come in for interviews and met with representatives of the Office of Current Intelligence, the Covert Action Staff, and -- of course -- the JOT staff. In reporting the result of these interviews, 25X1A the JOT staff stated that [REDACTED] egotistical attitude during the interviews unfortunately convinced his interviewers that he was not 25X1A suitable for Agency employment." 58/ Soon after the interviews [REDACTED] was turned down by the Office of Security. In spite of a probing

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telephone call from [REDACTED] to the DDCI, it was decided^{25X1A}
to reject [REDACTED]. A security officer then talked with him personally and^{25X1A}
persuaded him to withdraw his application. There is nothing in the
records to indicate that [REDACTED] displeasure ever^{25X1A}
damaged the Agency's cause.

A promising supplemental source of JOT recruits was devel-^{25X1A}

[REDACTED]

At that time, the Agency was looking for Chinese language competence,^{1A}
and [REDACTED] looked for this factor particularly in screening the files.
As it turned out, he found very little Chinese language capability and
very few of the [REDACTED] applicants who were qualified for the
JOT program. 59/

3. The University Consultants. By 1953 the "University Con-
tacts" proposed in the DTR's July 1951 staff study as in-residence
"spotters" for the Agency JOT recruitment effort were being generally
referred to as the University Consultants, a term that was officially
used thereafter. As noted earlier, the DTR visualized the consultants
as the major instrument of candidate recruitment and proposed that 50

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of them be identified in the major colleges and universities, cleared, briefed, and activated. The concept was sound, certainly, but the application of it was difficult, the size of the group never reached the target of 50, the actual effectiveness of the consultants is questionable, and the program was terminated in a somewhat ignominious fashion.

Soon after the DTR's proposal for the establishment of a career corps in the Agency was approved by the DCI-- with, of course, the deletion of the elite corps concept -- the DTR and the Assistant Director for Personnel, at that time Davison, got together to work out the ground rules for establishing and managing the university contacts program. They reached mutual agreement on the mission, organization, and administrative details of the program, and their plan was approved by the DCI on 22 October 1951. 60/ According to the DCI's document of approval, "the Director of Training [has] joint responsibility with Assistant Director (Personnel) for the selection of those persons who are to become members of the consultant contact staff." 61/ The "joint responsibility" phrase preserved the ambiguity in the proposals of November 1950 and July 1951.*

* See above, p. 9.

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By mid-summer of 1952, almost a year after the consultant program had been approved, only one university contact had been selected, cleared, and activated -- a Dean at an Eastern university; but by mid-summer of 1953, 18 had been fully cleared and 24 more were in the appointment machinery. 62/ By the end of 1953, apparently, 19 of the 24 in process had been cleared; on 15 January 1954, the DTR reported that there were 37 "University Consultant Contacts" established and said that "it is planned to increase this number to about 70." 63/ Two years later, at the end of 1955, the total number of consultants had grown very little. In February 1956 the IG's report referred to the "spotter system" and said that "about 40" consultants constituted the system. The report then added this comment: "The spotter system has had little success and the Professional Recruiters of O/Pers have accounted for most of the accepted candidates." 64/ The IG did not recommend the elimination of the university consultant system, however, and it continued at about the same level thereafter. In a 1960 IG survey report, for example, it is stated that the JOT recruitment was done by "seven field recruiters working through 34 consultants in leading colleges and universities." 65/ This time there was no reference to the degree of success of the system.

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The established procedure devised to keep the university consultants aware of developments and requirements in the JOT program was to invite them to Washington for a three-day briefing once each year. The Agency paid all expenses and paid those who came the stipulated daily consultant's fee while they were in Washington and en route. The Washington meetings were arranged and conducted by the personnel procurement component of O/Pers, and OTR participated in the briefing programs. It was not possible, of course, for all of the consultants to be available for any one of the Washington meetings, and usually about half of them attended. In March 1958, for example, the C/JOTP reported that "18 University Consultants, who act as spotters for JOT candidates, were given the usual annual briefing on the Program." 66/

The particular briefing referred to in the report covered three days, during which the group was addressed by the DCI, the DDCI, the IG, the DDS, the ADDS, the DTR, the DPers, and senior Clandestine Services officers from the FI, CI, and PP Staffs -- in addition, of course, to the chief of the JOT program and the OTR school chiefs.

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A part of the three-day program was a day and a night spent [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] where the consultants were given a comprehensive briefing on the clandestine training given there. 67/

Undoubtedly there was some justification for the IG's 1956 attribution of "little success" to the university consultants program. It was not as productive as it was intended to be, largely because few of the consultants really worked at the "spotting" job; their other duties, naturally, had priority, and most of them were very busy people. Both OTR and O/Pers, however, felt that the system was productive enough to warrant continuation; and it remained in operation throughout the 1951-66 period.* Although the demise of the system took place outside the time-span of this history, it should be noted briefly here.

What turned out to be the last Washington meeting of the University Associates -- as the university consultants were sometimes called -- took place on 13, 14, and 15 November 1967. There were 25 in the group, many of them newly appointed consultants. This

* A retrospective evaluation of the university consultants program is provided by [REDACTED] in a paper completed in the spring of 1971, The Evolution of the Junior Officer Training Program, 1951 - 1963. In that paper [REDACTED] says that "in actual practice, it produced relatively few men or women who became career employees."

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program did not include the [REDACTED] visit, but it did include the 25X1A addresses by senior Agency officials and a dinner in the executive dining room. The program closed at 1600 on Wednesday, 15 November, and the consultants departed for airports and home campuses. Ten months before this Washington meeting was held, Ramparts magazine had published an article revealing CIA's funding of the National Student Association's activity in sending representatives to international meetings of student organizations. After the publication of the article, the Agency became a target for attack from all manner of organizations and groups, including student groups, of course. By the end of the year, most of the college and university campuses of the country had developed an open hostility toward CIA and anyone associated with it. It was obvious both to the Agency and to the university consultants that the campus climate would not permit the consultant program to continue with any degree of effectiveness, and the program was quietly dropped -- as was the "100 Universities Program," which is described briefly below.*

* For a detailed analysis of other effects of the Ramparts article on the Agency, see CS Historical Paper No. 196, The 1967 Crisis in CA Operations: Ramparts Exposures.

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4. The 100 Universities Program. At a Washington meeting of the university consultants in the fall of 1962, during a discussion of possible ways to improve JOT recruiting results, one of the consultants -- the record doesn't say which one -- suggested that CIA's mission might be better understood on the nation's campuses if senior representatives of the Agency would go to the campuses and talk with people who were influential in guiding the careers of students. 68/ The suggestion met with general approval, and the JOT staff followed up with a specific proposal, which was submitted as the "100 Universities Program." The proposal recommended that 100 colleges and universities be selected for visitation by Agency officers; all areas of the country would be represented in the group of institutions, as would all types of institutions -- liberal arts, engineering, and the graduate professional schools. The proposal was approved by the DCI early in 1963, and the program was launched.

From a list of Agency officers compiled jointly by OTR and O/Pers, the Executive Director chose about twelve men, most of them with academic experience in teaching or administration, who would be called upon to make the visitations. About half of these were OTR officers, and the others came from various Agency components.* The

* Including a future Director
of Training

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Office of Personnel made the arrangements for the visits -- through the resident consultant, if there was one in the college or university, and with the institution's administrative officers if there wasn't. The standard arrangement was for a group of from twenty to thirty key members of the faculty and administration of the school to be invited to an informal luncheon or dinner to hear the Agency speaker. Usually the nearest resident professional recruiter went with the speaker and introduced him to the group. Although the speakers were given guidelines for the content of their talks, they were not required to use an approved written text; they spoke informally, almost always without notes, and they answered questions from the members of the group.

For the most part this program was very well received on the campuses, and the speakers felt that it was very effective in clarifying the Agency's role in the US Government and dispelling the fears in some of the academic minds. For example, from 4 through 8 November 1963 [REDACTED], the Chief of the OTR Language and Area School, visited five institutions in the Colorado-Utah area: the Universities of Colorado, Denver, and Utah; Brigham Young University; and Colorado College. [REDACTED] began his 20 November 1963 report of the visits with this somewhat over-punctuated paraphrase 69/:

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And, lo, on one occasion, as we ended our oration, out of the multitude before us, two learned but formerly unbelieving savants, now enlightened and confident, stepped forward and sought to be taken in. A third, moved and reflective, opened his gates and invited us to come among his people that they, too, might share enlightenment. (And, thus was the responsiveness wherever we went. . . of those who came with hunger and skepticism and who departed to spread the gospel.)

A bit later in his report, [REDACTED] manages to escape the captivity of 25X1A Biblical sonority and say simply that he feels that the 100 Universities Program was "worth far more than every penny and every hour it cost."

The 100 Universities Program was terminated after 1965. By that time all of the principle universities had been covered at least once, and continuation of the program might well have led to redundancy. There appears to have been no final evaluation of the program, but most of the Agency participants seemed to agree -- in principle, at least -- with [REDACTED] glowing tribute. 25X1A

C. Recruiting Problems

1. The Basic Problem. The first official identification of the problem that was the basic one in the JOT program throughout the 1951-66 period came in August 1953 in a report of the IG survey of the

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Office of Training. 70/ The report noted that recruitment for the program had fallen far below anticipated levels. In June 1954 the C/JOTP commented on the IG's statement, admitting that "the program has not developed its full possibilities" but insisting that it had made sufficient progress to warrant "intensification. . . in recruitment of JOT's." 71/ As the program developed during the next few years, the demand for JOT "graduates" in the various Agency components increased steadily, and just as steadily the short-fall in recruiting became relatively greater -- a clear case of supply failing to meet demand.

Early in 1960 the problem was further complicated by the establishment of quotas of JOT program graduates to be assigned to the three Directorates -- 90 to the DDP, 25 to the DDI, and 8 to the DDS. 72/ The quotas were to become effective in 1961, which meant that during calendar year 1960 enough candidates had to be taken into the program to yield 123 graduates to fill the quotas -- an almost impossible task for the few professional recruiters in the field. Before the end of 1960 official concern about the fact that recruiting was far behind its goals prompted the Director of Personnel to ask the chief of the O/Pers Personnel Operations Division for an explanation. 73/ The chief of the POD reviewed the recruiting procedures and the recruiting

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capabilities, admitted the failure to meet quotas, and analyzed the reasons for the failure. He stated frankly that although some improvement might be made, recruiting capabilities as they stood at the time were not adequate to meet the demand and the short-fall was likely to continue. 74/

It did continue, of course. As late as July 1965 the DTR reported to the DDS that the July class of JOT's would, at best, total 66 instead of the planned 75. 75/ A few months later, the situation was even more critical. The DTR reported that as far as the JOT program was concerned, the "manpower pinch has become progressively worse" and the January 1966 JOT class would probably be 35 instead of the 75 planned. 76/ At the end of 1965, then, the JOT program, which had achieved outstanding qualitative success in the selection and training of young men and women whom the Agency components were eager to assign to responsible jobs, was still suffering from the problem of inadequate candidate input.

2. Causes of the Problem. Discussion of the causes of the basic recruiting problem must begin with the fact that from 1951 to 1961 there were only seven professional recruiters in the field. In his 1960 report the IG recommended that the number be increased from seven to nine,

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79/ and this was done. Just why -- in the face of the growing importance of the JOT program and the repeated lamentations over the continuing failure of recruiting to meet quotas -- the number of recruiters was not doubled or tripled is difficult to understand; it can only be assumed that in this case bureaucratic doctrine dictated the fighting of the problem rather than the solving of it.

After the basic problem had been surfaced by the IG in 1953, 25X1A
[REDACTED] identified one of the causes. He said that it appeared "to be a definite policy of PPD [the Personnel Procurement Division of O/Pers] that a recruiter gains as much credit for the placement of a teletype operator as for the placement of a JOT. Since the time and energy required to recruit the former is much less than the latter, it is only natural that men seeking placements will concentrate in the areas from which they obtain the greatest rewards." 80/ Although the validity of 25X1A
[REDACTED] assumption that the same field recruiters who looked for teletype operators also looked for JOT candidates might be questioned, his statement did point out that the recruiters had responsibilities in addition to the JOT recruiting. A part of the professional recruiter's job was to find qualified people to fill specialized professional jobs in the Agency -- engineers, scientists, political scientists, and the like. The

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requirements for such people were assigned to the recruiters, and they had to try to fill them. Actually, only about 45 percent of the professional recruiter's time could be devoted to JOT recruitment. 78/

One of the major factors in the recruiting problem was the mathematical relationship between first identification of qualified candidates and the final selection and entering-on-duty of JOT's. In fiscal year 1956, for example, 57 people were taken into the program. The records show that the 57 were the product of 409 original identifications and reviews of files; of the 409, 389 were interviewed in the field, 221 of these were tested in the field, and 172 were brought to Washington for further testing. 80/ The ratio of EOD's to original identifications was about one to seven. In fiscal year 1957 the ratio decreased; 715 candidates were identified, 648 were tested in the field, 398 were interviewed, 305 were brought to Washington for testing, and 82 actually entered the program -- a ratio of less than one to eight. 81/ The 1956 and 1957 figures are based on initial identification of candidates and eventual input for the program. Early in 1960 the recruiting division of O/Pers used a somewhat different base in pointing out that in bringing on board 80 JOT's in the 1960 calendar year the recruiters would have to conduct 2,200 field interviews that would produce 500

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
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referrals for follow-up that would result in 475 interviews that would produce 250 personnel actions that would produce the 80 JOT's. 82/
Such figures tend to give perspective to the field recruiter's problem.

The February 1961 review of the recruiting problem made by the Chief of the Personnel Operations Division in response to the request from D/Pers identifies some additional aspects. It states that only a few of the university consultants had been useful and only a very few "consultant cases cross all the hurdles successfully." It also

25X1A


not their business and that most of their nominees were the sons or nephews of their clients. The review also mentions the tendency to raise the selection criteria for the JOT program -- more mature people with more education and more practical experience -- and the increasing difficulty in keeping pace with all of the changing requirements. Although the chief of the recruiting component didn't mention it, he may have had in mind the 1956 IG recommendation that more individuals of non-Caucasian origin be recruited for eventual assignment to Africa and Southeast Asia. 83/

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One facet of the problem that the 1961 survey did not discuss in any detail was competition -- the fact that many qualified candidates for the JOT program found other career opportunities more appealing. In 1956 the JOT staff made a study of the reasons given over an 18-month period by 123 qualified candidates -- out of a total of 369 in process -- who declined a firm offer of placement in the program. Of the 123, 41 decided to accept positions in business, 33 to accept other government offers, 19 to continue their education, 12 to accept teaching positions, and 18 to accept "miscellaneous or unspecified" offers. 84/ The survey showed that only 10 gave the low entrance salary as a major reason for declining the JOT offer, and only five mentioned the long wait for security clearance as a major factor.

The chief of the program felt that, in spite of the fact that only five mentioned the clearance delay, the wait for security clearance was the "biggest single factor" in declinations. He admitted, however, that "the fact that it takes three to four months to process a case is not anyone's fault; we have had excellent cooperation from every office or unit involved in applicant processing." 85/ The security clearance delay, then, must be added to all of the other causes of the recruiting problem.

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
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3. Solutions and Remedies. As noted earlier in this section, the recruiting problem remained unsolved through 1965 -- and for a few years thereafter, actually -- but there were a number of solutions proposed and a number of remedies tried. There can be no practical evaluation of their effectiveness, of course, but certainly they must have had some retarding effect on the growth of the problem and therefore warrant mention here.

In the above-cited February 1961 review of the problem, the chief of the O/Pers recruiting component suggested courses of action that might be taken to increase the recruiting intake. The first was an advertising campaign, using the newspapers of principal cities as the media; the ads would identify the employer as the US Government, not CIA. He points out that this device was tried in The New York Times and was "moderately successful." The second approach suggested was increased use of university alumni placement files; the third was

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years later); and the sixth was a contract with one or more management consultant firms.

None of these devices was adopted immediately, but in November 1962 the distribution of recruitment brochures was authorized; and during calendar year 1963, 15,000 copies of a colorprint brochure were distributed among 800 colleges and universities. 86/ By the fall of 1965, the recruiting intake, according to the DTR, was still "well below that needed to meet Agency requirements" and the shortage of field recruiters and increased manpower requirements in the Agency made it very difficult to get both "external" and "internal" candidates for the program. 87/ He recommended that advertising be used to get applicants from non-academic sources, that "direct relationships" be developed with university associates and selected department heads, and that there be "closer working arrangements" with field recruiters. 88/

The last of these recommendations was activated almost immediately. Early in November 1965 the C/JOTP proposed that members of his staff go into the field and conduct follow-up interviews with potential candidates already contacted by the recruiters. According to the DTR the purpose of such follow-up interviews would be "to sustain

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interest on the part of the applicant and to further explain the CT Program to him. " 89/ [REDACTED] was chosen for the first such ven-^{25X1A}ture, and late in November he interviewed 15 candidates [REDACTED] area; he reported that he was "generally encouraged" by the responses. 90/

At the end of the 1950-66 period, then, the recruiting problem was still unsolved, and the supply of recruits for the program was continually falling far below the components' demands for JOT graduates. It might be well at this point to go a bit beyond the timespan of this history and report that within the five-year period following 1965 the recruiting problem vanished. For reasons best left for discussion in a later historical paper, the demand for program graduates diminished to the point where the wisdom of continuing the program was seriously questioned.

D. The Internal Source

1. Background. The Agency's career development program, as it was conceived by Smith and outlined by Baird in his 1951 staff study, consisted of two sub-programs -- the professional trainee program, which became the JOT program, and the career corps program, which was designed to select outstanding young Agency employees and give

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them training for career development. As noted earlier in this paper, the implementation of the second of these sub-programs involved the participation of all of the components of the Agency and, thus, all of the consequent coordination machinery.

Because the professional trainee program did not at the outset directly affect any Agency components except OTR and O/Pers and so was not involved in the cumbersome Agency-wide coordination process, it was activated immediately. The career corps program was slow in getting started. Eventually, however, it began to take shape as "The Junior Personnel Career Development Program," a title that was later shortened somewhat to the Junior Career Development Program, abbreviated as JCD.

2. The Junior Career Development Program. An informative -- if somewhat subjective -- account of the origin and early development of the JCD program is given by [REDACTED] in his 1971 review of the evolution of the JOT program. Although this account was written almost 20 years after the beginning of the program, [REDACTED] obviously had the relevant documents at hand to support his memory of events -- and he was very closely involved in these events when they happened. [REDACTED] wrote:

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The internal phase of the JOT Program originally was the Junior Personnel Development Program. This matter was the subject of long discussions by the CIA Career Service Board in 1953 and early 1954! Then a task force was established consisting of seven senior officers with secretarial help to study the problem in the best bureaucratic tradition.

Their report fills six pages plus a covering letter and a plan outline of four pages. There is a "Memorandum of Understanding of Additional Policies and Procedures for Administering the Program for Career Development of Junior Personnel" of more than three pages of single spaced material duly signed by AD Pers and DTR. Then came organization and implementation meetings of AD Pers and DTR each with assistants who wrote up memos of understanding and memos for the record. The first consists of notes of agreement on 17 separate items. There follows an outline of items involved in processing candidates -- 28 of them amplified by explanatory notes "a" through "n". It even suggested that any member of the Agency who was good enough to be considered for this training should also qualify for placement on the "Junior Executive Inventory" which as far as I know died quietly years ago.

And this was just the beginning of the papers dated from 2 April 1954 through 29 July 1954. These were augmented by an Agency notice of four pages (distribution AB including overseas personnel) and changes in the Regulations. Application forms had to be devised and approved and A&E testing mechanisms devised and approved by both offices. Everything, but everything, had to be spelled out in writing. Hence, cumbersome procedures, elaborated beyond reason, and unnecessary if people had trusted each other and worked together.

In implementing the program, we went through the prescribed and complicated bureaucratic acrobatics at a great rate -- for awhile. The predicted rush of candidates did not materialize. A and E's preparations to test 500 people were wasted.

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The elaborately planned meetings of the joint selection committee took place with increasing infrequency. Reasons: good candidates were discouraged by supervisors (even AD's and Division Chiefs) who didn't wish to lose their able and productive youngsters. For the most part, those who were encouraged or allowed to apply were ordinary types who couldn't qualify. But a few good ones did come along. [*]

25X1A

All of [REDACTED] statements of fact could easily be documented, and his generalizations could be exemplified; but -- although [REDACTED] and Baird were members of the JCD "joint selection committee" -- the program belonged to O/Pers and comes within the historical jurisdiction of that Office. It is of importance here only to the extent that its termination resulted in an additional source of candidates for the JOT program, candidates who came to be called "internals." The JCD problems described by [REDACTED] must have been apparent to every- one interested in the program. Certainly they were to the IG, for in his report of the 1956 survey of the JOT program he recommended that "the Junior Career Development Program be terminated and its

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* In theory each of the so-called JCD's was to take a training program tailored to his individual needs. In practice the few JCD's who actually entered the program took "appropriate" OTR courses being offered at the time.

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career development mission absorbed by the expanded JOT Program." 92/ The IG's recommendation was approved by the DCI, and the JCD was officially terminated in August 1956. 93/

3. Development of Internals. The regulation that ended the JCD program also established basic procedures for the admission to the JOT program of those young on-duty officers who were qualified. These "internals" were to be considered for admission upon their own individual application or upon the recommendation of supervisors, heads of Career Services, the D/Pers, the DTR, the DDP, the DDI, or the DDS. After nomination, the internals went through the same process of screening and selection as did the externals, and the same criteria were applied. At the time of the elimination of the JCD program there were ten young officers actually being trained in the program, and on 7 October 1956 these ten trainees were transferred to the JOT program. 94/

Thereafter the internals continued to make up a part of each JOT class -- a part varying in size, through the years, from one-tenth to one-fourth. Actually the addition of the internals to the JOT groups turned out to be most beneficial to the program. The internals held their own in competition with the externals, and there was never any indication of an external-internal compartmentation. In addition, of

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course, the internals made an experiential contribution to the program, a contribution that had the effect of putting the training in proper perspective in relation to the realities of the intelligence business.

An indication of the quantitative scope of the internal phase of the program is provided by this example: as of 7 April 1964 the JOT staff had 44 internal applications on hand, 25 of them representing DDP nominees; of the total, 19 had been accepted and were being processed, 8 were under consideration for entry into the October class, 10 were possibilities for entry into the January 1965 class, and 7 had not yet had the final pre-selection interview; in addition to the 44 applications, about 75 "profiles" of nominees were being prepared for initial consideration. 95/

Another quantitative indication is given by a report of the status of DDP internal nominees as of the end of calendar year 1964: the DDP components had nominated 68 candidates on 27 April 1964; of these, 38 had been accepted -- 11 for the class of July 1964, two for the October class, 19 for the class of January 1965, two for the March class, and four for the July class; of the 30 nominees who were not accepted, 16 were unqualified, two were rejected by the medical staff, one was

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rejected because she was the wife of a "non-Agency employee," two were assigned PCS away from Headquarters after they were nominated, and nine withdrew their applications during the selection process. 96/

A general summary of the quantitative aspects of the internal phase of the program shows that from the beginning in October 1956 through June 1965, 97 internals had been accepted in the JOT program, 94 of them had completed the training, and three had resigned from the Agency before the completion of training. Of the 94 graduates of the program, 64 had returned to their "Directorate of origin," 15 had changed from the DDI to the DDP, four had changed from the DDP to the DDI, two had changed from the DDS to the DDP, four had changed from the DDP to the DDS, four had changed from the DDI to the DDS, and one had changed from the DDI to the Office of the DCI. 97/

4. Problems. Although, as noted above, the internal JOT's created no problems within the program itself, there were problems faced by the JOT staff in getting qualified internals into the program. Basically the problem was the same one lamented by [REDACTED] in his account of the JCD program -- good candidates were discouraged by supervisors who didn't want to lose their "able and productive youngsters." In all fairness to the supervisors it should be pointed out that

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as work pressures increased and budget cuts created manpower shortages the supervisors were understandably reluctant to release the men who were best able to do the work that had to be done.

In any event the problem did exist. A survey of the 1965 internal applicants who had been accepted into the JOT program showed that eleven were being withheld and not permitted to start training. 98/ In December 1965 the Acting DTR transmitted the results of the survey to the DDS and noted the seriousness of the problem. As a specific example he reported that [REDACTED] [Chief of the DDP Records Integration Division] claims that he has so many [REDACTED] to trace that he simply can't spare anyone." 99/

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E. Processing and Selection

As it did for most aspects of the JOT program, the DTR's 1951 staff study established the pattern for the processing and final selection of the candidates once they had been recruited and had become definite possibilities for entry into the program. The staff study contains a nine-page appendix devoted to "the Testing and Assessment of Applicants." Because that appendix not only sets a basic pattern that was

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followed throughout the 1951-66 period but also discusses the philosophical and psychological aspects of testing and assessment, it is attached to this report as Appendix A.*

A 1960 staff study of the management of the JOT program contains a general summary of the processing and selection of candidates, one that is highly condensed and over-simplified but serves well as a point of departure for a more detailed discussion. 100/ That summary states that after the potential candidate is identified and interviewed by the field recruiter and judged promising, he is "given a written test prepared by the A&E Staff and administered throughout the year at 35 locations over the country." If these tests indicate to the JOT staff that he is a "good" candidate, he is invited to Washington at Agency expense for interviews. After the interviews, according to the summary, he is either selected or rejected; selection is subject to "medical and security checks." The following paragraphs amplify and exemplify the generalities given in the summary.

* P. 196.

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
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5. Admission. During the first five years of the JOT program, as noted earlier in this history, the JOT's selected for the program were admitted individually when they became available and entered into scheduled training courses with other Agency students. Oftentimes it was necessary for them to wait for the beginning of a course, and they were assigned to temporary chores while they were waiting. Later, when the JOT's came on board in groups, an organized procedure of indoctrination was established. This consisted, usually, of one day devoted to personnel processing and personal interviews with their JOT staff counselor -- the man who would be with them as friend and monitor throughout the program -- and with the chief of the JOT staff and the DTR. A second day was devoted to meetings of the entire group.

The VIP aspects of these group meetings have been described earlier -- the students were addressed by the DCI and a number of other very senior Agency officials. These VIP addresses served to impress them with the importance of the Agency's mission and to

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assure them that they had been very carefully selected to play significant roles in the accomplishment of that mission. Whatever feeling of self-importance or sense of elitism these VIP talks may have created in their minds was soon diminished, however, by the talks of the DTR and the C/JOTP. The DTR's talk was usually brief and blunt: they had been selected for the program because they had outstanding capability; the development of that capability would be severely tested throughout the program; what they got out of the program depended on what they put into it. The C/JOTP used the DTR's talk as a sort of synopsis and went into detailed discussion of the philosophy of the program, the goals toward which it strived, the performance expected of its participants, and the realities that they would face in meeting the achievement standards set for them. In 1961 [REDACTED] decided to put his talk 25X1A paper as a "Recapitulation" of the methods and objectives of the JOT program and give copies to "all successful candidates." Because that recapitulation captures the spirit and flavor of the program as it existed after ten years of successful development, it is attached to this paper as Appendix B.*

* P. 206.

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III. Program Management

A. Organization and Personnel

1. Organizational Development. Although the organizational relationship of the JOT program to other activities of OTR during the 1951-66 period has been described in earlier historical papers,* it is reviewed here briefly as background. From the beginning of the program early in 1951 to September 1952, the professional trainee program -- as it was then called -- was one of the responsibilities of the Basic Division of TR(O), the designation given to the non-clandestine training activity in OTR. The JOT program first appeared on the official organization chart of OTR in September 1952 -- as the Junior Officer Training Division (JOTD). The JOTD was shown as one of the Divisions of TR(O) reporting to the Deputy Director of Training (Overt), one of the two DDTR's reporting to the DTR at the time. The JOTD appeared without change of designation or level after the February 1953 reorganization of OTR and after the December 1953 reorganization, the one that eliminated the dual-deputy system and established a single DDTR.

* OTR-5, pp. 21 and 119, and OTR-6, pp. 4 and 9.

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In December 1954 there was another reorganization of OTR, one that reflected some of the IG's recommendations and also paid lip-service to a few of the recommendations made by the Agency Management Staff. One major change was the elimination of all "Division" designations and the establishment of "Schools." An apparent major change was the transfer of the JOT program to the jurisdiction of the OTR Support Staff with the designation of the Junior Officer Training Program. In actual practice the chief of the JOT program continued to report directly to the DTR; the subordination to the Support Staff was one of the lip-service aspects of the reorganization. In February 1956 the DTR apparently decided that lip-service was no longer necessary, and the JOTP was reinstated at the School level. On the official DTR organization chart issued in May 1956 the JOTP appeared at the School level, and it continued in that position throughout the remainder of the 1951-66 period.

2. Growth of the Staff. As noted earlier in this history, when 25X1A
[REDACTED] relieved [REDACTED] as chief of the program in April 1952, his staff 25X1A
consisted of two clerical people and one military officer, [REDACTED] 25X1A

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assigned on a temporary basis to handle the Military Agreements phase of the program. [REDACTED] continued in the position until August 1953, 25X1A and during the first half of calendar year 1953 he was assisted by a 25X1A second military officer, Commander [REDACTED]. After July 1953, apparently, there was no longer a need for a military officer on the staff -- the military agreements had been established and imple- 25X1A mented and the OCS procedures had become routine -- and [REDACTED] was 25X1A not replaced. Early in July, however, [REDACTED] a JOT graduate, was assigned to the staff and served until August 1955, devoting a major part of his time to the processing of the OCS arrangements. 25X1A In January 1954 [REDACTED] an OTR careerist, was assigned 25X1A to the staff as [REDACTED] deputy; he held the position until August 1956, 25X1A when he was reassigned and replaced by [REDACTED]. * From April 1952 through August 1956, then, the JOT staff consisted of the chief, never more than two officers assisting him, and never more than three clerical aides.


* The deputy designation was dropped temporarily at this time and reestablished in December 1956 with [REDACTED] assigned to the 25X1A position.

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Late in 1955 the IG Staff made a survey of the JOT program, and the report of the survey was submitted to the DCI in February 1956. 112/ In that report the IG recommended that "the present T/O of the JOT Division in OTR be increased by five positions, three individuals of professional grade to be selected one each from the offices of the DD/S, DD/P, and DD/I on the basis of their experience and knowledge of these components and the remaining two to provide necessary clerical support." Apparently the IG's recommendation was approved -- in principle, at least -- for in November 1956 the DTR recorded that the DD/S, on 16 October 1956, had approved the increase of the JOT staff by four positions. 113/



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valuable element of continuity as the program and the staff have changed over the years.* Other training officers assigned to the staff before the close of the 1951-66 period were [REDACTED] who served from February 1964 through 1966; [REDACTED] who replaced [REDACTED] April 1964; and [REDACTED] who was appointed in June 1965.

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Perhaps the most important support addition to the JOT staff came in the fall of 1956, when the Office of Personnel detailed an officer to the program. 114/ Before that time, the processing of personnel actions for the JOT candidates was a very complicated activity involving the JOT staff training officers, the OTR personnel officers, and components of O/Pers -- components that were located in buildings some distance from those occupied by OTR. The personnel officers detailed to the staff in 1956 and thereafter were assigned on a rotational basis and were not actually members of the staff, but they devoted full time to personnel actions required by the JOT program -- both EOD actions and placement after the completion of training.

* [REDACTED] has been of immense help to the writer of this history, and whatever merit the history may have can be largely attributed to that help.

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██████ retired from the Agency at the end of December 1963; 25X1A
he had served as chief of the JOT program for more than eleven years.
He had taken over the program when it was still in the experimental
stage and had not even begun to achieve Agency-wide recognition and
respect. With Baird's strong support, ██████ faced the multitude of 25X1A
problems that arose in the development of the program, solved most
of them, and fought hard for solutions even when it was impossible to
find them. He was impatient with red tape and often -- in private --
decried vehemently what he described as bureaucratic idiocy; but in
the interests of the program he always used tact and diplomacy in try-
ing to clear the obstacles that the bureaucracy put in his path. Through-
out his tenure as chief he succeeded in converting his dedication to the
program into a contagion. The members of his staff acquired the same
dedication and gave of their time and energy just as generously as did
their boss. When ██████ retired at the end of 1963, the program had 25X1A
achieved outstanding success, and its graduates had demonstrated its
practical effectiveness as a training program for future leaders of the

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Agency. If there was any one factor in [REDACTED] leadership that could be identified as the key to the success of the program, perhaps it was his adamant refusal to compromise the quality of the program.* 25X1A

[REDACTED] was followed as chief of the program by Robert [REDACTED] 25X1A

[REDACTED] was an OTR careerist who had served as chief of the Intelligence School and as Deputy Director of Training in the middle and late 50's and subsequently had been on rotational assignment overseas with the DDP. [REDACTED] reported for duty with the JOT 25X1A

staff on 3 December 1963 and officially assumed the position of chief on 31 December. Because he had held responsible positions in OTR during the formative years of the JOT program, he was thoroughly familiar with its objectives and problems; and because of his tour of duty with the DDP, he not only understood the DDP requirements for JOT graduates but also had ready access to senior officers of the Clandestine Services. Perhaps the fairest evaluation of [REDACTED] administration would be the statement that he guided the program 25X1A

* This evaluation is that of the writer of this history, who was an OTR school chief and worked very closely with [REDACTED] from 1957 through 1963. 25X1A

** A brief account of [REDACTED] background and pre-CIA experience is given in OTR-6, p. 51. 25X1A

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during the most troublesome years when demands for the graduates were the greatest and budget and manpower pressures made it impossible to meet the demands -- and during those years he kept intact the high qualitative standards of selection and training.

When [REDACTED] took over the program at the end of 1963, his staff consisted of four training officers, one assistant training officer, and four clerical assistants. In February 1964, an additional training officer, [REDACTED] was assigned; but there were no further increases in the staff until late in 1965. In October the DTR informed the DDS that in order to effect the "planned expansion" of the CT program the staff would have to have two additional officer positions. 115/ By the middle of December the two additional positions had been allocated, and OTR was "actively recruiting against" them. 116/

B. Duties of the Staff Officers

Many of the duties performed by the officers of the JOT staff have been identified, either implicitly or explicitly, in the discussion of recruiting and selection; and all of the other duties are described in the following sections on training programs and placement procedures. It would be useful here, however, to identify those duties briefly within the context of program management.

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1. Participation in Selection. During the recruiting and selection processes the staff members examined candidates' applications and "profiles," evaluated transcripts of college grades and reports of field interviews, and sat as members of selection teams and panels in making final judgment of acceptability.

2. Advising and Counseling. Each member of the JOT staff was assigned a number of JOT trainees -- the number depending upon the trainee load at any given time -- for whom he would act as advisor and guide throughout the training period. The staff counselor's job was to get to know his trainees, their characters, their capabilities, their limitations, and their personal problems. The objective of the counselor was successful, of course, only to the extent that he won the respect of the trainees -- and they were highly intelligent young people who had already achieved some distinction in academic pursuits and often in other fields.

3. Evaluation of Performance. One of the staff officer's duties was to keep informed of the performance of his advisees in the various training courses that made up the program. This he did so that he could detect performance problems when they arose and help to solve

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them before they became serious and so that at the end of the formal training program he would be better able to determine the most appropriate job assignments for his advisees.

4. Participation in Placement. Because the placement of JOT's after formal training was one of the critical stages in the whole program, great care went into the making of placement decisions.

Although the performance records constituted good evidence of assignment suitability, the staff advisor was best qualified to interpret the records of his advisees, and very often he made the final decision on placement.

5. Monitoring On-the-Job Performance. One of the key features of the JOT program throughout most of the 1951-66 period was the retention of the JOT on the OTR personnel roster after the completion of the formal training and until the completion of the on-the-job training. There were a number of advantages in this arrangement, as will be noted later, but all of those advantages depended upon the staff officer's awareness of how his advisees were performing on the job. The monitoring of on-the-job performance, then, was one of the staff officer's most important duties.

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C. The Program Coordinators

During the greater part of the 1951-66 period the JOT staff had no fixed internal organizational pattern. There was a deputy chief --
[REDACTED] from January 1954 to August 1956 and [REDACTED] from Decem-
ber 1956 to June 1965. Some of the staff officers were considered to be
DDI, DDP, or DDS representatives on the staff, but there appeared to
be no need for any formal internal organization recognizing the fact.*
In August 1960, however, a Program Coordinator was designated offi-
cially as a part of the staff.

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1. The Rationale. The establishment of the Program Coordina-
tor was the result primarily of criticisms that appeared from time to
time in the student feed-back, which was encouraged -- even required
-- as a sort of quality-control mechanism. Some of the students felt
that the individual segments of the training program were being given
by the OTR Schools without coordination with the other segments of the
program; this resulted, they believed, in repetition of substantive
coverage and duplication of skills training. The DTR, always

* After the expansion of the staff in 1965, the training officers were formally divided into four groups: Internal Phase, DDI Representatives, DDP Representatives, and DDS Representatives.

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sensitive to student criticism -- often without determining the validity of it -- took action to remedy the assumed ill by appointing an officer whose job it would be to assure that all segments of the formal training program were closely coordinated and that all repetition and duplication were eliminated.

2. The Coordinators. On 19 August 1960 [REDACTED] became the first JOT Program Coordinator. [REDACTED] had served an earlier tour of duty with OTR as the Operations School Chief of Field Training [REDACTED] from December 1954 to October 1956. He was familiar with OTR's problems and had played an important role in the development of the clandestine training segments of the JOT program. He appeared to be an excellent choice for the assignment. In all truth, however, he accomplished very little during the few months that he held the position; his major allegiance was to the Clandestine Services, and -- as were so many of the CS officers assigned on rotational tours of duty with OTR -- he was primarily concerned with keeping his DDP fences mended.*

* This uncomplimentary judgment is that of the writer of this history, who was Chief of the Intelligence School during [REDACTED] tenure as Program Coordinator.

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When [REDACTED] left the position in March 1961, [REDACTED] was appointed. As noted above, [REDACTED] was a long-time OTR career-ist, knew the problems of the JOT program, and was devoted to OTR's interests. He worked very hard at the coordinator's job, but in all probability he found it a frustrating one. Whether or not he actually accomplished anything of importance is open to question. In any event, when [REDACTED] left the job in March 1964 for a second tour of duty with the DDP, no successor was appointed.*

3. Evaluation. When the position of JOT Program Coordinator was established in 1960, the OTR School Chiefs -- and possibly [REDACTED] -- felt that there was no need for such a position. There was no real lack of coordination among the segments of the formal training program; the schools -- and [REDACTED] -- regularly exchanged course schedules, the chief instructors got together and discussed areas of overlap and duplication, and instructors were constantly sitting in on courses given by instructors in other schools. What repetition and duplication there was in the program was intentional and planned; it was a training device common in all educational efforts.

* In May 1967 the position was reestablished with somewhat different duties assigned to it, and [REDACTED] was appointed CT Program Coordinator.


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
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In addition there was a major coordination device that was introduced in the early years of the JOT program and continued as long as Baird was DTR. Once each year all OTR school and staff chiefs, most chief instructors who took part in the program training courses, and all members of the JOT staff gathered  for 25X1A

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a two-day session devoted entirely to the program. Although a part of each of these sessions was devoted to the management aspects of the program, a much greater part was devoted to the content and conduct of the training courses. School chiefs and chief instructors described course plans in detail and discussed methods of presentation and of performance evaluation. Questions were raised, and points of conflict were debated. Baird was always present at these meetings; and at the end of the session, he and everyone else present knew a great deal about what the JOT was being taught and how. Perhaps it should be noted here that these sessions [REDACTED] were not always entirely^{25X1A} peaceable. Baird encouraged frankness and honest dissent, and they were always forthcoming. Arguments were frequently heated, and tempers were not always curbed. Baird, himself, was not averse to becoming involved in argumentation, and sometimes he did.

D. Summary

This discussion of the management of the JOT program does not include coverage of the many problems that confronted the JOT staff during the 1951-66 period. Those problems will be identified and described in a later section of this history. At this point, perhaps an

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adequate summation of the program management would be the statement that both [REDACTED] did brilliant work in directing the pro- 25X1A gram during the period, and the program -- though understaffed -- was well staffed with men who added dedication to their many capabilities.

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IV. Training Programs

The three basic elements of the JOT program were selection, training, and placement -- all three of which were functions of the program management discussed above. The selection element, including recruiting and assessment, has been described earlier in this history; the placement element is described later. The present discussion covers the training element. In his February 1956 report of a survey of the JOT program, the Inspector General said "an essential element of the JOT Program is the principle of training before assignment to duty with an operating component. After the candidate is entered on duty he is given a series of training courses designed to give him a thorough indoctrination in Agency activities and skills." This statement, capsulized as it is, provides a sound point of departure for discussion of the training element of the JOT program.

A. Program Development, 1951-58

1. The Original Plan. The introduction to the DTR's July 1951 staff study states that "Basic Training is already established to provide professional trainees with the necessary skills and knowledge to enable them to enter an office with general competence in intelligence, and to make the most of on-the-job training." 117/ The obvious implication

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is that the DTR felt that training courses already established were adequate to provide the formal training that the JOT would require. This is made explicit in Appendix F of the staff study. Here the basic training courses of the "CIA Intelligence School" are described as "designed to give the trainee the knowledge and skills basic to intelligence." These courses, according to Appendix F, consist of the necessary lectures on orientation, mission, and security; the structure of the US Government and CIA's role therein; the missions of the Intelligence Advisory Committee Agencies; the organization of CIA; the world situation, foreign policy, the Soviet Government and its history; and the methods employed in intelligence. The statement admits that these "early courses cannot turn out finished intelligence officers" and notes that the "tentative twelve week program will be interspersed with problems and training films, and selections for readings in foreign languages." A separate appendix in the staff study outlines the language training phase of the "tentative" 12-week program, indicating that the foreign language would be Russian and the trainees would devote 20 hours each week to it.

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There are three significant aspects of this 1951 plan for the training of JOT's. The first is that at that time the "CIA Intelligence School" was still a concept in Baird's mind, and the basic training courses in the "school" were also nonexistent; actually, the concept of the school never did materialize as such, but the basic courses did.* The second significant aspect of the plan was the absence of any reference to clandestine operations training for the JOT's; obviously, it was assumed that the "professional trainees" would be prepared for duty with the non-covert components of the Agency. The third aspect was that -- aside from the absence of reference to clandestine training -- the plan identified all of the elements that later became parts of the JOT program.

2. Early Development. In his 1971 retrospective paper on the evolution of the JOT program, [REDACTED] says that the formal training program was at first "a hit-or-miss jumble" and that the program management had to "play it by ear." 118/ Actually the training program for the professional trainees during the early years was not as unstructured as [REDACTED] recalls. As noted earlier, the first group of 25X1A

* See OTR-5, p. 32.

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trainees began the program in July 1951. They were given a 14-week course divided equally into study of intelligence and study of Russian, a half of each day to each. The intelligence half of the course was provided by the Basic Training Division of TR(O), and the Russian study was done [REDACTED] through external training arrangements. This plan, to be sure, had an element of the "play-it-by-ear" approach, but it soon changed. In 1952 Baird persuaded [REDACTED] 25X1A [REDACTED] 25X1A to transfer from the Office of National Estimates to OTR to develop a "basic intelligence course" specifically for the professional trainees,* 119/ and during 1952 the study of Russian was dropped as a major part 25X1A of the program. By mid-1952 [REDACTED] had developed a six-week course, and it was being given for those professional trainees who had entered on duty after July 1951. By the fall of 1952 it had become apparent that the intake of professional trainees did not warrant giving the course for them alone, and it was opened to all professional recruits.

From that time until mid-1954 the six-week Basic Intelligence Course constituted the formal training program for the JOT's. At the completion of the course the trainees were assigned either to language


* A brief description of [REDACTED] background and experience is given in OTR-6, p. 53. 25X1A

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training or to on-the-job training. In 1954 the Basic Intelligence Course was discontinued as such, and the content of it was reorganized into a four-week Basic Orientation Course (BOC) and a four-week Intelligence Principles and Methods Course (IPM). The JOT's took both of these courses; the trainees entered on duty individually when they became available and were assigned various interim tasks while they awaited the beginning of the BOC. 25X1A



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regulation, mandatory training for all Agency professionals; the ITC was elective and was to be taken primarily by officers assigned to analyst positions and by JOT's whose major interest was in the processing and production phases of intelligence.* Very few non-JOT's elected the ITC; the course was soon oriented particularly to the needs of the JOT's, and -- in effect if not by design -- it became a JOT course, the first except for the course started by [REDACTED] in 1952.

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B. The Integrated Program

1. The Rationale. During the early years of the JOT program, when it was still considered experimental and the number of trainees was small, the individual admission of JOT's on a when-available basis and the placement of them in regularly scheduled courses was the only practicable way of handling the program. Deferment of the individual's EOD date would have risked declinations to accept jobs immediately available and thus would have wasted the time and expense of the selection procedures. In addition, the numbers coming on board did not warrant special courses for the JOT's. By 1958, however, the program had proved itself; it was no longer experimental, and it had been

* See OTR-8, pp. 43-49 and 104-107.

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accepted Agency-wide as a major source of young professional officers. As early as 1956 the IG had given full approval to the program and had recommended that it be expanded.

It was expanded, of course, and by the middle of 1958 the chief of the program and the DTR decided that the time had come to systematize the recruiting and selection so that JOT's would enter on duty once each year in one group. The concept had ample precedent in the time-honored admission practices of academic institutions. The once-a-year admission practice would require a major change in the entering of JOT's in training courses, so a part of the plan was to establish a series of courses for JOT's only; the numbers to be admitted would easily justify such a program.

Because the implementation of the plan directly affected only OTR and O/Pers, it was considered an internal OTR reorganization; and the approvals of the DDS and the Executive Director were given informally. There appears to be no record of who devised the term "integrated program," and it is of no great consequence; at the time, "integration" had not yet acquired connotations of conflict, and the term did describe accurately the merging of many of the aspects of the JOT program.


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2. The Courses. In September 1958 the chief of the JOT program, in a report to the OTR Plans and Policy Staff, outlined the sequence of training that would be given to the first class of JOT's in the integrated program. He said that the JOT's, who would enter on

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Communism. It covered the origin and development of the Communist movement, the philosophy of Communism, the rise of Communist governments in Europe and Asia, the development of Communist parties in the free world, and Communist methods and tactics. At this time, of course, Communism was considered a real and present danger to the free world; the major objective of the course was "know the enemy."

After the Communism course the first group in the integrated program was given a two-week course called "The American Heritage." The concept of this course was developed by [REDACTED] then 25X1A chief of the Intelligence School, and approved by Baird. At first glance the rationale behind the concept appeared to be sound: after learning of the mission of US intelligence and the Agency's part in it, and after studying the enemy and the nature of his threat to the American Way of Life, the JOT's should learn exactly what it was that was being threatened -- what, that is, intelligence had to defend; and because the JOT's were extremely intelligent young people with outstanding academic records, the teaching had to be done at a highly sophisticated level, using the best brains available in the country brought in from major universities and high places in government.

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While the American Heritage course was in the planning stage, some senior OTR instructors, all of whom were involved in the development of the integrated program,* raised eyebrows and scratched heads after a second look at this rationale. If, indeed, the JOT's were extremely intelligent young people with outstanding academic records -- most of them in the fields of political science and history -- couldn't they be expected to know and understand the traditional values of the American Way of Life? Was it necessary or profitable to devote two full weeks and the best brains of the country to the review and embellishment of what they already knew? Such questions were raised and summarily dismissed as the unenlightened views of small men with little vision. Planning went forward; comprehensive reading lists were compiled, and letters of invitation to speakers -- prepared for the DCI's signature -- were drafted. [REDACTED] designated himself as chief instructor of the course, and most of the preparation work was done by JOT's already on board awaiting the beginning of the first integrated program.

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* One of these, of course, was the writer of this history who was chief of one of the Intelligence School faculties at the time.

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A few days before the program began in October 1958 the American Heritage ran into trouble. The lead-off guest speaker was to be a distinguished -- perhaps notorious -- professor of political science in a prestigious eastern university. The letter inviting him to speak was sent through channels for the DCI's signature and was soon bounced back to OTR unsigned. It seemed that the academic gentleman addressed was at that time in great disfavor with the Administration, and in high places in the Agency it was decided that it would be unwise to extend an invitation to him. It appeared also that some of the other best brains on the guest speaker list might be politically tainted, and it was suggested to OTR that the guest-speaker level be lowered to a safer plane.* This was done, and the American Heritage course was given sans best brains for the first integrated JOT group.**

* In his 1971 recollections of the evolution of the JOT program, [REDACTED] 95X1A notes that "one idea, eventually turned down by the DCI, was to have the class addressed by a number of distinguished citizens of various political and philosophical persuasions." 122/

** The course was abandoned after the first running, and some elements of it were incorporated in the expanded Intelligence Orientation course for JOT's.

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After the American Heritage the group was given a five-week Intelligence Techniques course, essentially the same ITC that had been developed in 1956. The major change made by the integrated program was that all JOT's -- not only those interested in intelligence research and production -- took the course. The reasoning was that all JOT's, regardless of their eventual assignments, should have a basic understanding of the processing of intelligence information and the production of finished intelligence. The ITC was a do-it-yourself course; all of the instruction -- the presentation of problems and the detailed critiquing of solutions -- was done by members of the Intelligence Production Faculty of the Intelligence School.

After the ITC came the Clandestine Services Orientation (CSO), a two-week course devoted to the missions and functions of the DDP. Like the ITC, this course was required of all JOT's -- on the basis of the same rationale; those JOT's who would not later be assigned to the DDP should have a basic understanding of clandestine operations as an essential part of the Agency's mission.* The CSO was given by

* The requirement that all JOT's take both the ITC and the CSO was also an early attempt to break down the parochial barriers that had always separated the overt and covert sides of the Agency.

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
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the Headquarters Training Staff of the Operations School and made use of guest speakers from the Clandestine Services, seminars, and case studies.

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The nine JOT's who "entered specialized training in Research" went into the 12-week Intelligence Production Course (IPC), a new course developed by the Intelligence Production Faculty of the Intelligence School. The IPC was designed to provide for those JOT's who

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were to be assigned to the various components of the DDI an in-depth coverage of the missions of each of the DDI Offices and the methods employed to meet those missions. The course was composed of background lectures; visits to the components for observation of, and briefing by, the working analysts; practical problems related to components' work; seminars for review and discussion; and a final research paper on a major intelligence problem. One significant aspect of the course was the fact that several instructors took part continually, and all of them had had at least four years of working experience in a DDI component.

The first running of the integrated program -- with the exception of the American Heritage phase -- was judged successful by the DTR and the JOT staff, and it set the general pattern for JOT training thereafter. There were, of course, many minor modifications and some major changes. The more important of these are described in the following paragraphs.

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The next major step in the expansion came in March 1964. By that time the concept of bringing in all new professional employees of the Agency through the JOT program had gained popularity in some influential quarters -- not, however, in OTR. A part of this concept was the conviction that the eventual component assignments of all JOT's should be determined at the time of EOD. This conviction was not shared by the JOT program staff; they felt that such action would defeat one of the major objectives of the program -- placement after demonstrated competence for and interest in the specific job. In any event, in March 1964 the decision was made by the DDS and the Executive Director to increase the number of annual JOT classes from two to four, the number of JOT graduates each year [REDACTED] and the 25X9 authorized personnel ceiling for JOT's [REDACTED] per year. 130/ To imple25X9 ment this decision plans were made to begin classes in July 1964 and in January, March, and October 1965. The July and January classes 25X9 would have about [REDACTED] JOT's in each, most of them to be assigned eventually to the DDP; the March and October classes would have about [REDACTED] 25X9 JOT's in each, all of them having been specifically designated for assignment to the DDI, the DDS, or the DDS&T. 131/

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The four-classes-per-year system was put into effect, but recruiting fell far below the established goals, and the individual classes were much smaller than the plans stipulated. The concept of bringing in all professionals through the JOT program faded away -- not because of opposition from OTR but because of the realities of recruiting to fill specialized jobs in the DDI and the DDS&T, jobs that had to be filled by people with maturity and experience considerably above the JOT level.

D. The DDS Program

1. Background. During the first three years of the JOT program the orientation of the training was entirely toward the DDI. Beginning late in 1953 the DDP became interested in JOT graduates, and from that time through 1965 the program became a major source of young officers for DDP assignment with as many as 80 percent of the graduates going into the Clandestine Services. Although a few graduates went to the DDS during the 1951-64 period, the program did not develop a DDS-oriented phase until late in 1964. The need for such a phase, however, had been suggested by the IG as early as February 1961. In a report of a survey of the Office of Logistics, the IG recommended

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that "the Director of Training increase the emphasis on logistics, especially as applied to station and project management, in the Junior Officer Training Program." 132/

Although the IG's report mentioned only logistics, it was the first official suggestion of the wisdom of including support training in the JOT program. The only recorded OTR reaction to the IG's recommendation came from [REDACTED] then the JOT Program Coordinator. 25X1A

In an August 1961 report he referred to the IG's recommendation, described the support coverage in the program at that time, and concluded that coverage of the logistics function "is adequate in the training program currently given to all JOT's." He added the statement that special courses in logistics were open to JOT's after they completed the program. 133/

2. Planning. From that time until March 1964 there was much talk of support training becoming a part of the JOT program, but there was no action. In early March 1964 there was a meeting of the chief of the Intelligence School, the chief of the OTR Plans and Policy Staff, and a member of the DDS Administrative Staff in which there was "preliminary discussion" of a support services segment of the JOT formal training program. 134/ There is no record of what prompted this

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meeting, but there is a record of a follow-up meeting in which the probable reason for the first meeting was surfaced. On 1 June 1964 [REDACTED] 25X1A
[REDACTED] of the Headquarters Training Staff of the Operations School, [REDACTED] 25X1A
[REDACTED] of the OTR Plans and Policy Staff, and [REDACTED] 25X1A
[REDACTED] of the Office of the DDS met to discuss a "Support 25X1A
Services portion of the JOT Program." 135/ The record of that meeting states that "discussion revealed that the DDS wants JOT's to qualify for chief of support at small stations." The meeting closed with the agreement that OTR would begin to construct the kind of program that the DDS wanted.

3. The Support Services Course. By the middle of October 1964 OTR had completed the planning, and the DTR submitted to the DDS an outline of the proposed Support Services Course. 136/ The course was to cover eight weeks and would be given in two phases. Phase one was a five- to eight-day coverage of administrative concepts, support policies, and the mission and organization of the DDS. Phase two was to last from six and one-half to seven weeks and cover practical aspects of field administration with emphasis on support at small stations -- personnel, finance, logistics, and security -- and the teaching methods would be practical exercises, case histories, and a comprehensive


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problem. The plan was to offer the course twice each year, at the conclusion of either the 18-week Operations Course or the 6-week Operations Familiarization Course. The first running was scheduled for 25 January 1965.

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F. Language Training

As noted earlier, one of the basic objectives of the original professional trainee program was to develop the foreign language capability of the trainees so that all of them would have a working fluency in at least one foreign language. The first group of trainees, the group that began the program in July 1951, devoted half of their training time to the study of Russian. This practice was soon abandoned, partly because of the difficulties that developed in administering and controlling the language training in an external facility and partly because the need for Russian language competence in the Agency turned out to be much less urgent than had been anticipated early in 1951. Thereafter there was no clearly defined language training policy in the JOT program. Some JOT's were assigned to language training after they had completed the program and had been assigned to operating components -- usually to meet the specific language needs of the individual components. Some JOT's took after-hours language training while they were in the program -- usually to maintain a language competence that they had had when they came into the Agency. In short, the language training aspect of the JOT program became peripheral and incidental. For example, during the 1953-56 period only about 10 percent of the JOT's

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had taken language training of any kind, 146/ and most of these had taken their training in the "soft" languages -- Spanish, French, and German.

An OTR staff study of the management of the JOT program early in 1960 laments the lack of a language training policy in the program and suggests that one reason for it can be the fact that the Agency had no stated policy on language competence. 147/ The study also points out that although the professional recruiters in the field look for JOT candidates with foreign language competence, such competence cannot be made a condition of employment; if it were, the study says, "future classes will simply shrink in size unless standards are lowered in some other, very likely more important, direction." The study then goes on with a strong recommendation that a language competence policy be established in the JOT program making certain levels of fluency a requirement for completing the program.

No action was taken on the recommendation, and language training continued as a haphazard activity. There was, of course, some excellent language competence among the JOT's. In 1958, for example, the chief of the program reported that he had nominated ten JOT's with fluency in Russian and Czech as possible interpreters for visits of

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delegations from the USSR and Czechoslovakia on cultural exchange programs. 148/ There is no record of whether or not any of the nominees were accepted. Among the JOT's there was enough language competence to permit cashing in on the "Language Incentive Awards Program."* In March 1960, for example, the chief of the program reported that between October 1959 and March 1960 JOT's had been awarded a total of \$1,200, most for German, Spanish, and French. 149/ In August 1961 the DTR reported that during fiscal year 1961 twenty-three JOT's had been given 31 language awards totaling \$2,662.50. 150/

G. On-the-Job Training

In the original concept of the JOT program, on-the-job training was equal, perhaps greater, in importance to the formal training program. During the first two years, when the JOT's came on board individually when available and were entered into regularly scheduled courses when those courses started, an attempt was made to assign the JOT's to desk training during the intervals of waiting. This, of course, didn't work. Supervisors were reluctant to take nonproductive bodies for short periods of time, there were not enough JOT staff

* See OTR-9.

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officers to help the JOT's find short-term desk assignments, and at that time DDP components would have nothing to do with JOT's -- they were all security risks. Even on-the-job assignments for the JOT's after completion of the formal training program were hard to come by. The program had not yet proved itself; and although some supervisors were glad to get bodies that didn't encumber their slots and put them to work doing clerical chores, very few were willing to do any actual on-the-job training. 151/

In April 1953, however, the JOT staff developed a "coordinated program" for on-the-job training, a program whereby the JOT staff would arrange for a desk assignment for each JOT who completed the formal training. 152/ In conjunction with the JOT staff member, the supervisor wrote out the elements of training that would be given the JOT on the desk assignment and set a definite period for the training. At the end of that period the supervisor would notify the JOT staff of the component's decision about keeping the JOT and assigning him to a position on the component's personnel table of organization. In his 1971 retrospective review of the JOT program, [REDACTED] describes the ^{25X1A} development and the principles involved in it. Because that

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description reflects so well both [REDACTED] philosophy of training and his personal dedication to the JOT program, it is attached to this paper as Appendix C.*

H. Addenda

There are two factors related to the JOT program that should be mentioned at this point but do not warrant discussion in detail. One is the performance evaluation of the JOT's conducted throughout the formal training program, and the other is the change of the name of the Junior Officer Training Program to the Career Training Program.

1. Performance Evaluation. In his original proposal for the establishment of the professional trainee program the DTR made it abundantly clear that the trainee's performance in training would be closely observed and frequently evaluated; his retention in the program and his continued employment with the Agency would depend on the quality of his performance. This principle was upheld throughout the 1951-66 period, and performance evaluation and the reporting of it was one of the important duties of all instructors involved in the program. In his 1956 report of a survey of the JOT program the IG wrote, "While

* P. 210.

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attending training courses, the trainee is under constant observation. His work is evaluated by the instructors and reports of his progress are submitted to the JOT Division."

The methods of evaluation varied with the individual training courses, and the methods changed from time to time over the years. In the Intelligence Orientation course, for example, there was little actual student performance that could be evaluated during the course, and the evaluation was done on the basis of a final examination alone. In the Intelligence Techniques course, on the other hand, there were a dozen or more specific problem-solving exercises, and each was critiqued and graded. During the early years of the program the fitness-report scale was used as the basic evaluation device. In the late 50's the "WAPSO scale" was introduced and used in all courses in the program. This device established five levels of performance -- weak, adequate, proficient, strong, and outstanding. There were times during the 1951-66 period when narrative evaluations were required -- written analyses of the JOT's performance stressing strong points and weaknesses. In the tradecraft courses given [REDACTED] the

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"murder session" was often used -- all instructors in a course would get together and discuss the performance of each JOT and arrive at some common ground for evaluation.

Needless to say, there was never full agreement among the OTR schools, the JOT staff, the A&E staff -- which worked closely with instructors in the evaluation procedure -- and even the instructors in a single course about the best methods of evaluation. An accepted system such as the WAPSO scale, for example, could mean quite different things to different instructors; and no system of evaluation could be free from the element of subjective judgment. Perhaps, after all, it didn't really matter very much what system was used or how it was used. The JOT's knew that they were being evaluated, and they performed accordingly; and the members of the JOT staff, who had to make the final decisions in which the evaluations played a part, knew the students well, knew the instructors well, and were quite capable of evaluating the evaluations.

2. The Name Change. In April 1965 the name of the JOT program was changed to the Career Training Program. The name change actually had no effect whatever on the program itself, but the rationale for the change -- at least that part of it that can be reconstructed from

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documents and memory -- is interesting and warrants mention here.

As noted above, there was for a time a conviction in medium high places in the Agency that all new professional employees should be brought in through the JOT program. It occurred to someone -- his identity is not recorded -- that some of the new professionals would be specialists more mature than most JOT's and might be reluctant to accept jobs with the Agency if it required entry with a "junior" stigma; ergo, the "junior" must be eradicated.

The first step in the eradication procedure came in January 1965 when [REDACTED] then chief of the JOT program, met with several ^{25X1A} O/Pers officers, including the Director of Personnel and the chief of the Personnel Procurement Division, to discuss the wisdom of changing the name of the program. 153/ The group decided that it would be wise to change the name and agreed to recommend to Colonel Lawrence K. White, then the DDS, that the name be changed from the Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP) to the Career Selection and Training Program (CSTP). The recommendation was made, and at some point between submittal and approval the "Selection" was dropped and the program became the CTP.

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V. Placement after Training

A. Early Procedures

1. Summary through 1955. The general procedures, those developed during the early years of the program, for the placement of JOT's after the completion of formal training and on-the-job training have already been mentioned in various sections of this history. Perhaps the best general summary of those procedures is that given by the IG in his February 1956 report of a survey of the program conducted late in 1955:

In making the initial assignment the directors of the JOT Program take into consideration the aptitudes and desires of the trainee and make every effort to place him in the most suitable position. Arrangements are made with the appropriate supervisor to take the trainee into his organization for a period of from three to twelve months to give him an opportunity to learn its functions by participating in them. This method of assignment on a trial basis benefits both supervisor and trainee. During this period of employment the trainee prepares progress reports at regular intervals for the JOT Division. The supervisor also submits reports to the JOT Division describing the trainee's activities and evaluating his performance. Both of these reports are prepared in narrative form which keeps them from being stereotyped and hence more valuable. [*]

* It must be assumed that the IG meant that the reports were more valuable because they were not stereotyped.

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While in the job assignment, the trainee remains on the T/O of the OTR. This provides the JOT Program with the ability to make assignments without the need for submitting to the time-consuming delays of normal administrative processes. It also permits the assignment of trainees to any component without regard for the limitations of personnel ceilings. This method provides the JOT Program with unusual flexibility and mobility in making assignments. It is, of course, subject to abuse by shortsighted supervisors who view it as a means of acquiring a high calibre employee at no cost to them. It also tends to become a form of paternalism in that the trainee is not exposed to the competition of his fellow workers and can always retreat to the shelter of the JOT Program and request reassignment if the situation is not to his liking.

In another section of the report the IG gives figures on the component distribution of JOT graduates as of 31 August 1955. At that time a total of 139 had completed the program: 85 had been assigned to the DDP staffs and area divisions, 43 had been assigned to the Offices of the DDI, and 11 had been assigned to the Offices of the DDS. Also at that time there were 43 JOT's in a training status and not yet assigned. It should be noted that all of the 85 assigned to DDP components had been so assigned after 1953; before that time the DDP was not interested in the product of the program, and all of the graduates went into the DDI components. Actually, then, from the beginning of 1954 through August 1955 the DDP-assignment trend became firmly established and set the pattern for assignment thereafter.

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2. Weakness in the System. The IG did not identify the preponderance of DDP assignments as a major cause, but he did point out that there were certain faults in the assignment system. In the paragraphs quoted above he qualified the advantages of the system by mentioning abuses by "shortsighted supervisors" and a form of "paternalism." Later in the report, he describes the placement system as "too hit or miss" and dependent upon the temporary needs of components as opposed to a "scheduled program based on prior study of the professional requirements of each major Agency component resulting from normal attrition." He points out that a scheduled program for the placement of JOT's after training would necessarily involve a scheduled program for the recruitment of JOT's and the systematic entering-on-duty of a predetermined number of JOT's each year. His specific recommendation is directed toward that end:

That the DCI direct the establishment of quotas to govern the recruitment of career trainees for each of the three major components of the Agency, i. e. DD/P, DD/S, and DD/I; such quotas to be directly proportionate to the professional attrition rate of each component.

Perhaps because the recommendation was directed toward the recruiting phase of the program rather than the placement phase, no immediate official action was taken toward establishing a system of

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component quotas for placement of JOT's after training. An early 1960 OTR study of the program applauds the work of the JOT staff in finding proper post-training assignments for JOT's but laments the lack of a sound placement system. 154/ The study recommends that each major component be "properly tooled up" for the assignment of a specific number of JOT graduates each year and that the requirements for the graduates be brought into "close balance" with the supply. The study assumed that the DDI and the DDS could do these things "in stride" but "the DDP will likely have trouble until its assignment system is more tightly centralized." By the end of 1959, then, no practicable system of placement quotas had been developed.

B. Development of Requirements

1. Informal Estimates. Early in 1959, however, the JOT staff had made informal and unofficial arrangements with the individual DDP components to submit estimates of their JOT graduate requirements. In March 1959 the JOT staff reported that the "tentative" requirements submitted by DDP components for the JOT's who would finish the current OC in August were much greater than the total number of JOT's in the class and that the staff had requested the components to place

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priorities on their requirements so that an equitable distribution could be made. 155/ Obviously the estimates of requirements had been made without reference to the available supply.

In February 1960 the JOT staff tried to approach reality by establishing its own quotas for component assignments. On the basis of the number of JOT's in a training status at the time, the staff judged that during calendar year 1960 there would be 123 program graduates and that 90 of these would be assigned to the DDP, 25 to the DDI, and eight to the DDS. 156/

2. DDP Action. Apparently this show of unilateral realism moved the DDP to take action on the problem. There is no record of the channels through which the pressures were applied, but in June 1960 the Deputy Director for Plans officially directed Panel C of the Clandestine Services Career Service Board to coordinate the placement of JOT graduates in the DDP. 157/ The panel was ordered to canvass the staffs and area divisions and get firm commitments for both on-the-job training and permanent assignments for JOT's; the panel was also to ratify the transfer of all DDP-assigned graduates from JOT slots to DDP slots.


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C. Expansion of Requirements

1. New Consumers. Between 1960 and 1966 new requirements were levied on the JOT program by Agency components that had not previously taken JOT graduates. Several of the administrative units of the Office of the DCI requested the assignment of JOT's; the DDI Office of National Estimates requested assignment of one JOT; and

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THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
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THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
1950-1966

OTR-11

by

[REDACTED] 25X1A

25X1A

Approved by:

[REDACTED]
Alfonso Rodríguez
Director of Training
Directorate for
Management and Services
June 1973

HISTORICAL STAFF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Foreword

In preparing the material for the writing of this report on the Junior Officer Training Program, the historian was confronted with an embarrassment of riches. The records of the origin of the program and its later development have been kept with meticulous care and nice discrimination; all of the basic documents were preserved, key papers related to change and expansion were kept in logical order, and notes on significant details were retained to lend color and life to the chronology. The historian's tasks here were basically those of selection, interpretation, evaluation, and -- finally, of course -- the compression of a host of documentary information into a coherent and readable story. Whatever success he may have achieved should be credited to those unheralded people who, over the years, have kept the records of the Junior Officer Training Program with what must have been a feeling of personal involvement.

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THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM

1950 - 1966

I. Origin and Early Development

A. Background

The origin and early development of the Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP) can best be described against the background out of which the program arose. In a real sense, the program was a product of the pressures of the time. The following paragraphs identify those pressures and describe the responses to them.

1. The Agency Climate, October 1950. On 7 October 1950, when General Walter B. Smith became the Director of Central Intelligence, 1/* CIA was little more than three years old and was still in a stage of organizational infancy. Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, whom Smith succeeded, had been DCI both before and after the activation of CIA in September 1947 -- before, of course, as the director of the Central Intelligence Group -- and had nurtured the new Agency through the early formative years. Smith faced the problem of bringing the Agency to maturity and building an organization that would have

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix D.

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the full capability of meeting the responsibilities outlined in the National Security Act of 1947 and satisfying the many and varied requirements implicit in those responsibilities -- requirements that appeared to multiply geometrically with the advent of the Korean War.

In October 1950 most of the intelligence officers in the Agency were men who had served in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, had stayed with the Strategic Services Unit after OSS was abolished, and had come to CIA through the short-lived CIG organization. They were competent, experienced intelligence officers, but they constituted only a cadre; the cadre was quite capable of providing the leadership needed at the time, but there was no reservoir of experienced manpower from which future leaders could be drawn. Neither was there, of course, any facility -- either academic or government -- capable of developing a reservoir of trained intelligence officers.

At the time, the Agency did have an excellent training component, the OSO/OPC Training Division (TRD), but the work of the TRD was oriented toward specialized training in the specific skills necessary to the conduct of clandestine activities. There was no systematic program directed toward the recruiting and training of

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people for the intelligence profession. Smith was faced, then, with the problem of building for the future without a reliable source of building materials. The establishment of the JOT program was a concrete manifestation of his determination to solve the problem.

2. The Appointment of Colonel Baird.* An interesting example of the development of organizational mythology is the generally accepted belief in the Agency, particularly in OTR, that late in 1950 Smith arranged with the US Air Force to have Colonel Matthew Baird recalled to active duty and assigned to the Agency to organize and develop a program designed to train people for the intelligence profession. Baird himself had no part in the generation of this myth; indeed, he did everything that he could to dispel the illusion. It persisted, however, and actually it did no real harm; but the historical record need not be garnished with myth.

Baird was on active duty with the US Army throughout World War II, primarily as a troop commander in the Pacific Theater of Operations. After the war, he was detached to inactive-duty status, and when the US Air Force was established in 1947 he became a

* The factual information in this section is based on Matthew Baird's recollections of the period. 2/

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member of the Air Force Reserve. After the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, Baird was recalled to active duty, and in November he reported to the Pentagon without any knowledge of what his assignment would be.

At the same time that Smith was appointed DCI in October 1950, William H. Jackson, a prominent New York attorney who had served the government in an important civilian role during World War II, was appointed Deputy to Smith.* Jackson and Baird had been roommates at Princeton University during their undergraduate years and had continued a close friendship thereafter. Jackson knew, of course, that Baird had been recalled to active duty and had not been assigned; he also knew that Baird had had experience in the administration of educational programs and had, in his military role as troop commander, demonstrated a high capability in the direction and management of people.

* Jackson resigned from staff status in the Agency on 23 August 1951 but continued to serve as Special Assistant and Senior Consultant to the DCI. He was followed in the DDCI position by Allen W. Dulles.

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The juxtaposition of the two events -- Baird's recall to active duty and Smith's urgent need for a man to develop and manage a career development program -- was a fortuitous one, and Jackson took the logical step. He recommended that Smith take the action necessary to have Baird assigned to the Agency under the established Air Force allotment of officers to CIA. During November 1950 Jackson arranged to have Baird meet Smith -- without informing Baird of the real reason for the meeting. There followed two or three other meetings, ostensibly social ones, during which Smith and Baird discussed -- within a more-or-less abstract military context -- the problems of officer development and career management.

During this period Baird was waiting for the Pentagon's decision on his assignment; according to his recollection of the situation, he was completely surprised when Smith told him what that assignment would be. Apparently neither Baird nor the Agency waited for the official papers on the assignment. There is in official files a document -- cited in the following section of this history -- obviously prepared by Baird and dated 30 November 1950; and CIA General Order 38, "Designation of CIA Officials," dated 1 December 1950,

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lists Baird as Director of Training. Baird recalls that the Air Force orders assigning him to the Agency carried an effective date of 2 January 1951. Whatever the cause of the discrepancy -- faulty recollection or bureaucratic expediency -- it has no bearing on the origin of the JOT program or on the emergence of the career service concept of which the program was a part.

There was, however, another factor in the appointment of Baird that did have a bearing. That was Smith's decision to bring into the Agency from the outside a man to develop the career service. There was in the Agency at the time a Personnel Office with a competent senior officer in charge, and career development was a standard function of the personnel component of an organization -- including military organizations. The probable explanation of Smith's deviation from standard practice is that the senior personnel officer was not a military man, and Smith felt that only a military officer could do the kind of job he wanted done. The consequences of Smith's action were serious and lasting. Most of the senior officers of the Agency at the time were members of the OSS alumni club; Baird was an intruder -- without any intelligence experience whatever -- brought in to do a job that could have been done by a member of the club; he was looked upon

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as Smith's "boy," and the club members resented him. This resentment was open and obvious during the early years of Baird's service with the Agency, and vestiges of it were apparent in the years that followed. Undoubtedly it was a major factor in the rough treatment that most of the senior officers gave to Baird's formal proposal for the establishment of a career service in the Agency -- a situation that is described in some detail in an earlier history.*

3. Emergence of the Career Service Concept.** Unfortunately, but understandably, no records were kept of the informal discussions, both before and after Baird's appointment, in which Smith described for Baird his concept of what an Agency career service should be. Such records might have explained the motivations behind some of Baird's subsequent actions -- and, of course, might have identified the origin of the troublesome "elite corps" label, which is reviewed below. In any event, there were a number of such discussions; and before Baird took any action at all, he was thoroughly familiar with Smith's ideas and desires.

* OTR-5, pp. 26-33.

** The undocumented information in this section is based on Baird's recollections. See footnote, p. 3, above.

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These ideas and desires first appeared in document form in a 30 November 1950 paper prepared by Baird and submitted to the "Executive" (a title which was changed in December 1950 to Deputy Director for Administration -- DDA), under whom Baird's program was initially placed.* This paper was a "Proposal" of the function of the Director of Training (DTR). 3/ It reflected Smith's conviction that the DTR should be "responsible for developing and directing all Agency training programs," and it listed two specific functions. The first of these was the DTR's responsibility to "design, establish and direct a program for the pre-employment selection, guidance and development of individuals for careers" in the Agency. The second was the responsibility to "design, direct the establishment of, and supervise an orientation and in-service training program for all staff employees."

The first of these two proposed specific functions contains all but one of the basic elements of what later became the JOT Program: pre-employment selection, guidance, and development; the one element that is not included is post-training job placement. The paper's brief description of this first specific function contains some elements that

* In 1952 the Office of Training was removed from the DDA area, and the DTR reported directly to the Office of the DCI.

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were not subsequently adopted as parts of the JOT program: the tailoring of an individual "development" program for each of the trainees, and the selection of trainees "no later than college graduation (or its vocational equivalent) but in most cases not later than the sophomore year." Between 30 November 1950 and 3 July 1951, when a more detailed proposal was submitted, both of these elements were dropped.* The 30 November 1950 proposal was marked "O.K." and initialed by the DDA, Murray McConnel; and Baird began immediately to put the first function into action. By mid-July 1951, a group of professional trainees had been recruited, screened, selected, and entered on duty in a training status.**

Having initiated action on that part of Smith's career service concept that could be started without getting enmeshed in the Agency's complex coordination machinery, Baird went to work on a detailed proposal for the creation of a career service development program. By the end of June 1951, the work had been completed, and on 3 July the DTR submitted to the DCI "A Proposal to Establish and Implement

* See below, p. 43.

** See below, p. 13.

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a Career Corps Program in CIA." 4/ This was a 72-page staff study of which the first 18 pages were devoted to discussion; 18 appendixes followed. In essence, the study proposed two programs which, together, would constitute the Career Corps Program: a program to "select, recruit, and train young men and women of great promise, and to place them in the Agency where they will be of the greatest use" and a program to "devise a method of identifying those employees of the Agency who have the highest potential for further development; to train and rotate them within and outside the Agency in such a way that they will develop the greatest usefulness to the Agency; and to place them in the most important positions." 5/

The first of these two programs, of course, was already in motion at the time the staff study was submitted. The second ran into rough going at the outset and -- except for a short-lived adaptation of it under the direction of the Office of Personnel* -- never did develop as Baird had proposed. As noted above,** the problems of the second program, identified as the "Career Corps Candidate" program in the

* See below, p. 74.

** See footnote, p. 7, above.

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staff study -- are discussed in an earlier historical paper and will be discussed here only to the extent that the program affected or was affected by the JOT program, which is identified in the staff study as the "Professional Trainee" program. It would be of interest, however, to mention at this point that the problems of the "Career Corps Candidate" program were foreshadowed very early in the game. After Smith received Baird's 3 July staff study, he sent it to the Assistant Director for Personnel for comment; implementation of both phases of the overall career corps program would require the closest coordination of the training office and the personnel office. On 24 July the Assistant Director for Personnel, Brigadier General F. Trubee Davison, USA, responded to the DCI. 6/ In the fourth paragraph of his memorandum, he said that he was "in hearty accord with the proposal, subject to the above minor qualifications. . . ." The minor qualifications included one that said,

Because the Agency is generally understaffed now and in order to gain the essential cooperations of the Assistant Directors, I suggest that rotation of the present Agency employees selected for the Career Corps be delayed until operating offices are nearer to their table of organization goals.

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Davison's memorandum was returned to him with a "1st Indorsement": "I do so approve. W.B.S." The delay, then, was recommended and approved; and thereby hangs the unhappy tale of the gradual demise of a part of the career corps concept. The other part of it, however, was very much alive.

B. The First Professional Trainees

Following the DDA's approval of Baird's 30 November 1950 proposal of the functions of the DTR, a personnel allotment of 100 "professional trainee" positions to be filled from "academic sources" had been granted to OTR. 7/ The Agency's field recruiters had been informed of the new program, and Baird and his chief assistant at the time, [REDACTED] had established informal contacts within the faculties of several universities. By March 1951 recruiting was in progress; by April a general program for training the recruits had been designed; and the first training was scheduled to begin on 9 July. 8/ The following paragraphs will describe the general background and qualifications of the group that entered this first program, the content of the training given them, and the management of the program.

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1. Background and Qualifications. The first group of professional trainees began the training program on 9 July 1951, as scheduled. There were 17 people in the group, 16 men and one woman. The youngest student was 21; the oldest was 28; the average age was 24. All of them had Bachelor degrees, three had M.A.'s, and three had LL.B.'s. The colleges and universities they had attended were Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Williams, Syracuse, Wesleyan, George Washington, Smith, Oxford, Wisconsin, and Denver. Seven of the students had majored in Political Science and five in Economics; the other major fields of study were English, Law, History, Psychology, Philosophy, French Literature, and Public Administration. Within the group there was some degree of fluency in Latin, Greek, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and Norwegian. Nine of them had completed military service, and eight had had foreign residence or travel.

In a general sense, this first group established the pattern of backgrounds and qualifications that was to characterize the JOT program thereafter. In later years there was, of course, a great increase in the number and geographical spread of colleges and universities represented, and there was an increase in both the average

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age level and the relative number of graduate degrees. It is altogether remarkable, however, that only seven months after the junior professional trainee concept had been approved, standards and procedures had been established and a group of prototype trainees had been recruited and processed and entered into a training program.

2. The Training Program. The original program designed for the JOT's* called for 14 weeks of formal training and two or three months of on-the-job training. The 14-week segment of the program consisted of mornings devoted to the study of the nature and function of intelligence and afternoons spent in study of the Russian language. The students were enrolled in the Basic Intelligence Course then being given by the Training (Overt) component of OTR. The Russian language study was done [REDACTED] with which OTR had 25X1A established an external training contract; at that time, the Agency had no internal capability for foreign language training.

* This term was not applied to the junior professional trainees in 1951; it is used here in the interests of convenience and clarity. The first term used for the group was "Career Corps Candidates" (p. 11, above). The JOT designation was first used in September 1952 (p. 92, below). In April 1965 the designation was changed to CT -- Career Trainees (pp. 51 and 138, below). The term used for the program was changed in the same sequence -- from Career Corps Candidate Program to Junior Officer Training Program to Career Training Program.

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The on-the-job segment of the training program began after the completion of the 14 weeks of formal training. The students retained their OTR personnel slots and were assigned to the Agency's substantive divisions for periods of time usually determined by the divisions. At the completion of the period of on-the-job training, the students were assigned to the divisions in which they had been working, if the assignment was mutually agreeable, or were given a different on-the-job training assignment if such a course seemed warranted. The post-training duty assignments of the first group of trainees were all to non-clandestine components of the Agency. At that time, there were still formidable barriers between the Agency's overt and clandestine elements; not until early 1953 did the Clandestine Services begin to accept JOT's.

3. Program Management. The management of the first group of JOT's was initially handled by Baird and his chief assistant, [REDACTED] 5X1A -- both of whom, of course, had other jobs to do. It was apparent from the outset that the management of the program would be a full-time job, and Baird persuaded [REDACTED] 25X1A [REDACTED] 25X1A to come into the Agency for a one-year 25X1A period to manage the JOT program. [REDACTED] entered on duty on

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30 September 1951 and took over the program. 9/ His staff consisted of one clerk-stenographer at the time; in February 1952 an additional clerical person was assigned to the staff.

By the time that [REDACTED] took over the job, the trainee group^{25X1A} on board had increased; and by the end of 1951, there were 37 students^{25X1A} in the program. 10/ [REDACTED] actually stayed with the Agency only until 13 April 1952. Because his service was clearly understood to be temporary, Baird had sought for a permanent chief of the program; and^{25X1A} on 20 February 1952, [REDACTED] reported for duty. [REDACTED]^{25X1A} took over the position of chief when [REDACTED] left. By April 1952, the "military agreements" phase of the JOT program had been established,^{25X1A} and [REDACTED] was temporarily assigned to the staff^{25X1A} to handle it. Thus when [REDACTED] became Chief, JOTP, his staff consisted of two clerical aides and one temporary training officer. Perhaps it should be noted at this point that -- as will become apparent later in this history -- the growth and outstanding success of the JOT program were largely the result of [REDACTED] dedication to the program,^{25X1A} his tireless efforts to keep the quality high, and his wisdom and forbearance in facing the many problems that had to be solved during his eleven years as chief.

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C. The Military Service Agreements*

1. Background. One of the major problems that faced the designers of the professional trainee program at the outset was the immediate draft eligibility of most young men at the completion of their academic studies. The colleges and universities of the country were to be the major sources of recruits for the program, and obviously these sources would not be very productive unless some method was found whereby the Agency could recruit draft-eligible young men. This problem must have been discussed at some length during those early unrecorded conversations between Smith and Baird, and a plan must have been made. In March 1951 Smith initiated the action to implement the plan.** Baird's 3 July staff study does not include the plan, but it does indicate clearly that one had been developed. The study includes a flow-chart showing how the professional trainee program would work, from the selection of the trainee to his post-training placement. 11/ In the recruitment and processing segment of that

* The subject of the Agency's relationships with the military services and with the Selective Service is covered in greater detail in Support Services Historical paper OP-5, Mobilization and Military Personnel Division, 1946-70, by [REDACTED] September 1971, S25X1A

** See footnote, p. 19, below.

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chart, there is a dotted-line box -- all of the other boxes on the chart are solid-line boxes -- in which appears the legend: "Men who have not satisfied their military obligation go into one of the services at our discretion." Also in the study there is an appendix titled "Arrangements with Armed Forces for Training of Professional Trainees," and beneath the title appears this notation: "This appendix will be written when negotiations with the Department of Defense are successfully completed." 12/

By 3 July 1951, then, a plan had been developed, and the implementation of it was in progress. Actually, there was already at that time a near prototype for such a plan. As of 1 June 1951 there was an allowance of 401 active-duty commissioned military personnel assigned to the Agency, and 385 were on board. 13/ Baird mentions this fact in his 3 July staff study -- not as a prototype for the military agreements related to professional trainees but as a segment of the on-duty Agency personnel that should be included in the Career Corps program.

Needless to say, the implementation of the military service agreements and the subsequent coordination of them involved massive paper work, and it would be unprofitable here to give a step-by-step

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chronology of the action.* The following paragraphs, then, limit discussion to a summary treatment of the agreements themselves, the procedures followed to put them into action, the major problems that developed, and an evaluation of the military service phase of the overall JOT program. Details of situations and developments are included only when those details serve to clarify by illustration and exemplification.

2. The Basic Agreements. The basic agreements between the Agency and the four military services -- Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps -- were negotiated and established between March and September 1951.** The original proposals submitted to the Department of Defense and the four component services were signed by Smith, and there was no delay in the affirmative responses to them. Essentially the four agreements were the same: the military service would accept for officer candidate training a quota-determined number of young men nominated by the Agency, would provide the training necessary to qualify them for commissions, and would then return

* Copies of all of the basic documents involved are available in the files of the OTR Career Training Staff.

** The initial proposal was made in a 5 March 1951 letter from Smith to the Secretary of Defense. 14/

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them to the Agency to serve in an active-duty status until the time when their military obligation had been completed and they could be converted to civilian status. These agreements were not restricted to young men recruited for the Agency's professional trainee program; on-duty employees of the Agency were also covered. 15/

There were, of course, certain restrictions common to all four agreements and some differences among the agreements. The common restrictions were those prohibiting the Agency from recruiting people already on active duty with one of the military services, graduates of the service academies, and people who had completed an ROTC program in a college or university.* The differences among the four agreements were those related to the quotas of Agency-sponsored OCS trainees and the duration of military training before the return of the trainees to the Agency. These differences are specified below.

* In 1954 the ROTC restriction was removed from the Army agreement and in 1956 from the Air Force agreement, and the Agency was permitted to recruit college graduates with reserve commissions.

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3. Procedures. The military agreements, necessarily, were predicated on the assumption that the Agency would make the necessary preliminary arrangements with the Selective Service Commission. In September 1951, such arrangements were made by Smith with the Director of Selective Service. Basically, the agreement provided that Selective Service would approve official Agency requests for the draft deferment of specified individuals with the provision that the individuals would be entered into a military Officer Candidate School within six months after the granting of the deferment. There was also a provision whereby the Agency could request a "stay of induction" for an individual after his local draft board had notified him of his induction date; the stay of induction could be requested for 60, 90, or 120 days, and only one stay-of-induction request for any one individual would be honored.

Although the arrangement with the Selective Service authorities was generally workable, it was not flexible enough to accommodate the Agency's security clearance procedures -- particularly when the stay-of-induction device was used. A candidate could not be assured of admission to the Agency's program until he had been fully cleared, and all too often there was a breath-held finish in the race to

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complete the security check before the expiration of the stay of induction. In May 1953 the DTR partially solved this problem by arranging for the provisional clearance of candidates for the JOT Officer Candidate School program. 16/

The procedures for the selection of JOT-OCS candidates for acceptance in the Agency program were the same as those applied to other JOTP candidates; they will be described in some detail later in this history. After selection and clearance, the JOT-OCS trainee entered on duty with the Agency and, along with the non-OCS JOT's, completed the first segment of the training program -- the Basic Intelligence Course or its later equivalent. Thereafter he went through the military enlistment procedures and was assigned to one of the four military services -- usually the one of his choice -- for officer candidate training.

The procedures in the OCS training varied with the individual services. The Army trainees were first processed for basic training -- early in the program at Fort Meade, Maryland, and after 1953 at Fort Knox, Kentucky. At the completion of basic training, the trainees -- without attending "Leadership School" -- were sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, for Officer Candidate School. Before August 1953

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there were two possible types of assignment for the trainee after completing OCS: if the Agency planned to assign the trainee only to headquarters duty after completion of his OCS training, he would be assigned directly to CIA on active-duty status; if the Agency planned to use the man in an overseas assignment, he would be assigned to a one-year tour of duty with a military component overseas. This option feature was a part of the original basic agreement with the Army -- as it was with the other three services -- and the determination of the option was to be made by the Agency. In August 1953, on the recommendation of [REDACTED] Chief of the JOTP, the option feature was eliminated 25X1A from all four of the military agreements, and all JOT-OCS trainees were assigned to troop or ship duty before returning to the Agency.

In either event -- whether the trainee returned to the Agency at the completion of OCS or at the completion of a tour of duty abroad -- he was re-entered into the JOT program for whatever formal and on-the-job training was required at the time of his return. He then remained on active-duty status, assigned to the Agency, until the expiration of his required period of military service, and then converted to civilian status as a staff employee of the Agency.

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The OCS training procedures in the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps followed the same general pattern as those of the Army. The Navy OCS trainees reported directly to the OCS at Newport, Rhode Island. After they finished the course, the Agency had the same general assignment option described above; the Navy's requirement for preparation for Agency service overseas was one year of sea duty. Air Force trainees reported to Lackland Air Force Base at San Antonio, Texas, for both basic training and OCS. The overseas preparation requirement was also one year of service abroad, but the Air Force offered additional options; Agency-sponsored OCS graduates could be sent to the Army Language School at Monterey, California, or to one or another of the Air Force special schools, including the Strategic Intelligence School. Marine Corps OCS trainees were sent to Quantico, Virginia, for ten weeks of basic training after which they were commissioned and given a 22-week Basic Officers' Course. Although the Agency's agreement with the Marine Corps included the option clause, the Corps strongly recommended that all Agency-sponsored Marine officers serve a year of active duty with the Corps; otherwise, they could not properly represent themselves as Marine Corps Officers.

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In addition to the clause in the basic Army Agreement permitting optional assignment after OCS, there was a clause permitting the Agency to request a waiver for any JOT-OCS trainee who, during the basic training period, developed a physical condition that would disqualify him for OCS but was not serious enough to disqualify him for enlisted service. The waiver would permit the man to enter OCS and return to the Agency for the completion of his military service. 17/

4. Problems

a. The Quotas. The original agreements with the military services established a quota of 180 positions that could be used by the Agency for the JOT-OCS program -- 50 Army, 65 Air Force, 55 Navy, and 10 Marine Corps. For some unexplained reason, perhaps clerical error, the Chief of the Military Personnel Division of the Personnel Office informed the DTR in a 21 August 1951 memorandum that the total quota was 150 positions -- 57 Army, 50 Air Force, 36 Navy, and 7 Marine Corps -- and assigned individual quotas based on those figures to the operating offices throughout the Agency. 18/ Baird recognized the error but accepted the figures because correction of it would mean a revision of the quotas already assigned to the various Agency

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offices and also because at the time it was obvious that the actual intake of JOT-OCS trainees would fall far below the total 150 figure.

19/ His second reason foreshadowed the course of future events.

More than a year later, in October 1952, only 18 of the 57 Army, 14 of the 50 Air Force, 15 of the 36 Navy, and 3 of the 7 Marine Corps positions had been filled, a total of 50 of the 150 available slots. 20/ Actually, these figures did not indicate a recruiting shortfall. The OCS programs and the subsequent time on active duty covered a period of about three years; if recruiting had continued at the rate indicated by the October 1952 figures and there had been no trainee attrition, the quotas would have been filled by the end of 1954. Recruiting did not continue at the same rate, however, and there was some attrition. In February 1953 there were 12 JOT-OCS trainees who had returned to the Agency after the military phase of their training and 43 who were at some point within the military phases -- a total of 55 in the overall program. 21/ In April 1954, more than a year later, the total was still the same, 22/ and it remained at that approximate level thereafter.

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The failure of the JOT-OCS program to achieve and maintain a full-quota level is explained by two conditions. First, the program was initiated soon after the Korean War began; and in the hot-war climate at the time, it appeared that it would be both in great demand by draft-eligible young men and of great benefit to the Agency. The demand never actually developed. Second, the rate of attrition in the JOT-OCS program was greater than had been anticipated. Some students dropped out during the OCS phase, some elected to remain in the military services and not return to the Agency, and some resigned from the Agency at the completion of the required service period. From the beginning of the program in 1951 to the end of 1959, for example, 152 young men -- about 30 percent of all of the males recruited for the JOT program -- had been entered into the JOT-OCS agreements. Of these 152 JOT-OCS trainees, 69 had either dropped out, stayed in the military service, or resigned from the Agency. 23/ The rate of attrition was very high, and the input to the program was not keeping pace. In calendar year 1958, for example, only 14 trainees entered the program and in 1959 only nine. 24/

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b. The 1956 IG Report. The high rate of attrition in the JOT-OCS program had become a matter of concern to the Agency as early as 1955. During the latter part of that year, the CIA Inspector General conducted a survey of the JOT program; and in his report, released in February 1956, he recommended that the OCS phase of the program be terminated -- giving the attrition rate as his major reason for the recommendation. 25/ In March 1956 the DDS proposed to the DCI that action on the IG's recommendation be deferred for one year, and the DCI approved. 26/

In December 1956 the DDS asked Baird* for his comments on the IG's proposal. In April 1957 Baird replied. 28/ He admitted that the attrition rate had been high -- of the total of 70 JOT-OCS trainees up to that date, only 36 were still with the Agency, an attrition rate of 48.6 percent -- but insisted that the program had advantages that more than offset the one disadvantage; and he described those advantages in detail. He recommended continuation of the

* Baird retained his military rank until 22 June 1953, when he reverted to civilian status. 27/

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JOT-OCS program. On 5 April the DDS approved the DTR's recommendation; on 10 April General Charles P. Cabell, then Acting DCI, approved it; and thereafter the program continued. 29/

c. Changes in Agreements. Through the 1951-66 period alterations were proposed, and many made, in the OCS agreements with the military services. Most of these had little direct bearing on the management and conduct of the JOT-OCS program, but all of them posed problems. Some of the minor changes have been noted above -- the termination of the "option" clause in the agreements and the lifting of the ROTC restriction, for example. There were, however, a few changes that were of some importance and warrant mention here.

In 1955 the Navy informed the Agency that the salaries and other costs of maintaining the JOT-OCS trainees during the required year of sea duty would have to be paid by the Agency. Dulles, then the DCI, objected strongly to this, and there was no compromise; the Navy agreement was terminated. 30/ Before the end of 1959, the Army OCS agreement was abandoned because virtually none of the JOT-OCS trainees could be persuaded to elect the Army OCS program.* 31/

* In September 1966, a new agreement with the Army was negotiated, and the Army OCS program was resumed.

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The Army agreement on ROTC, negotiated in 1957, continued in force, however. Early in 1962 the Air Force decided to send the Agency trainees to their Officer Training School (OTS) instead of their OCS.

32/ The change did not affect the procedures involved in the program, but it created a paper-work problem.

5. Conclusions. The military services agreements and the programs that were developed to implement them never did, perhaps, come up to what was expected of them. The paper work, the coordination, and the actual management of the programs created a major and continuing demand for the expenditure of personnel time and effort; and, quantitatively, the end product was slight in terms of the intake of permanent career intelligence officers for the Agency. Perhaps the best justification for the JOT-OCS program -- a justification that was as valid at the end of 1965 as it was in 1957 -- is that presented by Baird in his 1 April 1957 memorandum recommending that the program not be terminated 33/:

Through this program the Agency is able to recruit many able employees who otherwise would not be attracted to CIA.

Those who remain with us after completing active duty are of very high quality and represent a substantial gain to the Agency.

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All do valuable work while with the Agency, and those who remain are well prepared, through training and work experience, to carry on in responsible assignments.

Experience in the Program will motivate some who leave either to continue their education or to try other work, to return later to CIA.

All participants develop a good cover status which can be extremely useful in subsequent activities.

Those who leave us constitute an informed "Alumni Association" which may be of very considerable potential value to the Agency.

D. The Elite Corps Concept

Any historical account of the origin and development of the JOT program would be remiss if it failed to describe, in at least some measure, the unhappy emergence of the "elite corps" concept -- if concept it was -- and the oftentimes troublesome consequence of that emergence. Other Agency historians have discussed it, some in a veritable orgy of scholarly footnoting 34/ and in an earlier historical paper the present writer dismissed it with a curt footnote: "The origin of the term 'elite corps', as applied to the OTR Junior Officer Training Program, has been a subject for extensive and interesting, but unproductive, controversy." 35/ Neither the writers of the scholarly dissection nor the writer of the curt dismissal, however, had access

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to all the sources at the time of writing -- or, rather, to the one most illuminating source, the recollections of Baird. Subsequently, Baird's recall of the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the elite corps concept became available; the following account is a collation of Baird's written recollections and the evidence furnished by the relevant documents.

The first documentary mention of the elite corps -- the one that started all the trouble -- appeared in Appendix I (eye) of Baird's 3 July 1951 staff study proposing the establishment of a career corps in the Agency. 36/ The title of Appendix I is Identification of Career Corps: Career Management Program. The first sentence under the title is "In this study of career or career management development there is carried forward the conception of a limited and elite group implied in General Smith's letter to the Honorable John McCloy, 17 March 1951." In the Introduction section of the staff study, that part of Smith's letter containing the "implication" is quoted:

I am trying to build up a corps of well qualified men here who are interested in making a career with the Central Intelligence Agency. To effect this, I recently established a training section which functions -- as much as I dislike the term -- as a sort of career management office.

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Obviously, the quotation is given to establish the fact that a career corps program was Smith's idea and desire. Equally obviously, it is difficult to find in Smith's words any implication of an elite corps concept.

This, at least, was the conclusion reached by the chiefs of all the CIA Offices and Area Divisions after the staff study was sent to them on 7 August 1951 with a request for their written comments. 37/ On 13 September the DTR sent to the DCI a summary of the written comments submitted by the Office and Area Division chiefs; there was disagreement "in some quarters," support for basic principles in others, and "general approval" of OTR's recruitment and training plans and career management proposals; there was, however, "unanimous disapproval" of the "elite corps" concept. 38/ On 17 September, the career corps proposal was discussed at the DCI's staff conference, and the DCI concluded the discussion by vetoing the elite corps aspect of the plan. 39/

Thus the elite corps concept died in conference. Its ghost, however, continued to inhabit the halls of the Agency and haunt the Office of Training. Any criticism, no matter how inconsequential, of the JOT program or of anyone connected with it was sure to include

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reference to the elite corps concept, and gradually the phrase "elite corps" acquired the connotations of snobbism and preferential treatment.*

So much for what the documentary evidence -- or part of it -- reveals about the emergence and official demise of the elite corps concept. As usual, however, the documentary evidence does not tell the whole story -- and, of course, there were bits and pieces of documentary evidence that were ignored when Baird was branded with the stigma of having originated the elite corps concept and, by implication, attributing its origin to Smith. With the aid of Baird's recollections, the introduction of additional documentary evidence, and some judicious speculation,** perhaps the whole story can be told.

Baird recalls that during those early, unrecorded conversations with Smith about developing a corps of professional intelligence officers, Smith frequently used the "elite corps" term and even used the German

* As late as March 1971, the ghost was summoned to bolster an official request that the CT (formerly JOT) program be "re-examined." The document says that "the danger of elitism, always present in the CT program, has been considerably heightened. . . . Many CT's expect quick advancement and good assignments simply because 'they are superior.'" 40/

** The speculation is that of the writer of this history -- not Baird's.

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General Staff concept as an analogy. Against this background there was, indeed, in the General's letter to Mr. McCloy an elite corps implication. The Office and Area Division chiefs did not, of course, have this background; and when they unanimously objected to the elite corps idea -- attributing it to Baird, at that time an inexperienced upstart in the intelligence business -- Smith apparently found it politic to agree with them without revealing his own part in the origin of the idea. In all justice to Smith, it should be remembered that he was relatively new on the job, most of his Office and Area Division chiefs were old hands well established in the organization, and he had to depend upon their support. Permitting Baird to carry the elite corps onus on his back was, perhaps, a justifiable compromise with his conscience.

One factor that was, oddly, ignored in assigning the elite corps stigma to the JOT program was Baird's documentary exclusion of the JOT phase of the career corps program from elite corps status. His basic proposal was that there would be two separate phases in the overall program: the Professional Trainee (JOT) phase in which promising young people would be selected and trained for employment in the Agency, and the Career Corps phase in which Agency employees

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who had been on duty for at least two years would be selected and identified as career corps members. The proposal made it quite clear that the JOT's would not be eligible for career corps status until after they had completed the training program and had been on duty for at least two years. Thus, if the career corps was to be the elite corps the JOT's could not possibly be among the initial elite. In fact Baird made this quite clear in his 3 July 1951 proposal. In his discussion of the basic training of professional trainees he stated that "before trainees enter on duty, they will have been clearly informed that they are not an elite corps, and that their future in the Agency depends on their performance." 41/ Earlier in the staff study, in his proposal of the use of University Contacts in the recruitment of the professional trainees, Baird states that "at no time will the contact give the applicant the impression that he is being selected as a member of an elite corps, but rather that he will be given an opportunity to prove by his own performance that he is entitled to training and opportunity for advancement."* 42/ The JOT program, then, acquired the elite corps stigma

* The underlining appears in the text of the staff study.

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in spite of the fact that the program was specifically and firmly excluded from elite corps status. It is not difficult to assume that it was a case of guilt by association.

It is difficult, however, to understand the immediate and unanimous rejection of the elite corps phrase by the Office and Area Division chiefs. After all, the difference between "elite corps" and "career corps" is only one of semantics. Perhaps the explanation -- and the historical value of what may seem to be a somewhat lengthy digression -- lies in the fact that in July 1951 there was already a thriving elite corps in the Agency, and most of the Office and Area Division chiefs were either members of it or aspired to become at least associate members of it. Baird's -- or Smith's -- proposal of an elite corps not only threatened the organizational integrity of the existing elite corps but also -- and, perhaps, worse -- displayed a lack of understanding that an elite corps existed.

The elite-corps-in-being had no name, of course, no tangible charter, and no visible badge of membership; but it did exist, its members were known to each other, and it had a well developed mutual protective system. It was referred to by non-members -- often with ill disguised envy -- as the "OSS Alumni Association," the "DDP Club,"

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or the "Alpha Chapter of Omega Sigma Sigma." Again, lest injustice be done by implication, it should be remembered that this group really was "elite" in many respects, and there was good reason for its existence. The members were professional intelligence officers who had survived, sometimes literally, trial by fire; and they were engaged in an esoteric business the success of which, they were convinced, depended upon tight compartmentation. Certainly it was not their pride, their privacy, or their privileges that they wanted to protect but the standards of their profession. They may have felt that a second, but officially recognized, elite corps in the Agency would threaten those standards.

One might infer from this discussion so far that the elite corps label served as a whip or a goad that could be handily used against the JOT program and that Baird and the JOT staff were entirely innocent of any inclination toward the creation of an elite group. The actual JOT program procedures, however, suggested that the JOT's were, in fact, considered a bit above the level of common men. For example, after 1953 when the JOT's began to EOD in groups rather than singly, the first group exercise was an assembly at which the students were addressed not only by the DTR and the chief of the JOT program but

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also by the DCI or the DDCI and often the Inspector General. Other young professionals entering on duty with the Agency might meet briefly with the chief of the Office, Staff, or Area Division in which they would work, but they seldom met or saw any official at a higher level. Throughout the JOT program, particularly at the end of the individual training courses, very senior Agency officials would address the groups or mingle with the members during a social hour. Non-JOT professionals in training courses didn't get this treatment until they reached the mid-career or senior level of training. JOT program critics who wanted to use the elite corps label as a whip or a goad, then, had no difficulty in making it relevant to the program. The VIP treatment of the JOT's at the EOD stage was discontinued in the mid-60's, but end-of-course "graduation addresses" by senior Agency officials continued.

In conclusion perhaps it should be suggested that the JOT's may have been, in fact, members of an elite corps. They were selected on the basis of the highest standards; their training was rigorous and demanded a high level of performance; and their performance after

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training, the true test of quality, was almost uniformly outstanding. These are things that are discussed later in this history. Perhaps judgment of the validity of the "elite corps concept" should be deferred.

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II. Recruiting and Selection

Although the recruiting of candidates for the JOT program was, by regulation, a joint responsibility of the Office of Personnel (O/Pers) and the Office of Training and the actual selection of the JOT's was solely the responsibility of OTR, the two processes cannot logically be treated as separate activities. Recruiting was done with definite selection standards as guides; and applying these standards, the recruiters actually participated in the early stages of the selection process. The two activities, therefore, are discussed together here. The discussion covers first the basic patterns of recruitment and selection criteria established in the DTR's 3 July 1951 staff study; then the operational recruiting procedures and the application of the selection criteria are described; recruiting problems are identified; the emergence of the JOT "internals" program is discussed; and finally the post-recruiting selection and processing phases up to the point of entering on duty are described.

A. The Original Patterns

1. The Selection Criteria. In the opening sentence of the "Discussion" section of his 1951 staff study, the DTR said, "Our problem is to select able and versatile young people who will fit into several

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offices of the Agency, and to construct a program of training and rotation that will develop their capabilities to the utmost." The specific accomplishments and characteristics of an "able and versatile" young person are then identified:

A bachelor's degree from a good institution, with very high standing (from upper 1/4 to 1/10 of class depending on institution and other factors -- a mediocre undergraduate record will be disregarded only if the student has subsequently shown brilliance in graduate school, in the services, or in other fields); skill in a language of immediate utility, or proven language learning facility, demonstrated by successful study of two languages, or study of one beyond the elementary level; evidence of leadership and breadth shown by participation in non-academic pursuits; good personality, especially tact; sound health and morals; previous military service, or willingness to enter service at our direction; soundly motivated desire to make a career of CIA; willingness to accept anonymity. In the case of an unusually well-qualified person, exception may be made to these requirements.

The DTR also specified a few "negative criteria": people with poor academic records, people with excellent academic records but nothing else, people with physical defects serious enough to disqualify them for "overt" work, people with more than minor emotional troubles, people with a record of failure in language study, people unwilling to serve overseas, and people with "unsound motivation." The DTR pointed out that the Agency would probably continue to hire people with these negative qualities, and -- although they would be

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excluded from the Professional Trainee program -- they might eventually prove their worth and be selected for the "career corps" program.

These, then, were the criteria originally established for the Professional Trainee program. As noted earlier in this paper, the criteria established in the 3 July 1951 staff study differ in some ways from those outlined by the DTR in his 30 November 1950 memorandum containing a proposal of the functions of the DTR. 43/ In referring to the selection of candidates for the program, that proposal recommended that candidates should be selected "in most cases not later than the sophomore year." That concept of mid-college selection was submitted to the Agency's General Counsel in February 1951 for exploration. 44/ The General Counsel explored and discovered that Public Law 110 contained restrictions on the expenditure of government funds for external training of the kind called for by the proposal. The 3 July study, consequently, set the earliest time of selection as the acquisition of the bachelor's degree.

In addition to the general criteria to be applied to individual recruits, the staff study provided criteria for the composition of the trainee group. The DTR stated that in any group of 100 trainees there

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should be 38 "college graduates" -- presumably people with bachelor's degrees but with no work experience; five engineers with some experience in production; seven LL. B. 's, preferably with undergraduate majors in social sciences, area studies, or international relations; and 50 Ph. D. 's or graduate students who have not completed the Ph. D. but have had training and experience in research. The DTR made it clear that his figures were intended only as a guide to recruitment, that a well-qualified person should not be excluded because a specific category was filled, and that a second-rater should not be recruited just to fill a slot.

2. Recruiting Sources and Methods. The original concept of the recruiting phase of the professional trainee program was based on the "University Contacts" plan. Briefly, this was a plan to establish in 50 universities and colleges throughout the country a CIA "contact," a senior member of the faculty or administration who would act as a "spotter" for the Agency and would identify young men and women who had the qualifications for the program. In the universities there were to be two of these contacts, one at the college level and one at the

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graduate-school level. The DTR proposed that each contact be paid \$25 a day for ten days each year "so that he will give more than casual attention to the problem." 45/

An attachment to the staff study listed the 50 colleges and universities that the DTR identified as the most promising sources. The list was divided into four categories: Universities, Technical Schools, Liberal Arts Colleges, and Women's Colleges. Of the total 50 institutions, 29 were on the Eastern seaboard, six were in the west-coast area, and 15 were in the mid-west. This apparent imbalance in the geographic location of sources later became grounds for accusations that the JOT program was overloaded with "ivy leaguers," a subject that will be covered later in this history.

The general recruiting procedures outlined in the staff study began with the University Contact who -- after being selected, cleared, and brought to Washington to be briefed on the program -- would identify potential candidates during their junior year, would guide them into senior-year studies that would enhance their value to the Agency, and at the end of their senior year would turn them over to the Agency's Personnel Recruitment Officer. The Agency recruiter would then take

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Both of these questionable areas were clarified later, of course, but at this point it is of interest to suggest the reasons for the ambiguities. In July 1951 it was the DTR's understanding that OTR would run the professional trainee program -- as directed by Smith -- and that O/Pers would assist and cooperate. It was logical, then, for the DTR to assume that OTR would establish and manage the contacts system, and he felt that there was no need to specify that in his proposal. As far as the role of the professional recruiters of O/Pers was concerned, there were only seven of them in the field at the time, and obviously there were too few to take any major part in such a broadly based recruiting and selection activity. The DTR's assumptions were not without foundation, as was later demonstrated by the development of problems in the function of both the contacts system and the professional recruiters' activities.

Although the University Contacts system was the basic element in the original plan for recruiting professional trainees, the DTR defined two additional sources of candidates. One of these was the separation centers of the Armed Forces. Contacts would be established in these centers, and the personnel files of about-to-be-separated military personnel who met the Agency's criteria for the program would be

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submitted to the Agency for screening. The second additional source was identified as "young men and women turned up by the normal activities of Personnel Procurement." This referred, of course, to candidates that the professional recruiters might recruit without the aid of the University Contact. The first of these two additional sources later proved to be generally unproductive; after the end of the Korean War, the separation centers had little to offer in the way of qualified candidates. The second of the two, however, turned out to be the one major source of candidates.

Despite the fact that some of the DTR's original concepts of selection criteria and recruiting sources and methods did not develop according to plan, they did establish basic patterns that stood the test of time. The following sections of this paper trace the development of these patterns and the adaptations of them that created a viable system for the recruiting, selection, training, and placement of outstanding young men and women through the JOT program.

B. Recruiting Procedures

1. The Selection Criteria Applied. With the launching of the professional trainee program in July 1951, a formal summary statement of the selection criteria was established, and thereafter there

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was little variation. In 1956, for example, the Agency Inspector General wrote, "The JOT Program is designed to locate and acquire young men and women of exceptional talents who have the potential for a successful career in the intelligence field" 46/ -- not much different from the DTR's July 1951 statement: "to select, recruit, and train young men and women of great promise. . ." In an article published in an OTR Bulletin early in 1967 the statement appeared as "a primary means of selecting and developing well-qualified [sic] young men and women interested in making careers in intelligence." 47/

Such general statements, of course, did not provide the sole guidance in the application of criteria in the recruiting process. The real guidance came through constant informal coordination among the professional recruiters, the University Consultants -- as the "contacts" came to be called -- and the members of the JOT Program staff; and the most effective guidance came from experience in recruiting for the program. An example of the informal guidance that came from the JOT staff is provided by an excerpt from a letter that [REDACTED] Chief of ^{25X1A} the JOTP, wrote to a professional recruiter in 1953 specifying the kind of candidate that should be chosen 48/:

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A guy with brains which he has done a good job of cultivating; a loyal American who believes that being an American is worth doing something about and worth fighting for; to whom earning a big supply of the almighty dollar is not the main objective of his life; who can take it and if necessary hand it out (not so much physically as mentally and by example); who is stable, manly, hard working, and realistic, all to a reasonable degree.

The experiential factor in the application of the selection criteria is exemplified by an excerpt from a February 1961 memorandum written by the Chief of the Personnel Operations Division of O/Pers to the Director of Personnel in response to a request for a summary of the problems of recruiting for the JOT program 49/:

In selecting candidates to be recommended for JOTP, we have recruited the types of people which eight years' experience has shown are acceptable to the C/JOTP and his staff. Emphasis has been on the graduate student with what C/JOTP calls "built-in competence," especially language and area knowledge. We have looked for an excellent academic record, an interest in foreign affairs, a strong personality, and some aptitude for DD/P. We have expected him to be reasonably polished in manners, speech, and attitudes without requiring a rigid conformity to pattern.

The reference to built-in competence, especially in language and area knowledge, reflects an increased emphasis on language competence initiated by the chief of the JOT program in 1958. 50/ This emphasis was sustained and increased thereafter, and by the end of 1965 the pattern of language competence among JOT's had changed

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somewhat. In December 1965 the DTR reported to the DDS that the CT* staff had made a study of foreign language proficiency of JOT/CT's enrolled during the period from January 1960 through October 1965 and found that the number of students with no foreign language capability had decreased from 23 percent of each group entered on duty to 13 percent; and in the four groups entered on duty from 1 January 1965 through October, the highest number of language non-competents was 5 percent and the lowest 3 percent. 51/ At this time there was, understandably, special emphasis on competence in the Chinese languages, and the CT staff's study showed that of all of the JOT/CT's who had entered the program since 1960, 41 had had Chinese language competence, and 35 of them were still on duty with the Agency at the end of 1965. 52/

2. Development of Sources. The list of 50 colleges and universities identified by the DTR in his 1951 staff study did not have a limiting effect on the recruiting activity. Many of the institutions on the list were not exploited, either because no "contact" was established

* The official name of the JOT program was changed to the Career Training Program in April of 1965. The reasons for the change are given later in this history.

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in them or because there weren't enough professional recruiters in the field to exploit them. As the recruiting developed, colleges and universities not on the original list became sources of candidates. At the end of 1959, the JOT staff made a statistical study of recruitment from 1951 through 1959; the study shows that the 579 JOT's who had been recruited during the period had come from 163 different colleges and universities, four of them in foreign countries. 53/

A separate study, made at about the same time by the OTR Plans and Policy Staff, shows that the major geographical sources of JOT's recruited throughout the 1951-60 period were Massachusetts with 62 JOT's, Connecticut with 40, New Jersey with 27, Pennsylvania with 26, New York with 25, Wisconsin with 25, and California with 24. 54/ This study also points out that of all of the JOT's recruited in 1959, 25 percent came from "ivy-league" institutions, 10 percent from "quasi-ivy-league" institutions (Amherst, Williams, Radcliffe, and Smith), 41 percent from other private institutions, and 24 percent from state colleges and universities. Undoubtedly this breakdown by ivy-league and non-ivy-league schools reflects the then-continuing controversy over ivy league domination in the JOT program.

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The existence of this controversy was first noted officially in an IG survey of the program made in 1956. 55/ The report of the survey says that "there has been a tendency to place more emphasis on recruiting in Eastern universities than those in other parts of the country. This may be attributed in part to the convenience of these universities in a relatively small area, and a higher ratio of success in recruitment." The report then went on to recommend that greater effort should be made to recruit in the far-west and mid-west areas. The statistics cited above indicate that a greater effort was made between 1956 and 1960, but apparently the effort was not great enough to satisfy the IG. In a 1960 report the IG again mentioned the ivy-league dominance and again recommended that it be corrected. 56/

██████████ C/JOTP, felt that the 1960 criticism was not justified. He pointed out that in the then-current class the "ivy-leaguers" amounted to only 20 percent and that the IG "neglects to state that of 576 JOT's recruited since the beginning of the program 165 different institutions are represented." He also stated that if the number of ivy leaguers was, proportionately, a bit high there were reasons: there

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were more recruiters in the ivy-league area and "there is greater interest in international affairs on the Eastern seaboard than in other regions."* 57/

In addition to the major source of JOT candidates, the colleges and universities of the country, there were minor sources -- "walk-ins," "references," and (after October of 1956) "internals." The third category, internals, is discussed in some detail later in this history. The walk-ins were people who had become aware of the JOT program by word-of-mouth or through the overt publicity on the program.** They went to the personnel procurement office of the Agency in the Washington area, were interviewed by personnel officers, and -- if the interviewers felt that they were qualified -- applied for admission to the program. There appears to be no record of how many such applicants actually entered the JOT program, but certainly a few of them did, and many who were not accepted for the program were placed in other positions in the Agency.

* The writer of this history, who taught at the college and university level in the mid-west for more than 20 years, feels impelled to point out that this second "reason" was a parochial assumption unsupported by the facts.

** See below, p. 71.

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The so-called "references" were young men and women who were recommended by Agency employees or by non-Agency government officials who were aware of the program. The O/Pers recruiting component encouraged this reference activity and found it useful in developing leads to well qualified candidates. This source, however, was not without its perils. There were occasions when the JOT staff found that a young person recommended by a very senior Agency official did not meet the qualifications; in such cases, the staff always rejected the candidate and risked the displeasure of his sponsor. There were also occasions when the sponsor was a non-Agency government official whose displeasure might damage the Agency itself. For example, in early 1965, [REDACTED] 25X1A was recommended by [REDACTED] 25X1A was invited to come in for interviews and met with representatives of the Office of Current Intelligence, the Covert Action Staff, and -- of course -- the JOT staff. In reporting the result of these interviews, 25X1A the JOT staff stated that [REDACTED] egotistical attitude during the interviews unfortunately convinced his interviewers that he was not 25X1A suitable for Agency employment." 58/ Soon after the interviews [REDACTED] was turned down by the Office of Security. In spite of a probing

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telephone call from [REDACTED] to the DDCI, it was decided^{25X1A}
to reject [REDACTED]. A security officer then talked with him personally and^{25X1A}
persuaded him to withdraw his application. There is nothing in the
records to indicate that [REDACTED] displeasure ever^{25X1A}
damaged the Agency's cause.

A promising supplemental source of JOT recruits was devel-^{25X1A}

[REDACTED]

At that time, the Agency was looking for Chinese language competence,^{1A}
and [REDACTED] looked for this factor particularly in screening the files.
As it turned out, he found very little Chinese language capability and
very few of the [REDACTED] applicants who were qualified for the
JOT program. 59/

3. The University Consultants. By 1953 the "University Con-
tacts" proposed in the DTR's July 1951 staff study as in-residence
"spotters" for the Agency JOT recruitment effort were being generally
referred to as the University Consultants, a term that was officially
used thereafter. As noted earlier, the DTR visualized the consultants
as the major instrument of candidate recruitment and proposed that 50

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of them be identified in the major colleges and universities, cleared, briefed, and activated. The concept was sound, certainly, but the application of it was difficult, the size of the group never reached the target of 50, the actual effectiveness of the consultants is questionable, and the program was terminated in a somewhat ignominious fashion.

Soon after the DTR's proposal for the establishment of a career corps in the Agency was approved by the DCI-- with, of course, the deletion of the elite corps concept -- the DTR and the Assistant Director for Personnel, at that time Davison, got together to work out the ground rules for establishing and managing the university contacts program. They reached mutual agreement on the mission, organization, and administrative details of the program, and their plan was approved by the DCI on 22 October 1951. 60/ According to the DCI's document of approval, "the Director of Training [has] joint responsibility with Assistant Director (Personnel) for the selection of those persons who are to become members of the consultant contact staff." 61/ The "joint responsibility" phrase preserved the ambiguity in the proposals of November 1950 and July 1951.*

* See above, p. 9.

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By mid-summer of 1952, almost a year after the consultant program had been approved, only one university contact had been selected, cleared, and activated -- a Dean at an Eastern university; but by mid-summer of 1953, 18 had been fully cleared and 24 more were in the appointment machinery. 62/ By the end of 1953, apparently, 19 of the 24 in process had been cleared; on 15 January 1954, the DTR reported that there were 37 "University Consultant Contacts" established and said that "it is planned to increase this number to about 70." 63/ Two years later, at the end of 1955, the total number of consultants had grown very little. In February 1956 the IG's report referred to the "spotter system" and said that "about 40" consultants constituted the system. The report then added this comment: "The spotter system has had little success and the Professional Recruiters of O/Pers have accounted for most of the accepted candidates." 64/ The IG did not recommend the elimination of the university consultant system, however, and it continued at about the same level thereafter. In a 1960 IG survey report, for example, it is stated that the JOT recruitment was done by "seven field recruiters working through 34 consultants in leading colleges and universities." 65/ This time there was no reference to the degree of success of the system.

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The established procedure devised to keep the university consultants aware of developments and requirements in the JOT program was to invite them to Washington for a three-day briefing once each year. The Agency paid all expenses and paid those who came the stipulated daily consultant's fee while they were in Washington and en route. The Washington meetings were arranged and conducted by the personnel procurement component of O/Pers, and OTR participated in the briefing programs. It was not possible, of course, for all of the consultants to be available for any one of the Washington meetings, and usually about half of them attended. In March 1958, for example, the C/JOTP reported that "18 University Consultants, who act as spotters for JOT candidates, were given the usual annual briefing on the Program." 66/

The particular briefing referred to in the report covered three days, during which the group was addressed by the DCI, the DDCI, the IG, the DDS, the ADDS, the DTR, the DPers, and senior Clandestine Services officers from the FI, CI, and PP Staffs -- in addition, of course, to the chief of the JOT program and the OTR school chiefs.

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A part of the three-day program was a day and a night spent [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] where the consultants were given a comprehensive briefing on the clandestine training given there. 67/

Undoubtedly there was some justification for the IG's 1956 attribution of "little success" to the university consultants program. It was not as productive as it was intended to be, largely because few of the consultants really worked at the "spotting" job; their other duties, naturally, had priority, and most of them were very busy people. Both OTR and O/Pers, however, felt that the system was productive enough to warrant continuation; and it remained in operation throughout the 1951-66 period.* Although the demise of the system took place outside the time-span of this history, it should be noted briefly here.

What turned out to be the last Washington meeting of the University Associates -- as the university consultants were sometimes called -- took place on 13, 14, and 15 November 1967. There were 25 in the group, many of them newly appointed consultants. This

* A retrospective evaluation of the university consultants program is provided by [REDACTED] in a paper completed in the spring of 1971, The Evolution of the Junior Officer Training Program, 1951 - 1963. In that paper [REDACTED] says that "in actual practice, it produced relatively few men or women who became career employees."

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program did not include the [REDACTED] visit, but it did include the 25X1A addresses by senior Agency officials and a dinner in the executive dining room. The program closed at 1600 on Wednesday, 15 November, and the consultants departed for airports and home campuses. Ten months before this Washington meeting was held, Ramparts magazine had published an article revealing CIA's funding of the National Student Association's activity in sending representatives to international meetings of student organizations. After the publication of the article, the Agency became a target for attack from all manner of organizations and groups, including student groups, of course. By the end of the year, most of the college and university campuses of the country had developed an open hostility toward CIA and anyone associated with it. It was obvious both to the Agency and to the university consultants that the campus climate would not permit the consultant program to continue with any degree of effectiveness, and the program was quietly dropped -- as was the "100 Universities Program," which is described briefly below.*

* For a detailed analysis of other effects of the Ramparts article on the Agency, see CS Historical Paper No. 196, The 1967 Crisis in CA Operations: Ramparts Exposures.

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4. The 100 Universities Program. At a Washington meeting of the university consultants in the fall of 1962, during a discussion of possible ways to improve JOT recruiting results, one of the consultants -- the record doesn't say which one -- suggested that CIA's mission might be better understood on the nation's campuses if senior representatives of the Agency would go to the campuses and talk with people who were influential in guiding the careers of students. 68/ The suggestion met with general approval, and the JOT staff followed up with a specific proposal, which was submitted as the "100 Universities Program." The proposal recommended that 100 colleges and universities be selected for visitation by Agency officers; all areas of the country would be represented in the group of institutions, as would all types of institutions -- liberal arts, engineering, and the graduate professional schools. The proposal was approved by the DCI early in 1963, and the program was launched.

From a list of Agency officers compiled jointly by OTR and O/Pers, the Executive Director chose about twelve men, most of them with academic experience in teaching or administration, who would be called upon to make the visitations. About half of these were OTR officers, and the others came from various Agency components.* The

* Including a future Director
of Training

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Office of Personnel made the arrangements for the visits -- through the resident consultant, if there was one in the college or university, and with the institution's administrative officers if there wasn't. The standard arrangement was for a group of from twenty to thirty key members of the faculty and administration of the school to be invited to an informal luncheon or dinner to hear the Agency speaker. Usually the nearest resident professional recruiter went with the speaker and introduced him to the group. Although the speakers were given guidelines for the content of their talks, they were not required to use an approved written text; they spoke informally, almost always without notes, and they answered questions from the members of the group.

For the most part this program was very well received on the campuses, and the speakers felt that it was very effective in clarifying the Agency's role in the US Government and dispelling the fears in some of the academic minds. For example, from 4 through 8 November 1963 [REDACTED] the Chief of the OTR Language and Area School, visited five institutions in the Colorado-Utah area: the Universities of Colorado, Denver, and Utah; Brigham Young University; and Colorado College. [REDACTED] began his 20 November 1963 report of the visits with this somewhat over-punctuated paraphrase 69/:

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And, lo, on one occasion, as we ended our oration, out of the multitude before us, two learned but formerly unbelieving savants, now enlightened and confident, stepped forward and sought to be taken in. A third, moved and reflective, opened his gates and invited us to come among his people that they, too, might share enlightenment. (And, thus was the responsiveness wherever we went. . . of those who came with hunger and skepticism and who departed to spread the gospel.)

A bit later in his report, [REDACTED] manages to escape the captivity of 25X1A Biblical sonority and say simply that he feels that the 100 Universities Program was "worth far more than every penny and every hour it cost."

The 100 Universities Program was terminated after 1965. By that time all of the principle universities had been covered at least once, and continuation of the program might well have led to redundancy. There appears to have been no final evaluation of the program, but most of the Agency participants seemed to agree -- in principle, at least -- with [REDACTED] glowing tribute. 25X1A

C. Recruiting Problems

1. The Basic Problem. The first official identification of the problem that was the basic one in the JOT program throughout the 1951-66 period came in August 1953 in a report of the IG survey of the

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Office of Training. 70/ The report noted that recruitment for the program had fallen far below anticipated levels. In June 1954 the C/JOTP commented on the IG's statement, admitting that "the program has not developed its full possibilities" but insisting that it had made sufficient progress to warrant "intensification. . . in recruitment of JOT's." 71/ As the program developed during the next few years, the demand for JOT "graduates" in the various Agency components increased steadily, and just as steadily the short-fall in recruiting became relatively greater -- a clear case of supply failing to meet demand.

Early in 1960 the problem was further complicated by the establishment of quotas of JOT program graduates to be assigned to the three Directorates -- 90 to the DDP, 25 to the DDI, and 8 to the DDS. 72/ The quotas were to become effective in 1961, which meant that during calendar year 1960 enough candidates had to be taken into the program to yield 123 graduates to fill the quotas -- an almost impossible task for the few professional recruiters in the field. Before the end of 1960 official concern about the fact that recruiting was far behind its goals prompted the Director of Personnel to ask the chief of the O/Pers Personnel Operations Division for an explanation. 73/ The chief of the POD reviewed the recruiting procedures and the recruiting

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capabilities, admitted the failure to meet quotas, and analyzed the reasons for the failure. He stated frankly that although some improvement might be made, recruiting capabilities as they stood at the time were not adequate to meet the demand and the short-fall was likely to continue. 74/

It did continue, of course. As late as July 1965 the DTR reported to the DDS that the July class of JOT's would, at best, total 66 instead of the planned 75. 75/ A few months later, the situation was even more critical. The DTR reported that as far as the JOT program was concerned, the "manpower pinch has become progressively worse" and the January 1966 JOT class would probably be 35 instead of the 75 planned. 76/ At the end of 1965, then, the JOT program, which had achieved outstanding qualitative success in the selection and training of young men and women whom the Agency components were eager to assign to responsible jobs, was still suffering from the problem of inadequate candidate input.

2. Causes of the Problem. Discussion of the causes of the basic recruiting problem must begin with the fact that from 1951 to 1961 there were only seven professional recruiters in the field. In his 1960 report the IG recommended that the number be increased from seven to nine,

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79/ and this was done. Just why -- in the face of the growing importance of the JOT program and the repeated lamentations over the continuing failure of recruiting to meet quotas -- the number of recruiters was not doubled or tripled is difficult to understand; it can only be assumed that in this case bureaucratic doctrine dictated the fighting of the problem rather than the solving of it.

After the basic problem had been surfaced by the IG in 1953, 25X1A
[REDACTED] identified one of the causes. He said that it appeared "to be a definite policy of PPD [the Personnel Procurement Division of O/Pers] that a recruiter gains as much credit for the placement of a teletype operator as for the placement of a JOT. Since the time and energy required to recruit the former is much less than the latter, it is only natural that men seeking placements will concentrate in the areas from which they obtain the greatest rewards." 80/ Although the validity of 25X1A

[REDACTED] assumption that the same field recruiters who looked for teletype operators also looked for JOT candidates might be questioned, his statement did point out that the recruiters had responsibilities in addition to the JOT recruiting. A part of the professional recruiter's job was to find qualified people to fill specialized professional jobs in the Agency -- engineers, scientists, political scientists, and the like. The

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requirements for such people were assigned to the recruiters, and they had to try to fill them. Actually, only about 45 percent of the professional recruiter's time could be devoted to JOT recruitment. 78/

One of the major factors in the recruiting problem was the mathematical relationship between first identification of qualified candidates and the final selection and entering-on-duty of JOT's. In fiscal year 1956, for example, 57 people were taken into the program. The records show that the 57 were the product of 409 original identifications and reviews of files; of the 409, 389 were interviewed in the field, 221 of these were tested in the field, and 172 were brought to Washington for further testing. 80/ The ratio of EOD's to original identifications was about one to seven. In fiscal year 1957 the ratio decreased; 715 candidates were identified, 648 were tested in the field, 398 were interviewed, 305 were brought to Washington for testing, and 82 actually entered the program -- a ratio of less than one to eight. 81/ The 1956 and 1957 figures are based on initial identification of candidates and eventual input for the program. Early in 1960 the recruiting division of O/Pers used a somewhat different base in pointing out that in bringing on board 80 JOT's in the 1960 calendar year the recruiters would have to conduct 2,200 field interviews that would produce 500

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
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referrals for follow-up that would result in 475 interviews that would produce 250 personnel actions that would produce the 80 JOT's. 82/
Such figures tend to give perspective to the field recruiter's problem.

The February 1961 review of the recruiting problem made by the Chief of the Personnel Operations Division in response to the request from D/Pers identifies some additional aspects. It states that only a few of the university consultants had been useful and only a very few "consultant cases cross all the hurdles successfully." It also

25X1A


not their business and that most of their nominees were the sons or nephews of their clients. The review also mentions the tendency to raise the selection criteria for the JOT program -- more mature people with more education and more practical experience -- and the increasing difficulty in keeping pace with all of the changing requirements. Although the chief of the recruiting component didn't mention it, he may have had in mind the 1956 IG recommendation that more individuals of non-Caucasian origin be recruited for eventual assignment to Africa and Southeast Asia. 83/

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One facet of the problem that the 1961 survey did not discuss in any detail was competition -- the fact that many qualified candidates for the JOT program found other career opportunities more appealing. In 1956 the JOT staff made a study of the reasons given over an 18-month period by 123 qualified candidates -- out of a total of 369 in process -- who declined a firm offer of placement in the program. Of the 123, 41 decided to accept positions in business, 33 to accept other government offers, 19 to continue their education, 12 to accept teaching positions, and 18 to accept "miscellaneous or unspecified" offers. 84/ The survey showed that only 10 gave the low entrance salary as a major reason for declining the JOT offer, and only five mentioned the long wait for security clearance as a major factor.

The chief of the program felt that, in spite of the fact that only five mentioned the clearance delay, the wait for security clearance was the "biggest single factor" in declinations. He admitted, however, that "the fact that it takes three to four months to process a case is not anyone's fault; we have had excellent cooperation from every office or unit involved in applicant processing." 85/ The security clearance delay, then, must be added to all of the other causes of the recruiting problem.

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
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3. Solutions and Remedies. As noted earlier in this section, the recruiting problem remained unsolved through 1965 -- and for a few years thereafter, actually -- but there were a number of solutions proposed and a number of remedies tried. There can be no practical evaluation of their effectiveness, of course, but certainly they must have had some retarding effect on the growth of the problem and therefore warrant mention here.

In the above-cited February 1961 review of the problem, the chief of the O/Pers recruiting component suggested courses of action that might be taken to increase the recruiting intake. The first was an advertising campaign, using the newspapers of principal cities as the media; the ads would identify the employer as the US Government, not CIA. He points out that this device was tried in The New York Times and was "moderately successful." The second approach suggested was increased use of university alumni placement files; the third was

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years later); and the sixth was a contract with one or more management consultant firms.

None of these devices was adopted immediately, but in November 1962 the distribution of recruitment brochures was authorized; and during calendar year 1963, 15,000 copies of a colorprint brochure were distributed among 800 colleges and universities. 86/ By the fall of 1965, the recruiting intake, according to the DTR, was still "well below that needed to meet Agency requirements" and the shortage of field recruiters and increased manpower requirements in the Agency made it very difficult to get both "external" and "internal" candidates for the program. 87/ He recommended that advertising be used to get applicants from non-academic sources, that "direct relationships" be developed with university associates and selected department heads, and that there be "closer working arrangements" with field recruiters. 88/

The last of these recommendations was activated almost immediately. Early in November 1965 the C/JOTP proposed that members of his staff go into the field and conduct follow-up interviews with potential candidates already contacted by the recruiters. According to the DTR the purpose of such follow-up interviews would be "to sustain

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interest on the part of the applicant and to further explain the CT Program to him. " 89/ [REDACTED] was chosen for the first such ven-^{25X1A}ture, and late in November he interviewed 15 candidates [REDACTED] area; he reported that he was "generally encouraged" by the responses. 90/

At the end of the 1950-66 period, then, the recruiting problem was still unsolved, and the supply of recruits for the program was continually falling far below the components' demands for JOT graduates. It might be well at this point to go a bit beyond the timespan of this history and report that within the five-year period following 1965 the recruiting problem vanished. For reasons best left for discussion in a later historical paper, the demand for program graduates diminished to the point where the wisdom of continuing the program was seriously questioned.

D. The Internal Source

1. Background. The Agency's career development program, as it was conceived by Smith and outlined by Baird in his 1951 staff study, consisted of two sub-programs -- the professional trainee program, which became the JOT program, and the career corps program, which was designed to select outstanding young Agency employees and give

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them training for career development. As noted earlier in this paper, the implementation of the second of these sub-programs involved the participation of all of the components of the Agency and, thus, all of the consequent coordination machinery.

Because the professional trainee program did not at the outset directly affect any Agency components except OTR and O/Pers and so was not involved in the cumbersome Agency-wide coordination process, it was activated immediately. The career corps program was slow in getting started. Eventually, however, it began to take shape as "The Junior Personnel Career Development Program," a title that was later shortened somewhat to the Junior Career Development Program, abbreviated as JCD.

2. The Junior Career Development Program. An informative -- if somewhat subjective -- account of the origin and early development of the JCD program is given by [REDACTED] in his 1971 review of the evolution of the JOT program. Although this account was written almost 20 years after the beginning of the program, [REDACTED] obviously had the relevant documents at hand to support his memory of events -- and he was very closely involved in these events when they happened. [REDACTED] wrote:

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The internal phase of the JOT Program originally was the Junior Personnel Development Program. This matter was the subject of long discussions by the CIA Career Service Board in 1953 and early 1954! Then a task force was established consisting of seven senior officers with secretarial help to study the problem in the best bureaucratic tradition.

Their report fills six pages plus a covering letter and a plan outline of four pages. There is a "Memorandum of Understanding of Additional Policies and Procedures for Administering the Program for Career Development of Junior Personnel" of more than three pages of single spaced material duly signed by AD Pers and DTR. Then came organization and implementation meetings of AD Pers and DTR each with assistants who wrote up memos of understanding and memos for the record. The first consists of notes of agreement on 17 separate items. There follows an outline of items involved in processing candidates -- 28 of them amplified by explanatory notes "a" through "n". It even suggested that any member of the Agency who was good enough to be considered for this training should also qualify for placement on the "Junior Executive Inventory" which as far as I know died quietly years ago.

And this was just the beginning of the papers dated from 2 April 1954 through 29 July 1954. These were augmented by an Agency notice of four pages (distribution AB including overseas personnel) and changes in the Regulations. Application forms had to be devised and approved and A&E testing mechanisms devised and approved by both offices. Everything, but everything, had to be spelled out in writing. Hence, cumbersome procedures, elaborated beyond reason, and unnecessary if people had trusted each other and worked together.

In implementing the program, we went through the prescribed and complicated bureaucratic acrobatics at a great rate -- for awhile. The predicted rush of candidates did not materialize. A and E's preparations to test 500 people were wasted.

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The elaborately planned meetings of the joint selection committee took place with increasing infrequency. Reasons: good candidates were discouraged by supervisors (even AD's and Division Chiefs) who didn't wish to lose their able and productive youngsters. For the most part, those who were encouraged or allowed to apply were ordinary types who couldn't qualify. But a few good ones did come along. [*]

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All of [REDACTED] statements of fact could easily be documented, and his generalizations could be exemplified; but -- although [REDACTED] and Baird were members of the JCD "joint selection committee" -- the program belonged to O/Pers and comes within the historical jurisdiction of that Office. It is of importance here only to the extent that its termination resulted in an additional source of candidates for the JOT program, candidates who came to be called "internals." The JCD problems described by [REDACTED] must have been apparent to every- one interested in the program. Certainly they were to the IG, for in his report of the 1956 survey of the JOT program he recommended that "the Junior Career Development Program be terminated and its

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* In theory each of the so-called JCD's was to take a training program tailored to his individual needs. In practice the few JCD's who actually entered the program took "appropriate" OTR courses being offered at the time.

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career development mission absorbed by the expanded JOT Program." 92/ The IG's recommendation was approved by the DCI, and the JCD was officially terminated in August 1956. 93/

3. Development of Internals. The regulation that ended the JCD program also established basic procedures for the admission to the JOT program of those young on-duty officers who were qualified. These "internals" were to be considered for admission upon their own individual application or upon the recommendation of supervisors, heads of Career Services, the D/Pers, the DTR, the DDP, the DDI, or the DDS. After nomination, the internals went through the same process of screening and selection as did the externals, and the same criteria were applied. At the time of the elimination of the JCD program there were ten young officers actually being trained in the program, and on 7 October 1956 these ten trainees were transferred to the JOT program. 94/

Thereafter the internals continued to make up a part of each JOT class -- a part varying in size, through the years, from one-tenth to one-fourth. Actually the addition of the internals to the JOT groups turned out to be most beneficial to the program. The internals held their own in competition with the externals, and there was never any indication of an external-internal compartmentation. In addition, of

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course, the internals made an experiential contribution to the program, a contribution that had the effect of putting the training in proper perspective in relation to the realities of the intelligence business.

An indication of the quantitative scope of the internal phase of the program is provided by this example: as of 7 April 1964 the JOT staff had 44 internal applications on hand, 25 of them representing DDP nominees; of the total, 19 had been accepted and were being processed, 8 were under consideration for entry into the October class, 10 were possibilities for entry into the January 1965 class, and 7 had not yet had the final pre-selection interview; in addition to the 44 applications, about 75 "profiles" of nominees were being prepared for initial consideration. 95/

Another quantitative indication is given by a report of the status of DDP internal nominees as of the end of calendar year 1964: the DDP components had nominated 68 candidates on 27 April 1964; of these, 38 had been accepted -- 11 for the class of July 1964, two for the October class, 19 for the class of January 1965, two for the March class, and four for the July class; of the 30 nominees who were not accepted, 16 were unqualified, two were rejected by the medical staff, one was

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rejected because she was the wife of a "non-Agency employee," two were assigned PCS away from Headquarters after they were nominated, and nine withdrew their applications during the selection process. 96/

A general summary of the quantitative aspects of the internal phase of the program shows that from the beginning in October 1956 through June 1965, 97 internals had been accepted in the JOT program, 94 of them had completed the training, and three had resigned from the Agency before the completion of training. Of the 94 graduates of the program, 64 had returned to their "Directorate of origin," 15 had changed from the DDI to the DDP, four had changed from the DDP to the DDI, two had changed from the DDS to the DDP, four had changed from the DDP to the DDS, four had changed from the DDI to the DDS, and one had changed from the DDI to the Office of the DCI. 97/

4. Problems. Although, as noted above, the internal JOT's created no problems within the program itself, there were problems faced by the JOT staff in getting qualified internals into the program. Basically the problem was the same one lamented by [REDACTED] in his account of the JCD program -- good candidates were discouraged by supervisors who didn't want to lose their "able and productive youngsters." In all fairness to the supervisors it should be pointed out that

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as work pressures increased and budget cuts created manpower shortages the supervisors were understandably reluctant to release the men who were best able to do the work that had to be done.

In any event the problem did exist. A survey of the 1965 internal applicants who had been accepted into the JOT program showed that eleven were being withheld and not permitted to start training. 98/ In December 1965 the Acting DTR transmitted the results of the survey to the DDS and noted the seriousness of the problem. As a specific example he reported that [REDACTED] [Chief of the DDP Records Integration Division] claims that he has so many [REDACTED] to trace that he simply can't spare anyone." 99/

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E. Processing and Selection

As it did for most aspects of the JOT program, the DTR's 1951 staff study established the pattern for the processing and final selection of the candidates once they had been recruited and had become definite possibilities for entry into the program. The staff study contains a nine-page appendix devoted to "the Testing and Assessment of Applicants." Because that appendix not only sets a basic pattern that was

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followed throughout the 1951-66 period but also discusses the philosophical and psychological aspects of testing and assessment, it is attached to this report as Appendix A.*

A 1960 staff study of the management of the JOT program contains a general summary of the processing and selection of candidates, one that is highly condensed and over-simplified but serves well as a point of departure for a more detailed discussion. 100/ That summary states that after the potential candidate is identified and interviewed by the field recruiter and judged promising, he is "given a written test prepared by the A&E Staff and administered throughout the year at 35 locations over the country." If these tests indicate to the JOT staff that he is a "good" candidate, he is invited to Washington at Agency expense for interviews. After the interviews, according to the summary, he is either selected or rejected; selection is subject to "medical and security checks." The following paragraphs amplify and exemplify the generalities given in the summary.

* P. 196.

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
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5. Admission. During the first five years of the JOT program, as noted earlier in this history, the JOT's selected for the program were admitted individually when they became available and entered into scheduled training courses with other Agency students. Oftentimes it was necessary for them to wait for the beginning of a course, and they were assigned to temporary chores while they were waiting. Later, when the JOT's came on board in groups, an organized procedure of indoctrination was established. This consisted, usually, of one day devoted to personnel processing and personal interviews with their JOT staff counselor -- the man who would be with them as friend and monitor throughout the program -- and with the chief of the JOT staff and the DTR. A second day was devoted to meetings of the entire group.

The VIP aspects of these group meetings have been described earlier -- the students were addressed by the DCI and a number of other very senior Agency officials. These VIP addresses served to impress them with the importance of the Agency's mission and to

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assure them that they had been very carefully selected to play significant roles in the accomplishment of that mission. Whatever feeling of self-importance or sense of elitism these VIP talks may have created in their minds was soon diminished, however, by the talks of the DTR and the C/JOTP. The DTR's talk was usually brief and blunt: they had been selected for the program because they had outstanding capability; the development of that capability would be severely tested throughout the program; what they got out of the program depended on what they put into it. The C/JOTP used the DTR's talk as a sort of synopsis and went into detailed discussion of the philosophy of the program, the goals toward which it strived, the performance expected of its participants, and the realities that they would face in meeting the achievement standards set for them. In 1961 [REDACTED] decided to put his talk 25X1A paper as a "Recapitulation" of the methods and objectives of the JOT program and give copies to "all successful candidates." Because that recapitulation captures the spirit and flavor of the program as it existed after ten years of successful development, it is attached to this paper as Appendix B.*

* P. 206.

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III. Program Management

A. Organization and Personnel

1. Organizational Development. Although the organizational relationship of the JOT program to other activities of OTR during the 1951-66 period has been described in earlier historical papers,* it is reviewed here briefly as background. From the beginning of the program early in 1951 to September 1952, the professional trainee program -- as it was then called -- was one of the responsibilities of the Basic Division of TR(O), the designation given to the non-clandestine training activity in OTR. The JOT program first appeared on the official organization chart of OTR in September 1952 -- as the Junior Officer Training Division (JOTD). The JOTD was shown as one of the Divisions of TR(O) reporting to the Deputy Director of Training (Overt), one of the two DDTR's reporting to the DTR at the time. The JOTD appeared without change of designation or level after the February 1953 reorganization of OTR and after the December 1953 reorganization, the one that eliminated the dual-deputy system and established a single DDTR.

* OTR-5, pp. 21 and 119, and OTR-6, pp. 4 and 9.

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In December 1954 there was another reorganization of OTR, one that reflected some of the IG's recommendations and also paid lip-service to a few of the recommendations made by the Agency Management Staff. One major change was the elimination of all "Division" designations and the establishment of "Schools." An apparent major change was the transfer of the JOT program to the jurisdiction of the OTR Support Staff with the designation of the Junior Officer Training Program. In actual practice the chief of the JOT program continued to report directly to the DTR; the subordination to the Support Staff was one of the lip-service aspects of the reorganization. In February 1956 the DTR apparently decided that lip-service was no longer necessary, and the JOTP was reinstated at the School level. On the official DTR organization chart issued in May 1956 the JOTP appeared at the School level, and it continued in that position throughout the remainder of the 1951-66 period.

2. Growth of the Staff. As noted earlier in this history, when 25X1A
[REDACTED] relieved [REDACTED] as chief of the program in April 1952, his staff 25X1A
consisted of two clerical people and one military officer, [REDACTED] 25X1A

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assigned on a temporary basis to handle the Military Agreements phase of the program. [REDACTED] continued in the position until August 1953, and during the first half of calendar year 1953 he was assisted by a second military officer, Commander [REDACTED]. After July 1953, apparently, there was no longer a need for a military officer on the staff -- the military agreements had been established and implemented and the OCS procedures had become routine -- and [REDACTED] was not replaced. Early in July, however, [REDACTED] a JOT graduate, was assigned to the staff and served until August 1955, devoting a major part of his time to the processing of the OCS arrangements. In January 1954 [REDACTED] an OTR careerist, was assigned to the staff as [REDACTED] deputy; he held the position until August 1956, when he was reassigned and replaced by [REDACTED]. * From April 1952 through August 1956, then, the JOT staff consisted of the chief, never more than two officers assisting him, and never more than three clerical aides.

* The deputy designation was dropped temporarily at this time and reestablished in December 1956 with [REDACTED] assigned to the position.


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Late in 1955 the IG Staff made a survey of the JOT program, and the report of the survey was submitted to the DCI in February 1956. 112/ In that report the IG recommended that "the present T/O of the JOT Division in OTR be increased by five positions, three individuals of professional grade to be selected one each from the offices of the DD/S, DD/P, and DD/I on the basis of their experience and knowledge of these components and the remaining two to provide necessary clerical support." Apparently the IG's recommendation was approved -- in principle, at least -- for in November 1956 the DTR recorded that the DD/S, on 16 October 1956, had approved the increase of the JOT staff by four positions. 113/



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valuable element of continuity as the program and the staff have changed over the years.* Other training officers assigned to the staff before the close of the 1951-66 period were [REDACTED] who served from February 1964 through 1966; [REDACTED] who replaced [REDACTED] April 1964; and [REDACTED] who was appointed in June 1965.

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Perhaps the most important support addition to the JOT staff came in the fall of 1956, when the Office of Personnel detailed an officer to the program. 114/ Before that time, the processing of personnel actions for the JOT candidates was a very complicated activity involving the JOT staff training officers, the OTR personnel officers, and components of O/Pers -- components that were located in buildings some distance from those occupied by OTR. The personnel officers detailed to the staff in 1956 and thereafter were assigned on a rotational basis and were not actually members of the staff, but they devoted full time to personnel actions required by the JOT program -- both EOD actions and placement after the completion of training.

* [REDACTED] has been of immense help to the writer of this history, and whatever merit the history may have can be largely attributed to that help.

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██████ retired from the Agency at the end of December 1963; 25X1A
he had served as chief of the JOT program for more than eleven years.
He had taken over the program when it was still in the experimental
stage and had not even begun to achieve Agency-wide recognition and
respect. With Baird's strong support, ██████ faced the multitude of 25X1A
problems that arose in the development of the program, solved most
of them, and fought hard for solutions even when it was impossible to
find them. He was impatient with red tape and often -- in private --
decried vehemently what he described as bureaucratic idiocy; but in
the interests of the program he always used tact and diplomacy in try-
ing to clear the obstacles that the bureaucracy put in his path. Through-
out his tenure as chief he succeeded in converting his dedication to the
program into a contagion. The members of his staff acquired the same
dedication and gave of their time and energy just as generously as did
their boss. When ██████ retired at the end of 1963, the program had 25X1A
achieved outstanding success, and its graduates had demonstrated its
practical effectiveness as a training program for future leaders of the

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Agency. If there was any one factor in [REDACTED] leadership that could be identified as the key to the success of the program, perhaps it was his adamant refusal to compromise the quality of the program.* 25X1A

[REDACTED] was followed as chief of the program by Robert [REDACTED] 25X1A

[REDACTED] was an OTR careerist who had served as chief of the Intelligence School and as Deputy Director of Training in the middle and late 50's and subsequently had been on rotational assignment overseas with the DDP. [REDACTED] reported for duty with the JOT staff on 3 December 1963 and officially assumed the position of chief on 31 December. Because he had held responsible positions in OTR during the formative years of the JOT program, he was thoroughly familiar with its objectives and problems; and because of his tour of duty with the DDP, he not only understood the DDP requirements for JOT graduates but also had ready access to senior officers of the Clandestine Services. Perhaps the fairest evaluation of [REDACTED] administration would be the statement that he guided the program 25X1A

* This evaluation is that of the writer of this history, who was an OTR school chief and worked very closely with [REDACTED] from 1957 through 1963. 25X1A

** A brief account of [REDACTED] background and pre-CIA experience is given in OTR-6, p. 51. 25X1A

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during the most troublesome years when demands for the graduates were the greatest and budget and manpower pressures made it impossible to meet the demands -- and during those years he kept intact the high qualitative standards of selection and training.

When [REDACTED] took over the program at the end of 1963, his staff consisted of four training officers, one assistant training officer, and four clerical assistants. In February 1964, an additional training officer, [REDACTED] was assigned; but there were no further increases in the staff until late in 1965. In October the DTR informed the DDS that in order to effect the "planned expansion" of the CT program the staff would have to have two additional officer positions. 115/ By the middle of December the two additional positions had been allocated, and OTR was "actively recruiting against" them. 116/

B. Duties of the Staff Officers

Many of the duties performed by the officers of the JOT staff have been identified, either implicitly or explicitly, in the discussion of recruiting and selection; and all of the other duties are described in the following sections on training programs and placement procedures. It would be useful here, however, to identify those duties briefly within the context of program management.

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1. Participation in Selection. During the recruiting and selection processes the staff members examined candidates' applications and "profiles," evaluated transcripts of college grades and reports of field interviews, and sat as members of selection teams and panels in making final judgment of acceptability.

2. Advising and Counseling. Each member of the JOT staff was assigned a number of JOT trainees -- the number depending upon the trainee load at any given time -- for whom he would act as advisor and guide throughout the training period. The staff counselor's job was to get to know his trainees, their characters, their capabilities, their limitations, and their personal problems. The objective of the counselor was successful, of course, only to the extent that he won the respect of the trainees -- and they were highly intelligent young people who had already achieved some distinction in academic pursuits and often in other fields.

3. Evaluation of Performance. One of the staff officer's duties was to keep informed of the performance of his advisees in the various training courses that made up the program. This he did so that he could detect performance problems when they arose and help to solve

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them before they became serious and so that at the end of the formal training program he would be better able to determine the most appropriate job assignments for his advisees.

4. Participation in Placement. Because the placement of JOT's after formal training was one of the critical stages in the whole program, great care went into the making of placement decisions.

Although the performance records constituted good evidence of assignment suitability, the staff advisor was best qualified to interpret the records of his advisees, and very often he made the final decision on placement.

5. Monitoring On-the-Job Performance. One of the key features of the JOT program throughout most of the 1951-66 period was the retention of the JOT on the OTR personnel roster after the completion of the formal training and until the completion of the on-the-job training. There were a number of advantages in this arrangement, as will be noted later, but all of those advantages depended upon the staff officer's awareness of how his advisees were performing on the job. The monitoring of on-the-job performance, then, was one of the staff officer's most important duties.

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C. The Program Coordinators

During the greater part of the 1951-66 period the JOT staff had no fixed internal organizational pattern. There was a deputy chief --
[REDACTED] from January 1954 to August 1956 and [REDACTED] from Decem-
ber 1956 to June 1965. Some of the staff officers were considered to be
DDI, DDP, or DDS representatives on the staff, but there appeared to
be no need for any formal internal organization recognizing the fact.*
In August 1960, however, a Program Coordinator was designated offi-
cially as a part of the staff.

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1. The Rationale. The establishment of the Program Coordina-
tor was the result primarily of criticisms that appeared from time to
time in the student feed-back, which was encouraged -- even required
-- as a sort of quality-control mechanism. Some of the students felt
that the individual segments of the training program were being given
by the OTR Schools without coordination with the other segments of the
program; this resulted, they believed, in repetition of substantive
coverage and duplication of skills training. The DTR, always

* After the expansion of the staff in 1965, the training officers were formally divided into four groups: Internal Phase, DDI Representatives, DDP Representatives, and DDS Representatives.

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sensitive to student criticism -- often without determining the validity of it -- took action to remedy the assumed ill by appointing an officer whose job it would be to assure that all segments of the formal training program were closely coordinated and that all repetition and duplication were eliminated.

2. The Coordinators. On 19 August 1960 [REDACTED] became the first JOT Program Coordinator. [REDACTED] had served an earlier tour of duty with OTR as the Operations School Chief of Field Training [REDACTED] from December 1954 to October 1956. He was familiar with OTR's problems and had played an important role in the development of the clandestine training segments of the JOT program. He appeared to be an excellent choice for the assignment. In all truth, however, he accomplished very little during the few months that he held the position; his major allegiance was to the Clandestine Services, and -- as were so many of the CS officers assigned on rotational tours of duty with OTR -- he was primarily concerned with keeping his DDP fences mended.*

* This uncomplimentary judgment is that of the writer of this history, who was Chief of the Intelligence School during [REDACTED] tenure as Program Coordinator.

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When [REDACTED] left the position in March 1961, [REDACTED] was appointed. As noted above, [REDACTED] was a long-time OTR career-ist, knew the problems of the JOT program, and was devoted to OTR's interests. He worked very hard at the coordinator's job, but in all probability he found it a frustrating one. Whether or not he actually accomplished anything of importance is open to question. In any event, when [REDACTED] left the job in March 1964 for a second tour of duty with the DDP, no successor was appointed.*

3. Evaluation. When the position of JOT Program Coordinator was established in 1960, the OTR School Chiefs -- and possibly [REDACTED] -- felt that there was no need for such a position. There was no real lack of coordination among the segments of the formal training program; the schools -- and [REDACTED] -- regularly exchanged course schedules, the chief instructors got together and discussed areas of overlap and duplication, and instructors were constantly sitting in on courses given by instructors in other schools. What repetition and duplication there was in the program was intentional and planned; it was a training device common in all educational efforts.

* In May 1967 the position was reestablished with somewhat different duties assigned to it, and [REDACTED] was appointed CT Program Coordinator.


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
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In addition there was a major coordination device that was introduced in the early years of the JOT program and continued as long as Baird was DTR. Once each year all OTR school and staff chiefs, most chief instructors who took part in the program training courses, and all members of the JOT staff gathered  for 25X1A

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a two-day session devoted entirely to the program. Although a part of each of these sessions was devoted to the management aspects of the program, a much greater part was devoted to the content and conduct of the training courses. School chiefs and chief instructors described course plans in detail and discussed methods of presentation and of performance evaluation. Questions were raised, and points of conflict were debated. Baird was always present at these meetings; and at the end of the session, he and everyone else present knew a great deal about what the JOT was being taught and how. Perhaps it should be noted here that these sessions [REDACTED] were not always entirely^{25X1A} peaceable. Baird encouraged frankness and honest dissent, and they were always forthcoming. Arguments were frequently heated, and tempers were not always curbed. Baird, himself, was not averse to becoming involved in argumentation, and sometimes he did.

D. Summary

This discussion of the management of the JOT program does not include coverage of the many problems that confronted the JOT staff during the 1951-66 period. Those problems will be identified and described in a later section of this history. At this point, perhaps an

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adequate summation of the program management would be the statement that both [REDACTED] did brilliant work in directing the pro- 25X1A gram during the period, and the program -- though understaffed -- was well staffed with men who added dedication to their many capabilities.

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IV. Training Programs

The three basic elements of the JOT program were selection, training, and placement -- all three of which were functions of the program management discussed above. The selection element, including recruiting and assessment, has been described earlier in this history; the placement element is described later. The present discussion covers the training element. In his February 1956 report of a survey of the JOT program, the Inspector General said "an essential element of the JOT Program is the principle of training before assignment to duty with an operating component. After the candidate is entered on duty he is given a series of training courses designed to give him a thorough indoctrination in Agency activities and skills." This statement, capsulized as it is, provides a sound point of departure for discussion of the training element of the JOT program.

A. Program Development, 1951-58

1. The Original Plan. The introduction to the DTR's July 1951 staff study states that "Basic Training is already established to provide professional trainees with the necessary skills and knowledge to enable them to enter an office with general competence in intelligence, and to make the most of on-the-job training." 117/ The obvious implication

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is that the DTR felt that training courses already established were adequate to provide the formal training that the JOT would require. This is made explicit in Appendix F of the staff study. Here the basic training courses of the "CIA Intelligence School" are described as "designed to give the trainee the knowledge and skills basic to intelligence." These courses, according to Appendix F, consist of the necessary lectures on orientation, mission, and security; the structure of the US Government and CIA's role therein; the missions of the Intelligence Advisory Committee Agencies; the organization of CIA; the world situation, foreign policy, the Soviet Government and its history; and the methods employed in intelligence. The statement admits that these "early courses cannot turn out finished intelligence officers" and notes that the "tentative twelve week program will be interspersed with problems and training films, and selections for readings in foreign languages." A separate appendix in the staff study outlines the language training phase of the "tentative" 12-week program, indicating that the foreign language would be Russian and the trainees would devote 20 hours each week to it.

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There are three significant aspects of this 1951 plan for the training of JOT's. The first is that at that time the "CIA Intelligence School" was still a concept in Baird's mind, and the basic training courses in the "school" were also nonexistent; actually, the concept of the school never did materialize as such, but the basic courses did.* The second significant aspect of the plan was the absence of any reference to clandestine operations training for the JOT's; obviously, it was assumed that the "professional trainees" would be prepared for duty with the non-covert components of the Agency. The third aspect was that -- aside from the absence of reference to clandestine training -- the plan identified all of the elements that later became parts of the JOT program.

2. Early Development. In his 1971 retrospective paper on the evolution of the JOT program, [REDACTED] says that the formal training program was at first "a hit-or-miss jumble" and that the program management had to "play it by ear." 118/ Actually the training program for the professional trainees during the early years was not as unstructured as [REDACTED] recalls. As noted earlier, the first group of 25X1A

* See OTR-5, p. 32.

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trainees began the program in July 1951. They were given a 14-week course divided equally into study of intelligence and study of Russian, a half of each day to each. The intelligence half of the course was provided by the Basic Training Division of TR(O), and the Russian study was done [REDACTED] through external training arrangements. This plan, to be sure, had an element of the "play-it-by-ear" approach, but it soon changed. In 1952 Baird persuaded [REDACTED] to transfer from the Office of National Estimates to OTR to develop a "basic intelligence course" specifically for the professional trainees,* 119/ and during 1952 the study of Russian was dropped as a major part of the program. By mid-1952 [REDACTED] had developed a six-week course, and it was being given for those professional trainees who had entered on duty after July 1951. By the fall of 1952 it had become apparent that the intake of professional trainees did not warrant giving the course for them alone, and it was opened to all professional recruits.

From that time until mid-1954 the six-week Basic Intelligence Course constituted the formal training program for the JOT's. At the completion of the course the trainees were assigned either to language


* A brief description of [REDACTED] background and experience is given in OTR-6, p. 53.

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training or to on-the-job training. In 1954 the Basic Intelligence Course was discontinued as such, and the content of it was reorganized into a four-week Basic Orientation Course (BOC) and a four-week Intelligence Principles and Methods Course (IPM). The JOT's took both of these courses; the trainees entered on duty individually when they became available and were assigned various interim tasks while they awaited the beginning of the BOC. 25X1A



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regulation, mandatory training for all Agency professionals; the ITC was elective and was to be taken primarily by officers assigned to analyst positions and by JOT's whose major interest was in the processing and production phases of intelligence.* Very few non-JOT's elected the ITC; the course was soon oriented particularly to the needs of the JOT's, and -- in effect if not by design -- it became a JOT course, the first except for the course started by [REDACTED] in 1952.

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B. The Integrated Program

1. The Rationale. During the early years of the JOT program, when it was still considered experimental and the number of trainees was small, the individual admission of JOT's on a when-available basis and the placement of them in regularly scheduled courses was the only practicable way of handling the program. Deferment of the individual's EOD date would have risked declinations to accept jobs immediately available and thus would have wasted the time and expense of the selection procedures. In addition, the numbers coming on board did not warrant special courses for the JOT's. By 1958, however, the program had proved itself; it was no longer experimental, and it had been

* See OTR-8, pp. 43-49 and 104-107.

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accepted Agency-wide as a major source of young professional officers. As early as 1956 the IG had given full approval to the program and had recommended that it be expanded.

It was expanded, of course, and by the middle of 1958 the chief of the program and the DTR decided that the time had come to systematize the recruiting and selection so that JOT's would enter on duty once each year in one group. The concept had ample precedent in the time-honored admission practices of academic institutions. The once-a-year admission practice would require a major change in the entering of JOT's in training courses, so a part of the plan was to establish a series of courses for JOT's only; the numbers to be admitted would easily justify such a program.

Because the implementation of the plan directly affected only OTR and O/Pers, it was considered an internal OTR reorganization; and the approvals of the DDS and the Executive Director were given informally. There appears to be no record of who devised the term "integrated program," and it is of no great consequence; at the time, "integration" had not yet acquired connotations of conflict, and the term did describe accurately the merging of many of the aspects of the JOT program.


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2. The Courses. In September 1958 the chief of the JOT program, in a report to the OTR Plans and Policy Staff, outlined the sequence of training that would be given to the first class of JOT's in the integrated program. He said that the JOT's, who would enter on

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Communism. It covered the origin and development of the Communist movement, the philosophy of Communism, the rise of Communist governments in Europe and Asia, the development of Communist parties in the free world, and Communist methods and tactics. At this time, of course, Communism was considered a real and present danger to the free world; the major objective of the course was "know the enemy."

After the Communism course the first group in the integrated program was given a two-week course called "The American Heritage." The concept of this course was developed by [REDACTED] then25X1A chief of the Intelligence School, and approved by Baird. At first glance the rationale behind the concept appeared to be sound: after learning of the mission of US intelligence and the Agency's part in it, and after studying the enemy and the nature of his threat to the American Way of Life, the JOT's should learn exactly what it was that was being threatened -- what, that is, intelligence had to defend; and because the JOT's were extremely intelligent young people with outstanding academic records, the teaching had to be done at a highly sophisticated level, using the best brains available in the country brought in from major universities and high places in government.

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While the American Heritage course was in the planning stage, some senior OTR instructors, all of whom were involved in the development of the integrated program,* raised eyebrows and scratched heads after a second look at this rationale. If, indeed, the JOT's were extremely intelligent young people with outstanding academic records -- most of them in the fields of political science and history -- couldn't they be expected to know and understand the traditional values of the American Way of Life? Was it necessary or profitable to devote two full weeks and the best brains of the country to the review and embellishment of what they already knew? Such questions were raised and summarily dismissed as the unenlightened views of small men with little vision. Planning went forward; comprehensive reading lists were compiled, and letters of invitation to speakers -- prepared for the DCI's signature -- were drafted. [REDACTED] designated himself as chief instructor of the course, and most of the preparation work was done by JOT's already on board awaiting the beginning of the first integrated program.

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* One of these, of course, was the writer of this history who was chief of one of the Intelligence School faculties at the time.

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A few days before the program began in October 1958 the American Heritage ran into trouble. The lead-off guest speaker was to be a distinguished -- perhaps notorious -- professor of political science in a prestigious eastern university. The letter inviting him to speak was sent through channels for the DCI's signature and was soon bounced back to OTR unsigned. It seemed that the academic gentleman addressed was at that time in great disfavor with the Administration, and in high places in the Agency it was decided that it would be unwise to extend an invitation to him. It appeared also that some of the other best brains on the guest speaker list might be politically tainted, and it was suggested to OTR that the guest-speaker level be lowered to a safer plane.* This was done, and the American Heritage course was given sans best brains for the first integrated JOT group.**

* In his 1971 recollections of the evolution of the JOT program, [REDACTED] 95X1A notes that "one idea, eventually turned down by the DCI, was to have the class addressed by a number of distinguished citizens of various political and philosophical persuasions." 122/

** The course was abandoned after the first running, and some elements of it were incorporated in the expanded Intelligence Orientation course for JOT's.

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After the American Heritage the group was given a five-week Intelligence Techniques course, essentially the same ITC that had been developed in 1956. The major change made by the integrated program was that all JOT's -- not only those interested in intelligence research and production -- took the course. The reasoning was that all JOT's, regardless of their eventual assignments, should have a basic understanding of the processing of intelligence information and the production of finished intelligence. The ITC was a do-it-yourself course; all of the instruction -- the presentation of problems and the detailed critiquing of solutions -- was done by members of the Intelligence Production Faculty of the Intelligence School.

After the ITC came the Clandestine Services Orientation (CSO), a two-week course devoted to the missions and functions of the DDP. Like the ITC, this course was required of all JOT's -- on the basis of the same rationale; those JOT's who would not later be assigned to the DDP should have a basic understanding of clandestine operations as an essential part of the Agency's mission.* The CSO was given by

* The requirement that all JOT's take both the ITC and the CSO was also an early attempt to break down the parochial barriers that had always separated the overt and covert sides of the Agency.

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
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the Headquarters Training Staff of the Operations School and made use of guest speakers from the Clandestine Services, seminars, and case studies.

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The nine JOT's who "entered specialized training in Research" went into the 12-week Intelligence Production Course (IPC), a new course developed by the Intelligence Production Faculty of the Intelligence School. The IPC was designed to provide for those JOT's who

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were to be assigned to the various components of the DDI an in-depth coverage of the missions of each of the DDI Offices and the methods employed to meet those missions. The course was composed of background lectures; visits to the components for observation of, and briefing by, the working analysts; practical problems related to components' work; seminars for review and discussion; and a final research paper on a major intelligence problem. One significant aspect of the course was the fact that several instructors took part continually, and all of them had had at least four years of working experience in a DDI component.

The first running of the integrated program -- with the exception of the American Heritage phase -- was judged successful by the DTR and the JOT staff, and it set the general pattern for JOT training thereafter. There were, of course, many minor modifications and some major changes. The more important of these are described in the following paragraphs.

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The next major step in the expansion came in March 1964. By that time the concept of bringing in all new professional employees of the Agency through the JOT program had gained popularity in some influential quarters -- not, however, in OTR. A part of this concept was the conviction that the eventual component assignments of all JOT's should be determined at the time of EOD. This conviction was not shared by the JOT program staff; they felt that such action would defeat one of the major objectives of the program -- placement after demonstrated competence for and interest in the specific job. In any event, in March 1964 the decision was made by the DDS and the Executive Director to increase the number of annual JOT classes from two to four, the number of JOT graduates each year [REDACTED] and the 25X9 authorized personnel ceiling for JOT's [REDACTED] per year. 130/ To imple25X9 ment this decision plans were made to begin classes in July 1964 and in January, March, and October 1965. The July and January classes 25X9 would have about [REDACTED] JOT's in each, most of them to be assigned eventually to the DDP; the March and October classes would have about [REDACTED] 25X9 JOT's in each, all of them having been specifically designated for assignment to the DDI, the DDS, or the DDS&T. 131/

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The four-classes-per-year system was put into effect, but recruiting fell far below the established goals, and the individual classes were much smaller than the plans stipulated. The concept of bringing in all professionals through the JOT program faded away -- not because of opposition from OTR but because of the realities of recruiting to fill specialized jobs in the DDI and the DDS&T, jobs that had to be filled by people with maturity and experience considerably above the JOT level.

D. The DDS Program

1. Background. During the first three years of the JOT program the orientation of the training was entirely toward the DDI. Beginning late in 1953 the DDP became interested in JOT graduates, and from that time through 1965 the program became a major source of young officers for DDP assignment with as many as 80 percent of the graduates going into the Clandestine Services. Although a few graduates went to the DDS during the 1951-64 period, the program did not develop a DDS-oriented phase until late in 1964. The need for such a phase, however, had been suggested by the IG as early as February 1961. In a report of a survey of the Office of Logistics, the IG recommended

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that "the Director of Training increase the emphasis on logistics, especially as applied to station and project management, in the Junior Officer Training Program." 132/

Although the IG's report mentioned only logistics, it was the first official suggestion of the wisdom of including support training in the JOT program. The only recorded OTR reaction to the IG's recommendation came from [REDACTED] then the JOT Program Coordinator. 25X1A

In an August 1961 report he referred to the IG's recommendation, described the support coverage in the program at that time, and concluded that coverage of the logistics function "is adequate in the training program currently given to all JOT's." He added the statement that special courses in logistics were open to JOT's after they completed the program. 133/

2. Planning. From that time until March 1964 there was much talk of support training becoming a part of the JOT program, but there was no action. In early March 1964 there was a meeting of the chief of the Intelligence School, the chief of the OTR Plans and Policy Staff, and a member of the DDS Administrative Staff in which there was "preliminary discussion" of a support services segment of the JOT formal training program. 134/ There is no record of what prompted this

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meeting, but there is a record of a follow-up meeting in which the probable reason for the first meeting was surfaced. On 1 June 1964 [REDACTED] 25X1A
[REDACTED] of the Headquarters Training Staff of the Operations School, [REDACTED] 25X1A
[REDACTED] of the OTR Plans and Policy Staff, and [REDACTED] 25X1A
[REDACTED] of the Office of the DDS met to discuss a "Support 25X1A
Services portion of the JOT Program." 135/ The record of that meeting states that "discussion revealed that the DDS wants JOT's to qualify for chief of support at small stations." The meeting closed with the agreement that OTR would begin to construct the kind of program that the DDS wanted.

3. The Support Services Course. By the middle of October 1964 OTR had completed the planning, and the DTR submitted to the DDS an outline of the proposed Support Services Course. 136/ The course was to cover eight weeks and would be given in two phases. Phase one was a five- to eight-day coverage of administrative concepts, support policies, and the mission and organization of the DDS. Phase two was to last from six and one-half to seven weeks and cover practical aspects of field administration with emphasis on support at small stations -- personnel, finance, logistics, and security -- and the teaching methods would be practical exercises, case histories, and a comprehensive


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problem. The plan was to offer the course twice each year, at the conclusion of either the 18-week Operations Course or the 6-week Operations Familiarization Course. The first running was scheduled for 25 January 1965.

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F. Language Training

As noted earlier, one of the basic objectives of the original professional trainee program was to develop the foreign language capability of the trainees so that all of them would have a working fluency in at least one foreign language. The first group of trainees, the group that began the program in July 1951, devoted half of their training time to the study of Russian. This practice was soon abandoned, partly because of the difficulties that developed in administering and controlling the language training in an external facility and partly because the need for Russian language competence in the Agency turned out to be much less urgent than had been anticipated early in 1951. Thereafter there was no clearly defined language training policy in the JOT program. Some JOT's were assigned to language training after they had completed the program and had been assigned to operating components -- usually to meet the specific language needs of the individual components. Some JOT's took after-hours language training while they were in the program -- usually to maintain a language competence that they had had when they came into the Agency. In short, the language training aspect of the JOT program became peripheral and incidental. For example, during the 1953-56 period only about 10 percent of the JOT's

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had taken language training of any kind, 146/ and most of these had taken their training in the "soft" languages -- Spanish, French, and German.

An OTR staff study of the management of the JOT program early in 1960 laments the lack of a language training policy in the program and suggests that one reason for it can be the fact that the Agency had no stated policy on language competence. 147/ The study also points out that although the professional recruiters in the field look for JOT candidates with foreign language competence, such competence cannot be made a condition of employment; if it were, the study says, "future classes will simply shrink in size unless standards are lowered in some other, very likely more important, direction." The study then goes on with a strong recommendation that a language competence policy be established in the JOT program making certain levels of fluency a requirement for completing the program.

No action was taken on the recommendation, and language training continued as a haphazard activity. There was, of course, some excellent language competence among the JOT's. In 1958, for example, the chief of the program reported that he had nominated ten JOT's with fluency in Russian and Czech as possible interpreters for visits of

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delegations from the USSR and Czechoslovakia on cultural exchange programs. 148/ There is no record of whether or not any of the nominees were accepted. Among the JOT's there was enough language competence to permit cashing in on the "Language Incentive Awards Program."* In March 1960, for example, the chief of the program reported that between October 1959 and March 1960 JOT's had been awarded a total of \$1,200, most for German, Spanish, and French. 149/ In August 1961 the DTR reported that during fiscal year 1961 twenty-three JOT's had been given 31 language awards totaling \$2,662.50. 150/

G. On-the-Job Training

In the original concept of the JOT program, on-the-job training was equal, perhaps greater, in importance to the formal training program. During the first two years, when the JOT's came on board individually when available and were entered into regularly scheduled courses when those courses started, an attempt was made to assign the JOT's to desk training during the intervals of waiting. This, of course, didn't work. Supervisors were reluctant to take nonproductive bodies for short periods of time, there were not enough JOT staff

* See OTR-9.

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officers to help the JOT's find short-term desk assignments, and at that time DDP components would have nothing to do with JOT's -- they were all security risks. Even on-the-job assignments for the JOT's after completion of the formal training program were hard to come by. The program had not yet proved itself; and although some supervisors were glad to get bodies that didn't encumber their slots and put them to work doing clerical chores, very few were willing to do any actual on-the-job training. 151/

In April 1953, however, the JOT staff developed a "coordinated program" for on-the-job training, a program whereby the JOT staff would arrange for a desk assignment for each JOT who completed the formal training. 152/ In conjunction with the JOT staff member, the supervisor wrote out the elements of training that would be given the JOT on the desk assignment and set a definite period for the training. At the end of that period the supervisor would notify the JOT staff of the component's decision about keeping the JOT and assigning him to a position on the component's personnel table of organization. In his 1971 retrospective review of the JOT program, [REDACTED] describes the ^{25X1A} development and the principles involved in it. Because that

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description reflects so well both [REDACTED] philosophy of training and his personal dedication to the JOT program, it is attached to this paper as Appendix C.*

H. Addenda

There are two factors related to the JOT program that should be mentioned at this point but do not warrant discussion in detail. One is the performance evaluation of the JOT's conducted throughout the formal training program, and the other is the change of the name of the Junior Officer Training Program to the Career Training Program.

1. Performance Evaluation. In his original proposal for the establishment of the professional trainee program the DTR made it abundantly clear that the trainee's performance in training would be closely observed and frequently evaluated; his retention in the program and his continued employment with the Agency would depend on the quality of his performance. This principle was upheld throughout the 1951-66 period, and performance evaluation and the reporting of it was one of the important duties of all instructors involved in the program. In his 1956 report of a survey of the JOT program the IG wrote, "While

* P. 210.

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attending training courses, the trainee is under constant observation. His work is evaluated by the instructors and reports of his progress are submitted to the JOT Division."

The methods of evaluation varied with the individual training courses, and the methods changed from time to time over the years. In the Intelligence Orientation course, for example, there was little actual student performance that could be evaluated during the course, and the evaluation was done on the basis of a final examination alone. In the Intelligence Techniques course, on the other hand, there were a dozen or more specific problem-solving exercises, and each was critiqued and graded. During the early years of the program the fitness-report scale was used as the basic evaluation device. In the late 50's the "WAPSO scale" was introduced and used in all courses in the program. This device established five levels of performance -- weak, adequate, proficient, strong, and outstanding. There were times during the 1951-66 period when narrative evaluations were required -- written analyses of the JOT's performance stressing strong points and weaknesses. In the tradecraft courses given [REDACTED] the

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"murder session" was often used -- all instructors in a course would get together and discuss the performance of each JOT and arrive at some common ground for evaluation.

Needless to say, there was never full agreement among the OTR schools, the JOT staff, the A&E staff -- which worked closely with instructors in the evaluation procedure -- and even the instructors in a single course about the best methods of evaluation. An accepted system such as the WAPSO scale, for example, could mean quite different things to different instructors; and no system of evaluation could be free from the element of subjective judgment. Perhaps, after all, it didn't really matter very much what system was used or how it was used. The JOT's knew that they were being evaluated, and they performed accordingly; and the members of the JOT staff, who had to make the final decisions in which the evaluations played a part, knew the students well, knew the instructors well, and were quite capable of evaluating the evaluations.

2. The Name Change. In April 1965 the name of the JOT program was changed to the Career Training Program. The name change actually had no effect whatever on the program itself, but the rationale for the change -- at least that part of it that can be reconstructed from

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documents and memory -- is interesting and warrants mention here.

As noted above, there was for a time a conviction in medium high places in the Agency that all new professional employees should be brought in through the JOT program. It occurred to someone -- his identity is not recorded -- that some of the new professionals would be specialists more mature than most JOT's and might be reluctant to accept jobs with the Agency if it required entry with a "junior" stigma; ergo, the "junior" must be eradicated.

The first step in the eradication procedure came in January 1965 when [REDACTED] then chief of the JOT program, met with several ^{25X1A} O/Pers officers, including the Director of Personnel and the chief of the Personnel Procurement Division, to discuss the wisdom of changing the name of the program. 153/ The group decided that it would be wise to change the name and agreed to recommend to Colonel Lawrence K. White, then the DDS, that the name be changed from the Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP) to the Career Selection and Training Program (CSTP). The recommendation was made, and at some point between submittal and approval the "Selection" was dropped and the program became the CTP.

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V. Placement after Training

A. Early Procedures

1. Summary through 1955. The general procedures, those developed during the early years of the program, for the placement of JOT's after the completion of formal training and on-the-job training have already been mentioned in various sections of this history. Perhaps the best general summary of those procedures is that given by the IG in his February 1956 report of a survey of the program conducted late in 1955:

In making the initial assignment the directors of the JOT Program take into consideration the aptitudes and desires of the trainee and make every effort to place him in the most suitable position. Arrangements are made with the appropriate supervisor to take the trainee into his organization for a period of from three to twelve months to give him an opportunity to learn its functions by participating in them. This method of assignment on a trial basis benefits both supervisor and trainee. During this period of employment the trainee prepares progress reports at regular intervals for the JOT Division. The supervisor also submits reports to the JOT Division describing the trainee's activities and evaluating his performance. Both of these reports are prepared in narrative form which keeps them from being stereotyped and hence more valuable. [*]

* It must be assumed that the IG meant that the reports were more valuable because they were not stereotyped.

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While in the job assignment, the trainee remains on the T/O of the OTR. This provides the JOT Program with the ability to make assignments without the need for submitting to the time-consuming delays of normal administrative processes. It also permits the assignment of trainees to any component without regard for the limitations of personnel ceilings. This method provides the JOT Program with unusual flexibility and mobility in making assignments. It is, of course, subject to abuse by shortsighted supervisors who view it as a means of acquiring a high calibre employee at no cost to them. It also tends to become a form of paternalism in that the trainee is not exposed to the competition of his fellow workers and can always retreat to the shelter of the JOT Program and request reassignment if the situation is not to his liking.

In another section of the report the IG gives figures on the component distribution of JOT graduates as of 31 August 1955. At that time a total of 139 had completed the program: 85 had been assigned to the DDP staffs and area divisions, 43 had been assigned to the Offices of the DDI, and 11 had been assigned to the Offices of the DDS. Also at that time there were 43 JOT's in a training status and not yet assigned. It should be noted that all of the 85 assigned to DDP components had been so assigned after 1953; before that time the DDP was not interested in the product of the program, and all of the graduates went into the DDI components. Actually, then, from the beginning of 1954 through August 1955 the DDP-assignment trend became firmly established and set the pattern for assignment thereafter.

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2. Weakness in the System. The IG did not identify the preponderance of DDP assignments as a major cause, but he did point out that there were certain faults in the assignment system. In the paragraphs quoted above he qualified the advantages of the system by mentioning abuses by "shortsighted supervisors" and a form of "paternalism." Later in the report, he describes the placement system as "too hit or miss" and dependent upon the temporary needs of components as opposed to a "scheduled program based on prior study of the professional requirements of each major Agency component resulting from normal attrition." He points out that a scheduled program for the placement of JOT's after training would necessarily involve a scheduled program for the recruitment of JOT's and the systematic entering-on-duty of a predetermined number of JOT's each year. His specific recommendation is directed toward that end:

That the DCI direct the establishment of quotas to govern the recruitment of career trainees for each of the three major components of the Agency, i. e. DD/P, DD/S, and DD/I; such quotas to be directly proportionate to the professional attrition rate of each component.

Perhaps because the recommendation was directed toward the recruiting phase of the program rather than the placement phase, no immediate official action was taken toward establishing a system of

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component quotas for placement of JOT's after training. An early 1960 OTR study of the program applauds the work of the JOT staff in finding proper post-training assignments for JOT's but laments the lack of a sound placement system. 154/ The study recommends that each major component be "properly tooled up" for the assignment of a specific number of JOT graduates each year and that the requirements for the graduates be brought into "close balance" with the supply. The study assumed that the DDI and the DDS could do these things "in stride" but "the DDP will likely have trouble until its assignment system is more tightly centralized." By the end of 1959, then, no practicable system of placement quotas had been developed.

B. Development of Requirements

1. Informal Estimates. Early in 1959, however, the JOT staff had made informal and unofficial arrangements with the individual DDP components to submit estimates of their JOT graduate requirements. In March 1959 the JOT staff reported that the "tentative" requirements submitted by DDP components for the JOT's who would finish the current OC in August were much greater than the total number of JOT's in the class and that the staff had requested the components to place

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priorities on their requirements so that an equitable distribution could be made. 155/ Obviously the estimates of requirements had been made without reference to the available supply.

In February 1960 the JOT staff tried to approach reality by establishing its own quotas for component assignments. On the basis of the number of JOT's in a training status at the time, the staff judged that during calendar year 1960 there would be 123 program graduates and that 90 of these would be assigned to the DDP, 25 to the DDI, and eight to the DDS. 156/

2. DDP Action. Apparently this show of unilateral realism moved the DDP to take action on the problem. There is no record of the channels through which the pressures were applied, but in June 1960 the Deputy Director for Plans officially directed Panel C of the Clandestine Services Career Service Board to coordinate the placement of JOT graduates in the DDP. 157/ The panel was ordered to canvass the staffs and area divisions and get firm commitments for both on-the-job training and permanent assignments for JOT's; the panel was also to ratify the transfer of all DDP-assigned graduates from JOT slots to DDP slots.


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C. Expansion of Requirements

1. New Consumers. Between 1960 and 1966 new requirements were levied on the JOT program by Agency components that had not previously taken JOT graduates. Several of the administrative units of the Office of the DCI requested the assignment of JOT's; the DDI Office of National Estimates requested assignment of one JOT; and

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
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To the credit of the DDP and the JOT staff it should be pointed out that the lowering of the selection criteria and the training requirements was not at any time proposed as a solution to the problem. In

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February 1965, for example, when the supply-demand ratio was at its worst, the DDP TRO sent to the DTR a memorandum recommending more intensive evaluation of the students in the OC. 165/ He pointed out that there were three kinds of students in the course: those who discover early in the course that they have no "affinity for CS work" and decide to withdraw and should be encouraged to withdraw; those who are "dilatory and lethargic" and should be removed from the course; and those who prove suitable for CS activities. The last category, according to the DDP TRO, should be evaluated fully at six-week intervals -- at the end of 6, 12, and 18 weeks -- the final evaluation to be an intensive one covering performance during the entire course.

A partial solution of sorts was suggested in early 1961. In a report to the DTR the chief of the JOT program described a conversation with [REDACTED] then the DDP TRO, in which [REDACTED] made it clear that he shared "the DDP attitude that once a JOT is assigned to a DDP component he should become the property of that component." The attitude that [REDACTED] referred to was one that had not at that time become an actual proposal but was gaining strength among some senior DDP officers. The concept was that the established practice of the JOT graduate remaining on the JOTP rolls for a year or

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more and thus under the control of the JOT staff prevented the DDP component from making full use of the body where it would do the most good -- for the component, that is; if the component were given full control of the JOT immediately upon assignment, the requirements could be satisfied much sooner and thus the supply-demand imbalance would be reduced. The reasoning of this concept appears now to be somewhat obscure, but at that time it appeared to make sense to some people.

Not, however, to [REDACTED] He was convinced that surrendering^{25X1A} control of the JOT's career development upon initial assignment to a component would destroy one of the major values of the JOT program; it would eliminate the opportunity for the component to take the JOT only after he had demonstrated capability, and it would make more difficult the reassignment of the JOT if the initial assignment proved to be unsatisfactory to him. 166/ Eventually, however, the concept of immediate transfer at initial assignment was accepted -- not because it was good but because it was expedient. By the middle of 1965 budget curtailment had forced the DTR to use all possible economy measures; one of them, as he reported to the DDS in July 1965, was the "much

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quicker" assignment of JOT's to component slots, which reduced the time of their incumbency of OTR slots and thus reduced personnel costs in OTR. 167/

D. Types of Assignment

JOT graduates were, of course, assigned to all manner of Agency jobs, and it would be fruitless here to catalog the assignments given them during the 1951-66 period. Once they had been removed from the JOTP personnel roles and had become members of the career services of their components, they began to lose their JOT identities, and soon they became only statistical data for follow-up studies of the achievements of JOT graduates. It would be of interest here, however, to mention some of the kinds of initial assignments given to JOT's as first steps in the development of their careers with the Agency.

1. Non-Covert Assignments. Except for the DDP the DDI was the major consumer of the product of the JOT program. Later, of course, the DDS phase of the program developed; and with the establishment of the Deputy Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T), a small number of JOT's were assigned to components of that directorate. Perhaps the trend in the assignment of JOT graduates to non-DDP components is best identified by the OTR staff study of the program

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completed early in 1960. 168/ That study shows that 44 JOT graduates, 40 men and four women, had been assigned to DDI components from the beginning of the program through December 1959. Of these, 16 had gone to the Office of Current Intelligence, 12 to the Office of Research and Reports, 13 to the Office of Operations -- eight of them to the Contacts Division, and one each to the Office of Central Reference, the Office of National Estimates, and the Office of Scientific Intelligence -- later expanded and established as the DDS&T. The study also shows that seven graduates had been assigned to the DDS, three to the Office of Personnel and two each to the Office of Training and the Commercial Staff. Although the numbers changed over the next five years, the proportions remained about the same -- with some increase in the DDS share of the non-covert assignments.

2. Clandestine Services Assignments. The general nature of the DDP assignments of JOT graduates has already been identified, but some specific examples are of interest. Before 1960, when the supply-demand imbalance was not a critical factor and the JOT staff still controlled the development of JOT's after the completion of training, it was the practice to arrange for developmental assignments of JOT's to the area divisions of the DDP. In December 1957, for example, the

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E. Conclusions

Despite the "hit-or-miss" procedures during the early years of the JOT program, the slowness of the DDP to establish coordinated mechanisms for placement, and the continuation of estimates of requirements that far exceeded the supply, the placement procedures worked. To what extent they might have worked better during the latter part of the 1951-66 period if the JOT staff's control after training had not been eroded by budget pressures and the DDP's need for productive bodies is a matter of conjecture. In all probability continued JOT staff control would have saved some JOT's from frustrating assignments and others from dead ends; it might even have reduced the attrition rate among ex-JOT's -- a problem that is discussed briefly in VI, B, 1, below.

Perhaps it should be noted here, however, that there was a minor cause of attrition in the placement procedures themselves -- the rejection of JOT graduates who were considered unqualified for assignment. In September 1961, for example, the DDP TRO informed the DTR that one man who finished OC No. 11 would not be acceptable to any DDP component; his performance in the course was unsatisfactory. In reporting this to the DDS, the DTR mentioned that the man's substandard performance had been reported by OTR instructors as early as

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July 1961 and at that time he had been placed on probation. The DTR also noted that the case was only the second of its kind in the history of the program. 172/ Undoubtedly there were other cases in the years that followed -- not enough of them to constitute a serious problem, but the fact that there were such cases is a tribute of a kind to the qualitative integrity of the JOT placement procedures.

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VI. Major Problems

Many of the major problems that arose in the development of the JOT program over the 1951-66 period have been identified earlier in this paper and need not be described here. There were, of course, a host of those minor problems that continually arise in the administration of any program involving the management of people, and a cataloging of them would contribute little to this paper. There were, however, a few problems of major interest and consequence that should be identified and described briefly. Some of them arose from situations outside the JOT program, and some of them were internal problems; they are discussed below in those two categories.

A. External Problems

1. Control of the Program. As noted earlier, when the JOT program began as the professional trainee program it was largely experimental and entirely an OTR activity. The Office of Personnel was involved in the recruiting activity but was not concerned with the actual management of the training program. The DDI components of the Agency were interested in the JOT program only as a possible minor source of young officers, and the DDP had no interest at all.

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By the end of 1953, however, the program was no longer experimental; Agency components, including those in the DDP, were convinced of the effectiveness of the program and were eager to get its graduates.

As early as August 1953 the IG recognized the potential of the program as a major channel for bringing young professionals into the Agency, and in his report of a survey of OTR he raised a question "as to whether the JOT Program is properly in the Office of Training rather than in the Office of Personnel." 173/ He did not, however, answer his own question and make a recommendation of a change in placement. The question, however, continued to be raised from time to time, and in January 1954 the DTR apparently decided that the time had come to answer the question. In a memorandum addressed to the DDCI, he stated his opposition to a change of placement of the program and gave his reasons. 174/ The memorandum was in the form of a staff study; the conclusions pointed out that the quality of the program would inevitably suffer if personnel administration should become the dominating element in the administration of the program. The DTR's memorandum must have been convincing, for the DDCI approved the recommendation and the question was answered.

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It did not, however, stay answered. Early in 1956 the IG raised it again -- this time in a different context and with some modifications. As noted earlier, the IG's February 1956 report of a survey conducted late in 1955 recommended that the Junior Career Development Program, the internal program managed by O/Pers, be merged with the JOT program.* At the same time he suggested that OTR be merged with O/Pers under a single Director of Personnel and Training. 175/ The recommendation that the JPD program be merged with the JOT program was approved, of course, but the merger of OTR and O/Pers was not.

Although there was no subsequent official effort to seize control of the JOT program, there must have been a continuing undercurrent of feeling in some places that OTR should not be in control. Late in 1958 Baird was interviewed by a representative of the CIA Historical Staff and stated that the JOT program was always "under fire" because it controlled manpower and that the "operating divisions would rather have their own complete control over personnel."

* See above, p. 28

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He also said that O/Pers was trying to control the program "because it is the only successful personnel management program in the Agency."

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2. Pressures for Expansion. Although the IG's August 1953 report recognized the success of the JOT program, it did not make specific recommendations that the program be expanded. In his February 1956 report, however, he said that "the success of the JOTP dictates the expansion of the program to a much broader one to bring in all professional employees through the program." 177/ The report contains a two-phase plan for gradual transition of the JOT program to an "Agency Career Management Program," and it recommends that the number of JOT positions be increased from 100 to 200. 178/ That part of the IG's recommendation that concerned the increase in the number of positions was approved, and the positions were allocated. The 200 positions, however, were not filled; and during the next few years the number was reduced. In January 1959 [REDACTED] told the representative of the CIA Historical Staff that the program had once had 200 slots but "limitations imposed by the DCI on the Agency" had reduced the number to 100 -- including 40 military positions for the OCS JOT's.

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The reduction in the number of JOT positions did not stop the pressures for expansion of the program. In his 1956 report, the IG had said that all young professional officers should be brought into the Agency through the JOT program. No DCI decision was made at the time to implement the IG's suggestion, so in his August 1960 report of a survey of the CIA training program he put his earlier suggestion into the form of a specific recommendation: "that the DCI establish as Agency policy that all junior professional officers enter Agency employment through the JOTP." 180/ This recommendation was stoutly opposed by OTR. The opposition was bluntly expressed by the JOT Program Coordinator, at that time [REDACTED] in a memorandum addressed to the DTR. [REDACTED] said, "in order to retain the fineness of the product, we must resist watering down its base." 181/ Baird agreed with [REDACTED] and convinced the DDS -- and ultimately the DCI -- that the IG's recommendation should be disapproved.

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During this 1959-60 period there were a few influential non-OTR officers who shared Baird's and [REDACTED] reluctance to see the JOT program expanded. In January 1959 the Historical Staff representative interviewed [REDACTED] then the DDP TRO, and raised the question of the expansion of the program. [REDACTED] said that

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instead of talking about expanding the program someone should raise the question of whether or not OTR and O/Pers were recruiting too many JOT's; he thought that recruiting should wait until the Agency caught up with pressure for reduction in personnel. He added that he didn't think that all new young professionals should come in through the JOTP; the divisions should be allowed to recruit directly. 182/

No doubt there were others outside of OTR who shared

[REDACTED] views, but their voices were not heard, and the pres-
sures for expansion continued. In November 1963 the DTR reported to the DDS that he "understands that the Office of Personnel will submit to the DDS a proposal to expand the JOTP [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He stated that he had directed his staff to study and report on what additional staff, facilities, and funds "may be required to support this expansion." 183/ By 10 December the OTR staff study and report had been completed, and the DTR wrote a memorandum to the Director of Personnel containing a summary of the results of the study. Apparently by that time the DTR had seen a draft copy of the O/Pers proposal to the DDS. Baird referred to the proposal and said that he did not like the idea of bringing in all new professionals through the JOT program; such action would inevitably reduce the selection and training standards

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3. Relocation of the Program. A problem that appeared to be a major one at the time arose early in 1963 in the form of a proposal to move the entire JOT program [REDACTED] Just where the proposal originated and what forces initiated it are somewhat obscure. The first documentary reference to it appeared in a May 1963 paper written by [REDACTED] presumably to be submitted to the DTR. 187/ [REDACTED] refers to an "informal paper circulated within OTR preliminary to a staff study on the subject." There is no record of the actual submittal of the paper, and in all likelihood [REDACTED] handled the matter directly with Baird on a personal basis -- as he did with so many matters that did not require official channeling outside of OTR. This proposal reportedly originated outside of OTR -- in the Clandestine Services -- and was more-or-less smuggled in for circulation as an informal paper.* The concept behind the proposal was that the JOT program would be a more secure source of young officers for the DDP if the entire program, from EOD through the formal training, were conducted [REDACTED]

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* The writer of this history was chief of one of the OTR schools at the time, and these conjectures are based on his recall of the situation.

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
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By the end of 1959 it had become apparent that a real problem existed and that something should be done about it. An OTR Plans and Policy Staff study completed early in 1960 summarized the problem in terms of starting salaries for JOT's and the rate of their promotion to higher grades. 188/ The study pointed out that most JOT's entered the program as GS-07's with a salary of \$4,980 per year; after two full years, they might reach the GS-10 grade with a salary of \$6,505. A few highly qualified JOT's might come in at the GS-08 level, \$5,470 per year, or even the GS-09 level; at the end of two years, they might

* See above, p. 65.

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component to which they had been assigned after training. The DTR's statement concluded with this caveat: "It must be clearly understood that there is nothing automatic in this program. . . which is based on the quality of performance of the individual." 190/

The DTR's policy was effective, of course, only as long as the JOT stayed on the OTR personnel rolls. After he had been transferred to another career service, he became subject to the policies and practices of that career service, and the policies and practices of the various career services differed. Consequently the rate-of-promotion problem was never really solved and continued to be a source of discontent among the JOT's in the program and among the ex-JOT's with some of the Agency components. In December 1961 an attempt was made to standardize the promotion of ex-JOT's. The DTR and the Chief of the JOT program convinced the Director of Personnel that there should be an Agency-wide policy on the matter, and the D/Pers sent to the DDS a memorandum recommending a standard rate of progression for JOT's; the official policy would be that JOT's who entered on duty as GS-07's "should expect to be promoted to GS-11 in approximately three and one-half years." 191/ On 18 December 1961 the DCI approved this policy. 192/ The language of the "policy" was ambiguous,

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of course, and it served only to remind the various career services of the good intentions of the Agency; it did not solve the rate-of-promotion problem.

B. Internal Problems

1. Attrition. The problem of attrition among JOT's, both while they were in the program and after they had been assigned to Agency components, was a constant irritant to OTR and, particularly, to the JOT staff. The seriousness of the problem varied with the persons or groups who made judgments of it at various times over the 1951-66 period. OTR pointed out that the rate of attrition among JOT's and ex-JOT's was much lower than that in the Agency as a whole and much lower than that in other Government agencies. Some non-OTR critics, including the IG, pointed out that in view of the care, time, and expense of recruiting and selecting the JOT's the rate of attrition among them should be much lower than other averages. Some such critics -- not including the IG -- declared that there must be something wrong in the selection process; if there weren't, those candidates who were possible drop-outs would be identified and not accepted into the program.

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Perhaps it should be noted here that not all of the resignations that constituted the attrition problem were occasioned by the JOT's dissatisfaction with the program or the Agency. In addition to those who were attracted by offers of higher pay or family circumstances, there were a number of "induced" resignations. Two such resignations were noted earlier in this history,* and there were a number of others -- several of them consequent to reluctance or refusal to accept assignments.

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to accept an assignment to Vietnam." 195/

2. Women and Wives. Ungallant as it is to list women and wives among major problems, within the context of the JOT program they did create difficulties that warrant brief mention here. The problems created by women JOT's were, of course, quite different from those created by the wives of JOT's.

* See above, p. 156.

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
a. Women JOT's. The basic problem with women JOT's was that they could not be treated, in all respects, as were the male JOT's. In spite of the precautions taken by the recruiters and the JOT staff in the selection process, most of the women JOT's entered the program with major misconceptions about the nature of the intelligence business. Although they did not really expect to become latter-day Mata Haris, the mythology of espionage had led them to expect at least a taste of the cloak-and-dagger flavor of the trade. When they discovered that real-life clandestine operations had very little use for women -- that little usually limited to women of another profession -- and women's jobs in the Agency were primarily those of analysis and reports writing, disenchantment set in and disaffection followed. In the early years of the program, when virtually all of the JOT's were assigned to DDI components, the problem was a minor one; but when the DDP opened the Operations Course for JOT's late in 1963 and later began to accept male graduates of the program, muted mention of discrimination was heard among the women.

Eventually, of course, the DDP components began to accept a few women JOT graduates, almost all of them in reports officer positions. The women who opted for DDP assignment were not

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accepted in the Operations Course, but when the Operations Familiarization Course became a part of the program they were accepted in that -- and when the OFC became a required segment of the formal training, all women JOT's took the course. The admission of women

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The number of women students in the JOT groups never exceeded 10 percent of the total and was usually in the 5 percent range. Early in the program's development it was decided that relatively few of the JOT's should be women. In fact by the end of 1955 the field recruiters had been instructed to consider women candidates only if they had Master's degrees or some other appropriate record of

25X1A * The writer of this history somewhat indelicately recalls that in an OTR Senior Staff meeting in the late 50's, the problems of sending women JOT's [redacted] courses were discussed, and the DTR suggested that the paper work involved should use some code device to designate male JOT's and women JOT's. [redacted] solemnly proposed the code words "jots" and "tittles."

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achievement beyond the undergraduate level. This restriction kept the numbers down somewhat, but there were still many who met the higher qualification. As late as 1964 the problem still existed; the chief of the program, some of his staff officers, the Director of Personnel and his deputy, the chief of the Personnel Procurement Division, and a DDS staff officer held a meeting on 15 May to discuss the problem of "lady applicants -- too bright to reject and too young and inexperienced to accept in the program." 196/

b. Wives. There need be no explication of the importance of wives in the development of men's careers, and this importance was magnified when the men were entering upon careers that required deviations from normal modes of life and involved cover, security, and -- to some extent -- dissemblance. As the JOT program developed during the early years, more and more married men came into the program -- in fact, a conscious effort was made to recruit married men because family responsibilities were likely to make them more stable. The wives problem must have troubled the JOT staff from the beginning, for in January 1956 [REDACTED] wrote in a memorandum to the Office of Security, "We have not yet solved the problem of how best to handle the wives of JOT's." 197/ 25X1A

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It was more than a year later that the JOT staff found a partial solution to the problem. In a routine periodic report in September 1957 [REDACTED] stated that "in order to develop higher morale and also to provide better support of cover assignments" three groups of JOT wives were given briefings on the Agency, medical care, and security; this "pilot operation," continued [REDACTED], "has been sufficiently successful so that an Agency-wide briefing of wives is being considered." 198/ 25X1A

The Agency-wide briefing of wives never materialized, but the briefing of JOT wives continued as a standard practice. After 1957 the briefing of wives of JOT's grew in scope, and non-OTR speakers, some of them senior Agency officers, took part. Early in 1964 the non-OTR speakers were dropped, and the briefings were given by Baird, [REDACTED] -- then chief of the program -- and members of the program staff. 199/ Later in 1964 a new phase of the wives' briefing was introduced. Some of the wives and children of the JOT's then in the Operations Course were taken [REDACTED] for a weekend. 200/ The briefing practices continued thereafter through 1965, and the "wives problem" was solved to the extent that solution was possible.. 25X1A

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3. Dissension in the Ranks. Although the JOT program was well organized and well managed and the JOT's themselves were highly intelligent young people with some degree of maturity, it was inevitable that there should be incidents of dissent and protest; such incidents are endemic to the human condition. Dissent in the JOT ranks never assumed proportions that threatened the quality or integrity of the program, but there was enough of it to create problems that warrant mention here.

a. Causes. In almost any employment situation there are built-in circumstances that lead to some degree of dissatisfaction and disgruntlement, and in almost every training situation the necessary discipline generates some degree of resistance. The JOT's were both employees and trainees; dissidence was inevitable. Perhaps the first cause of dissent among the JOT's was disenchantment early in the program. The field recruiters were inclined to overstate the attractive aspects of the program and understate the drudgery involved. In February 1956 the IG reported that he had interviewed a number of JOT's then in the program and had concluded that there was a "lack of

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uniformity" in the information given JOT candidates by the field recruiters. 201/ He made no specific recommendation of action on the problem, but he clearly identified it as a cause of dissatisfaction.

There were, of course, a number of other causes -- absence of a clearly defined promotion policy and slowness of promotion, the reduction of overseas assignment slots, unsatisfactory post-training assignments involving dull work or uncongenial supervisors, prejudice induced by the "elite corps" stigma, and the growing popularity in the land of the "youth revolution." This last factor, perhaps, was the major cause of the two most serious situations that developed during the 1951-66 period -- one of them a verbal attack on the JOT establishment and the other a series of demonstrations against established authority.

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b. The [REDACTED] Affair. [REDACTED]

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JOT in training status, sent to the DDS and the D/Pers a memorandum severely criticising the JOT program. The major points made in the memorandum were that there "is a lack of clear definition of the purpose of the JOT Program," that there were "a number of specific problems which have caused dissatisfaction and disillusionment among Junior Officer Trainees," that "the JOT cannot help feeling that he has

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been misled as to the purpose of the program, " that there had been "failure to follow through on the promises made" when the JOT's were recruited, and that the members of the JOT staff had given "short shrift" to the JOT's in the matter of discussing the training for development of their careers. 202/ On the cover sheet under which the memorandum went to the DDS and the D/Pers there was a note explaining the reason for sending the memorandum outside of channels. The note made it clear that should anyone be openly critical of the program in OTR he would suffer consequences; the nature of the consequences was not specified.

If the problem had been handled by personal discussion with [REDACTED] in an effort to learn more of her motivation for sending it, there probably would have been an easy and quiet solution. At the time, however, [REDACTED] was acting chief of the program -- in [REDACTED] absence -- and [REDACTED] apparently decided that a major issue had been raised and called for a major solution. He sent to all JOT's, including graduates of the program, a long memorandum listing Miss [REDACTED] specific charges and requesting comment on the validity of them. 203/ Unfortunately he did this without consulting Baird; and [REDACTED] over whose name the memorandum was sent, was on leave at


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the time and knew nothing about it. Baird learned of the [REDACTED] memo25X1A
random from the supervisor of a JOT who had received it; he called the
JOT office to get a copy, and after reading it he sent it to [REDACTED] with25X1A
a note on the buck slip: "Ed, this is an admirably expressed memo and
I agree with all you've said. I suggest in the future, however, that my
office be cut in prior to dissemination." 204/25X1A



ation was simply a product of one person's frustrations, but the [REDACTED] A
memorandum magnified it to proportions far greater than were warranted.

* Copies of the JOT responses are found in OTR CT Staff file, Program-General 2. Ad Hoc Surveys and Summary Reports.

** A handwritten note reporting the interview is found in the file cited above.

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c. The Infamous OC Eleven. A second manifestation of dissension in the ranks was much more serious in terms of the problems created within the JOT program. This situation developed at [REDACTED] in 1961 during the running of Operations Course No. 11, 25X1A which began in January of that year. There were 51 students in the OC-11 class, and not more than 16 of them were involved in most of the incidents that created the problem. These few banded together early in the course and became known as "the rat pack."* The records indicate that the existence of a group of dissidents had been recognized by the training staff soon after the course began, but no warning was sounded.

The first incident in the series that subsequently became a matter of major concern occurred on the evening of 8 April, when five members of the "rat pack" broke into the locked area of the [REDACTED] 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED]. Nothing was taken, but some damage was done to the property. The miscreants were identified, and on 12 April all five of them were put on probation and a statement of their offense was

* A complete documentary record of Operations Course No. 11 activities, both official and unofficial, is in OTR CT Staff file The JOT Program, Class of January 1961.

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entered in their personnel files. The second incident, a re-play of the first, took place at some time on the weekend of 22-23 April. This time the operation was more successful; the locked area of the bar was entered, one bottle of bourbon was taken, and the operational personnel were not later identified. No punitive action was taken "for lack of evidence."

The third incident came on the night of 17 May. Five members of the "rat pack" were on a recreational visit to the [REDACTED] 25X1A [REDACTED] area and made a tour of the night clubs, later exploring the "red-light" district of the community. Here they became involved in a fight between a white man and a Negro; the white man turned out to be a plainclothes detective. No arrests were made, but the five JOT's were identified and were later reprimanded and given a warning. The fourth 25X1A incident involved two of the five students who had been in the [REDACTED] 25X1A [REDACTED] incident and a third member of the pack. At eleven o'clock on the evening of 8 June, firecrackers or "cherry bombs" were exploded

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[REDACTED] in the area. Although the culprits were known, no punitive action was taken because the night duty officer could not positively identify the men.

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The fifth incident, involving almost all members of the class, was somewhat different from the others and might well have been considered inventive and amusing if it had not been a flagrant disregard of discipline. On 27 June the class was involved in a "Caching Operation," a simulated situation in which the caching was to be done without detection by the "people's militia," a local security force being enacted by members of the instructional staff. The students decided to depart from the script of the exercise; they made an attempt to "capture" the people's militia instead of evading them, and to carry out their plan they made "unauthorized use" of government vehicles. The actual capture was not effected, but the training exercise was completely disrupted. On 7 July the chief instructor of the OC critiqued the "caching operation" and severely criticized the "capture" departure as a dangerous breach of operational discipline. During his critique, four of the students walked out of the room.

In addition to these major incidents, there were a number of minor ones -- a noisy beer-drinking bout, the dumping of water-filled waste baskets in living areas, an arrogant confrontation with the

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involved in the incidents were separated from the Agency; at least sixteen of them were placed on probation, and a few of them were found "unsuitable" for assignment to the Clandestine Services. Most of them later became outstanding intelligence officers. In retrospect, the incidents that made OC-11 an "infamous" group appear to have been a manifestation of high spirits and an in-establishment expression of the youth revolution. At the time, however, the incidents were matters of grave concern to the JOT staff, to the DTR, and to many other senior officers in the Agency.

d. Factionalism. In the August 1960 IG report of a survey of the Agency training program appears a recommendation that "the DTR together with the Director of Personnel take steps to eliminate prejudices that have arisen which tend to assign second class status to DD/S and DD/I careers." 205/ The recommendation was made within the context of a discussion of the JOT program, and the IG was simply recognizing a condition that had begun to develop in the mid-1950's. After the DDP decided late in 1953 that the JOT program was a valuable source of young officers for Clandestine Services assignment, DDP components were eager to furnish guest speakers for the JOT training courses. These speakers, in all honesty, were convinced that

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clandestine operations were the essentially important activities of the Agency, and their presentations were naturally biased. Most of them were ignorant of the functions of the DDI, and most of them considered the DDS a sort of housekeeping component. Unintentionally, probably, their enthusiasm and their parochialism created the impression that the DDP was the real CIA and that only eggheads and other lesser mortals were attracted to the DDI and the DDS.

Some of this attitude was absorbed by the JOT's, and a degree of factionalism developed in the JOT classes. Usually this did not emerge until the completion of the Headquarters phase of the training program. The fact that about 75 percent of the JOT's opted for operations training thereafter tended to create the impression that the DDI and DDS JOT's either were unqualified for DDP assignments or were dull souls who courted either the seclusion of research or the quiet security of a support function. Actually, of course, the non-DDP oriented JOT's were such because they wanted to be, and during the Headquarters phase of the training they had demonstrated high capability for either research or support. In addition, the JOT program

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staff was highly perceptive of career development possibilities and thoroughly competent to channel the JOT's into the assignments for which they were best suited.

Factionalism was never a real problem of importance in the JOT Program. The JOT staff and the OTR school chiefs were not really concerned about it. The IG's concern, in all probability, was aroused by interviews with non-DDP JOT's who resented the "second-class-status" stigma even though they had no desire whatever to be assigned to a DDP component. As a matter of fact, the IG may have been influenced by some ex-DDI OTR instructors who were disturbed by what they called the "DDP sales pitch."

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VII. Evaluation and Conclusions

A. Evaluation of the Program

Like the JOT's themselves, the JOT program was constantly being evaluated, both formally and officially and informally and unofficially. Throughout this history incidents of both kinds of evaluation have been cited -- some reflecting favorable attitudes and some unfavorable attitudes. At this point of final evaluation of the JOT program as it functioned from 1951 to 1966, there appears to be no need to compile a detailed catalog of all of the value judgments made over the 15-year period; exemplification will serve -- exemplification of the official evaluations, of the unofficial feed-back evaluations, and of the kind of self-evaluation done by the JOT staff.

1. The IG Reports. The first evaluation of the JOT program in an IG report appeared in August 1953, only two years after the program began and before the Clandestine Services had fully accepted the JOT program as a source of young operations officers. The IG's statement was somewhat guarded: "The Junior Officer Training Program has been successful, and its handling by the Office of Training while

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initially conducted on a strictly experimental basis has constantly improved." 206/ Three years later, the IG apparently decided that the program had proved itself 207/:

In a relatively short period of time the JOT Program has achieved remarkable results. It has provided the Agency with more than 182 career employees of extraordinary talent and leadership potential with still more in process of recruitment, selection, and training. It has not only demonstrated the feasibility of planned career development but has identified the factors that make it practicable.

In the same report, the IG recommends that "the Director of Training be commended in recognition of the significant accomplishments inherent in the growth and success of the JOT Program from its inception to its present status as the first effective career development mechanism in the Agency." 208/

In August 1960 the IG submitted a report of a survey of all training activities conducted in the Agency -- including not only OTR programs but also component training and external training of all kinds. In that report he stated that 209/:

The JOTP has achieved solid acceptance in the Agency by locating students of high character and demonstrated academic performance, then instructing and motivating them in the objectives and methods of intelligence to the point where they readily adapt to and become productive in operating assignments.

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
All of the IG reports cited above were signed by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., the Agency Inspector General from April 1953 until April 1962, when he was appointed Executive Director of Central Intelligence. Kirkpatrick resigned from the Agency in September 1965, accepted a position at Brown University, and later wrote a book about the Agency -- The Real CIA. In that book he refers to "the Agency junior officer training program that was ultimately to become one of the finest in government." 210/

2. Supervisors' Comments. The files of the OTR Career Training Staff contain records of a great many unsolicited comments by supervisors on the performance of JOT graduates. They are uniformly laudatory. For example, in 1964 the chief of the Headquarters [REDACTED] 25X1A desk in the DDP reported that he had just returned from a two-month 25X1A TDY [REDACTED] and had found that all JOT's assigned there were doing "outstanding work." 211/ In March 1964 the Executive Officer of the Office of National Estimates sent an informal note to the chief of the OTR Intelligence School giving high praise to the work of a JOT newly 25X1A assigned to ONE, [REDACTED] incidentally, was the first woman JOT assigned to ONE.

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3. The [REDACTED] Validation Study. Although the DTR and the chief of the JOT program accepted the evaluations of the IG as indicative of the overall quality of the program and accepted the feed-back from the supervisors of JOT graduates as indicative of the post-training performance of JOT's, they were not content to rest on the laurels thus bestowed. They insisted on a continuing process of self-evaluation within OTR. The JOT staff held weekly sessions in which procedures were analyzed and individual cases discussed; the various OTR schools regularly held postmortems on JOT courses completed and planning sessions on those to be given; and at least once each year, as noted earlier in this history, there was a two-day meeting [REDACTED] devoted entirely to discussion and evaluation of the JOT program.

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Everyone involved in the program realized, however, that the real test of the effectiveness of the program was the level of performance of the JOT graduate on the job. Late in 1963 the DTR and the chief of the program decided to make a systematic study of on-the-job performance by ex-JOT's.


There appears to be no record of who proposed this study; it was probably the result of one of the many informal discussions between Baird and [REDACTED]. In any event, it was decided that [REDACTED] a JOT staff member with wide experience in clandestine operations, should go to Europe and conduct a two-month, on-the-spot survey of the effectiveness of ex-JOT's on the job. The plan went forward, and in February 1964 the Deputy DDP approved [REDACTED] detailed plan for the validation study, as it was called. 214/ The purposes of the study, according to [REDACTED] plan, were to interview ex-JOT's assigned to Europe and obtain their views on the adequacy of the JOT program as preparation for overseas assignment and their suggestions on how the program could be improved; to interview supervisors for their comments on the effectiveness of ex-JOT's on the job in comparison with officers who were not ex-JOT's; to interview Station and Base chiefs for their comments on the performance of ex-JOT's and to reach conclusions on the

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
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effectiveness of the program and make appropriate recommendations.



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that the JOT program had been most successful in selecting and training young officers for DDP assignment. His recommendations were that recruitment of JOT's stress maturity and practical experience, that the EOD grade of JOT's be raised to GS-08 and in exceptional cases to GS-09 or GS-10, that in the first overseas assignment JOT's should not be put under nonofficial cover, and that the practice of conducting overseas validation studies of the program be established as a continuing policy. 216/ There is no record of any official action being taken on [redacted] recommendations, but his validation study served its

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purpose; it was tangible proof that the JOT program was doing a completely competent job of selecting and training young intelligence officers for service with the Agency.

B. Conclusions

In a real sense, whatever conclusions can be drawn from this study of the JOT program from 1951 to 1966 are implicit in the individual sections of the history and in the evaluations described above. A brief recapitulation, however, will serve the useful purpose of capsulization. The original concept of the program and the plan to put it into action, as they were developed by Baird and his staff, were sound and realistic. The standards established for the recruiting and selection of candidates were high, but they were attainable; and the procedures themselves were carried out by the recruiters and the OTR staffs in a manner that was both effective and non-compromising with quality. The management of the program under both [REDACTED] was almost flawless-25X1A. The various phases of the training program designed by the OTR schools were highly professional and fully responsive to the needs. For the most part the placement of JOT graduates was done with understanding and wisdom; there were, of course, a few misplacements, but these were largely the result of conditions over which the program

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staff had no control. The major problems that inevitably developed during the 1951-66 period were treated in proper perspective, and at no time did they threaten the quality or effectiveness of the program. There were, to be sure, some blunders made, some trials that proved to be errors, and some conflicts of interest and personalities; but these were minor irritants in a program that had definite objectives and high goals and achieved them.

Perhaps the most significant experiential lesson that can be drawn from the history of the JOT program is that the success of the program probably derived from the fact that it was conducted not as a personnel program but as a program for people -- carefully selected people who became distinct individuals at the beginning and remained so throughout the training and placement periods. The JOT's were not statistical entities -- either round or square pegs to be placed mechanically into holes of the approximately proper shapes; they were individuals with certain talents, capabilities, and limitations, and all of these were considered as key factors in their training and placement. Admittedly the program was an expensive one; the institutional processing of personnel can be done most economically with highly sophisticated electronic machinery. Electronic machinery -- no matter how highly

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sophisticated -- cannot, however, make subjective judgments, and it is incapable of empathy; only people have the perceptiveness to determine how best to handle people, and people are more expensive than machines. The performance of JOT graduates in serving the Agency appears to have justified fully the investment in the JOT program.

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In some instances the Assessment Team will have to carry out its program away from Washington to suit the convenience of applicants, but as much as possible the assessments should be done in Washington.

Within forty-eight hours after completion of the assessment program a coordinated, staff assessment report on the applicant will be sent to the Director of Training to aid him in (a) making the final decision on the applicant's selection, and (b) working out a training program to develop the applicant's potential most effectively. This assessment report will also be used later by the chief instructors and the evaluation psychologist to plan further training for the trainee.

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Appendix B

Recapitulation*

You enter the Central Intelligence Agency to serve your country, not for self aggrandizement, public recognition, or an exciting life in exotic parts of the world. Ours is difficult work, requiring a keen mind, selfless effort, personal sacrifice, and the utmost dedication. You should not enter it unless you expect to work harder and under more difficult conditions than most of your friends, whatever their occupation. You should not enter it from a profit motive, because you cannot expect to accumulate wealth. At the outset we do not expect you to be highly motivated for a service about which you know so little, but we do expect you to be the kind of person who has the capacity for developing that motivation. It is our responsibility to train you for those activities which constitute dedicated service in CIA.

During the two years of your JOT status you will be under the direct supervision of one of the training officers of the Program. He is responsible to Chief of the Program and to the DTR for your training and development as an intelligence officer. It is his interest to provide you with the best opportunity and to use your talents consistent always with the needs of the Agency to progress in this profession. Your formal training will consist first of general orientation to the Agency, during which evaluations of your capacities are made. You will then be given intensive training in a functional area where you will learn the requisite skills. Then you will be assigned to a desk for a period of about a year to apply your skills and demonstrate your worth. The determination of these assignments is first and above all based on the needs of the Agency; second, the opinion of the JOT Program of where you can most appropriately apply your talents based on the principle of effective use of manpower; and third, your own interests and desires. It is during the on-the-job phase of your training that we hope

* This was prepared in 1961 by the Chief of the Junior Officer Training Program as a handout to be given to all JOT's at the beginning of the program (see p. 91, above).

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you will become motivated for service in CIA. Much of this incentive will be derived from the example set by your immediate supervisor. Accordingly, it is of great importance that your on-the-desk training program be well considered and well administered. Your training officer and your component supervisor are responsible for this, as well as other elements of your development.

There will probably be several members of your class who hold higher grades than those normally assigned. These people will fall into two categories:

a. Employees of the Agency who have been accepted for the JOT Program at the grades which they currently hold. They are called "internal" trainees.

b. Specially qualified individuals who have been recruited and hired for a special task and are on "directed assignment." They have had prior experience or possess skills in areas for which there is specific demand. "Directed Assignment" trainees enter training with the approval of the component to which they will be assigned. They will be transferred to that component as soon as their formal training is completed, and become subject to its promotion policies.

It is normal and proper for a young man contemplating a career to think about advancement and personal responsibilities. The Office of Training has established the policy of hiring and promoting junior officer trainees. The following relates to present conditions which are subject to change. Most JOT's are hired at GS-7. A few of the more mature candidates are hired at GS-8. Irrespective of the date on which you enter on duty, you will become eligible for a one-grade promotion at the conclusion of the formal training period, some 32 to 34 weeks after the class begins. This is not automatic, but is based on your performance and attitude. Having been trained for a certain type of work, you will then apply this training to a specific job, normally for about a year. During this period, you are on trial with the supervisor to whom you have been assigned. You will have opportunity:

a. to prove your value to the Agency in a work situation,

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b. to convince your supervisor that you are a desirable addition to his component as a permanent employee,

c. to evaluate your own fitness for this particular kind of service.

During this on-the-desk training period you remain a JOT. At its conclusion you will become eligible for your next promotion. Again, this is not automatic but based on the quality of your performance and your attitude. It must be recommended by your on-the-job supervisor. You will then be transferred to the task for which you have been trained and become the responsibility of that component. You will be in competition with your peers for whatever recognition you will later receive. The Office of Training no longer has any control over your promotions and you become subject to the policies of the part of the organization to which you have been reassigned. As in the Office of Training, the higher the grade, the longer you will wait for advancement. Outstanding performance is recognized by accelerated promotion.

It is a fundamental principle of the JOT Program that the trainees produce the highest quality performance of which they are capable, whatever the task assigned. All JOT's, except those on "directed assignment," must be ready and willing to accept any assignment. Due regard is given to family considerations and personal circumstances.

Security is the cornerstone of this business. Discretion in discussing any subject anywhere is mandatory. At all times you must be on guard to protect yourself from breaking security restrictions, particularly when you are in the company of outsiders. You must conduct your life in such a way that you are not subject to public censure or private blackmail.

Your initial experience will largely determine the value and importance to you of a career in intelligence. Your reward for entering this service will be in the satisfaction you get from having done your part of the job well. We need the most able people we can get. Those who are selected should possess a deep desire to serve their country knowing that rewards can only be in the intangible area of personal satisfactions.

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There is a difference between training and education. Assumably members of the Program are fairly well educated when they enter it. This education will, of course, continue as they mature. The purpose of the training is to provide tools whereby their education and mental acuity can be put to work in this business. The skills you will gain, added to your knowledge and intellectual ability, will with experience give you the equipment to become an effective intelligence officer. Your job will be to become as expert as possible in each area of training and experience you undergo. The cumulative total of these bits of expertise will produce a first-rate officer. You cannot know in advance when you will be called upon to use any part of your professional equipment whatever it may be. Your principal objective is to become truly professional at the earliest possible moment.

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Appendix C

On-The-Job Training*

From the beginning of the Program the importance of the on-the-job training was obvious. In spite of our own inexperience in intelligence matters, it became clear early in the Program that "some jobs in the Agency are most interesting and challenging, but a very large part of our work is deadly monotonous, drudging routine." (IG's Survey of the CIA Career Service 30 January 1960.)

In planning the on-the-job training, all agreed that a certain amount of routine gave basic understanding of the job and tested the staying qualities of the individual, a very important characteristic of the effective officer. But to assign a highly capable young person for a protracted period to a job that could be done by a good high school graduate defeated the purposes of the Program as defined by Gen. Smith. Furthermore, it served to quench the enthusiasm of the new officer at the time when the question of his true interest in our business was being determined and should be stimulated. For these reasons, the type of on-the-job training program that was proposed for him and the attitude of the office supervisor were of vital importance to the success of our effort.

On the other hand, we faced the dangers inherent in giving the JOT his own way and spoiling him for the disciplined work he would eventually do. And as was not infrequently the case, some supervisors resented our efforts to have some stimulating work included in the training assignment.

We faced a continuing need to adjust the relatively delicate balance between these two attitudes. There were frequent contacts by the training officers with supervisors as well as with the JOT's themselves. Our purposes had to be explained; we had to find good positions for our

* This is an excerpt from a paper, The Evolution of the Junior Officer Training Program, 1951-1963, written by [REDACTED] in 1971^{25X1A} (see p. 136, above).

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people, and we had to serve the divisions as well as possible. To keep a reasonably coherent approach by all training officers we held short staff meetings at the beginning of each day when we discussed reactions, opportunities, criticisms, new ideas, etc.

Negotiating for on-the-job training was an individual matter. By the time this phase of the Program was reached the training officer had gotten to know a good deal about the JOT. If the supervisor had had experience with us and was sympathetic the task was simple. In general, we approached him with the following concepts in mind:

The JOT who is attached for on-the-job training knows that he must prove his worth and demonstrate his fitness for employment. At the same time, the supervisor has the opportunity to evaluate him in the actual work of the desk without being committed to accept him at the end of the training period.

Inasmuch as during this training the JOT is the responsibility of the Office of Training, we request from the supervisor a formal statement of the objectives of the on-the-job training and the type of assignment which he may expect. This will allow us to monitor his progress and provide for effective personnel management of the JOT.

In this cooperative effort we ask that should the JOT show inadequacies or deficiencies which mean that he will not be acceptable for permanent employment, the supervisor report the fact to us promptly. We do this in the hope that a re-assignment can be effected which would be more appropriate to the interests of the Agency and the individual.

The Office of Training looks upon the supervisor during the on-the-job training as an integral and very important participant in the JOT Program. As an expert in his field, it is through his influence that the JOT will, we hope, become enthused to continue and develop a career in CIA.

We recognize that these young people are in the process of testing not only their abilities to cope with the unusual needs of the Agency but also their fitness for a career with us. They are perforce examining

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the rewards and satisfactions of this service in terms of their own life objectives. Their decisions about continuing in the Agency are often made during this period.

Experience has shown that JOT's who have begun their careers under supervisors who have taken interest in their development, who have provided them with opportunities for growth commensurate with their ability, and who in the Clandestine Services have planned overseas experience as soon as possible after adequate training -- such JOT's have for the most part continued in the Agency. Those, however, who for one reason or another have not been handled as individuals who are expected to make discriminating decisions have resigned.

Nothing in this should be interpreted as a plea for special treatment, coddling, softness, or favoritism in dealing with the individual. Rather we are attempting to say that the JOT respects the supervisor who makes stringent requirements of him, sets high standards for the performance expected of him, requires hard work, and demands his best effort. We believe job satisfaction will result from such treatment and have told the candidate at the time of his recruitment that this was one of our principles.

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Appendix D

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